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The primary problem of this dissertation will be to 
explicate the realistic position of Orestes A. Brownson 
as this position is manifest throughout his writings, 
with particular emphasis on those fundamental philo-
sophical theories which form the basis of this same 
realistic outlook. More specifically~ an attempt will 
be made to analyze and assess the specific elements upon 
which Brownson ultimately grounds his particular type of 
realism. A realism which is metaphysically dualistic, 
and which from an epistemological point of view is 
grounded on an intuitionistic basis. 
The secondary problems will be: first, to attempt 
to elucidate and assess at least the chief considerations 
.in Brownson!s evaluation of one of the main trends of 
modern philosophy, as it manifests itself especially in 
the position of Descartes, Locke, and Kant. Specifically, 
this is a trend toward an epistemological idealism, which 
maintains in one form or another, that the idea or mental 
representation is the direct and immediate object of 
conscious awareness. This clarification and assessment 
will include, in particular,· an analysis of the extent 
to which Brownson in some respects accepts and in other 
respects rejects the Kantian epistemology. Secondly, 
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an attempt will be made to clarify and evaluate Brownson's 
claim that Aristotle and even St. Thomas are guilty, at 
times, of the method of "exclusive psychology", 
The method of approach in ·the earlier chapters will 
be via an analysis of Brownson's critique of the positions 
which he rejects. This method will be chosen because it 
would seem that Brownson's realistic position is initial-
ly best explicated through an attempt to indicate the 
fundamental reasons for his dissatisfaction with what he 
regards as the main trend which modern philosophy has 
taken, especially, from Descartes' time onward. While 
the initial approach might, in the sense indicated, be 
considered negative in form, Brownson's critical analysis 
of this area of modern philosophy suggests at least, as 
do most critical studies, what will be the general 
tenor of the more positive outlook of the critic. 
Brownson's positive outlook is particularly evident in 
his castigation, of what he regards, as the idealistic 
tendency of the respective positions which he rejects. 
His opposition to this tendency is, at times, so vigor-
ous that it is virtually impossible not to be~ome aware, 
even at the outset, of his clear-cut realistic bent of 
mind. 
3 
This initial method of approach is not meant to 
suggest that there can be found any article written by 
Brownson that is wholly negative and critical, in which 
in one form or another, he is not hinting rather strongly, 
at least in general terms, as to what will be his positive 
solution of the problem at issue. Hence, although never 
isolated or compartmentalized in Brownsonts own works, 
this separation of the negative and critical portion of 
his work from the more positive and constructive will not 
be arbitrary, Rather, this me.thod will be chosen, since, 
such a method appears more adequate for an elucidation 
of his own particular type of realism. 
After discussing the more negative and critical 
aspects of Brownson's philosophical position in the 
earlier chapters, we will in the later chapters consider 
the more positive and constructive aspects of his position, 
in particular, those fundamental tenets of his realistic 
outlook, upon which in a last analysis his specific type 
of realistic intuitionism must stand or fall. In the 
concluding chapter attention will be focussed on a con-
sideration which has at least been hinted at in the 
earlier chapters, a consideration which at the outset 
might seem to have little, if any, organic relation with 
this dissertation as a whole, namely, Brownson's outlook 
as to the relation of faith and reason in a philosopher 
who is also a Christian. How.ever, Brownson's convictions 
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in this regard have had, as we will attempt to demonstrat~ 
more of an influence on his fundamental philosophical 
outlook than perhaps any other single factor in his 
philosophical development. 
The primary source materials consulted have been 
Brownson's own writings collected and edited, by his son, 
1 Henry F. Brownson, and published in twenty volumes. 
Apart from Brownson's writings themselves, two works in 
particular, as indicated in the bibliography, namely, 
America's Foremost Philosoplier, 2 and Orestes Brownson's 
Approach to the Froblem of God3 have been of value. 
The former is, if not exclusively, nonetheless mainly 
devoted to a consideration of the pro's and con's of 
Brownson's ontologistic leanings, together with a rather 
lengthy account of his creationistic theory. The latter 
is, as the title would suggest, a consideration of 
Brownson's proof for the existence of God, and a critical 
analysis of the same, in the light of the principles of 
st. Thomas Aquinas. Moreover, both of these authors 
have made a somewhat detailed attempt to indicate and 
1 Orestes A. Brownson, Brownson's Works, ed. Henry F. 
Brownson (20 vols.; Detroit: Thorndike Nourse, 1882~ 
1887). Hereafter referred to as Works. 
2 Sidney A. Raemers, America's Foremost Philosopher 
(Washington, D.C.: St. Anselm's Priory !Tess, 1931). 
3 Bertin Farrell, Orestes Brownson's Approach to ~ 
·Problem of God (Washington, D.c. : The Catholic University 
of America ~ess, 1950}. 
assess the contribution of those philosophers whose 
positions had an influence on the development of 
Brownson's ontologistic and creationistic views. Our 
indebtedness to these two authors is, therefore, mainly 
along the lines of their presentation of Brownson's 
ontologistic and creationistic views, together with the 
research they have completed relative to the sources of 
the same views. This indebtedness in these respects will 
be duly acknowledged in the fifth chapter, which chapter 
will deal with the relation of these same views to 
Brownson's intuitionistic realism. 
5 . 
From the st~ndpoint of periodical literatu,re, there 
appears to be but one periodi.cal article which is particu-
larly relevant to the problem of this dissertation, 
namely, "The Minor Transcendentalists and German Philoso-
f 
phy", by Rene Wellek, in which article the author has 
devoted but a few pages to a rather concise although 
clear and well organized discussion of the influence of 
the German philosophers, particularly Kant, on Brownsonts 
philosophical position$1 With the ex9eption of the 
above mentioned works we have discovered nothing of 
significance, having any direct bearing on our specific 
problems herein. However, there has ·been a-considerable 
1 f Rene Wellek, "The Minor Transcendentalists-and German 
"Philosophy," New England Quarterly, XV (Decemb,er, 1942), 
652-680. 
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amount of general research done on Brownson's writings 
in one field or another, the fruits of which have appeared, 
for the most part, in various periodical articles through-
out the years since his death. 
These periodical articles have not, on the. whole, 
appeared in the more scholarly periodicals but rather in 
periodicals which hav.e been aimed at the general public. 
In consequence, these articles tend more toward a popular 
and superficial presentation rather than toward a more 
scholarly and learned presentation. Despite this general 
dirth of scholarly publications, it is to be hoped, that 
there will occur in the near future a more serious con-
sideration of Brownson's works, particularly, among 
philosophers. 
The approach to Brownson's works will not, in this 
study, be chronological. However, where it is deemed 
necessary, we will attempt to indicate at what point or 
points there would seem to be inconsistencies in his po-
sition through chronological references. Again, an at-
tempt will be made to indicate, from chronological refer-
ence points, changes of a developmental character, to the 
extent that Brownson in his later philosophical writings, 
seemed more capable of expounding and clarifying doctrines 
which were contained germinally in his earlier philo-
sophical works. Moreover, where it is deemed important 
we will attempt to indicate by chronological references 
his basic philosophical theories, which do not seem to 
have undergone any significant changes throughout his 
philosophical works. 
Finally, certain factors will be indicated at 
appropriate places in the body of this dissertation, 
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which would seem to be of particular significance toward 
an appreciation and evaluation of Brownson's philosophical 
outlook. The first factor is, that despite the almost 
constant flux of Brownsonts theological views prior to 
his acceptance of the Catholic Church in 1844, the same 
cannot be fairly ascribed to his philosophical views. 
His philosophical views were not, on the whole, subject 
to this same flux but remained fundamentally constant 
throughout his life. The second factor mentioned is the 
fact that Brownson spent roughly half his life among 
groups representing not only differing the.ological views 
but likewise to a considerable extent differing philo-
sophical views. This furnished for Brownson a vantage 
point which relatively few men have enjoyed. This is a 
vantage point which, ideally at least, might be con-
sidered conducive to a more equitable appreciation and 
evaluation of the pro's .and con's of these differing 
philosophical outlooks. 
CHAPTER I 
THE FUNCTION OF COMMON SENSE AND LOGIC IN BROWNSON'S 
PHILOSOPHY 
The primary purpose of this chapter is to explicate 
the meaning which Brownson attaches to the term common 
sense, and also his views of the relation of common sense, 
as he understands the term, to philosophy; likewise, to 
elucidate Brownson's views relative to the function of 
philosophy in justifying, to the extent possible, the 
views of common sense. It is moreover within the scope 
of this chapter to discuss Brownson's view of the part 
which Logic should play in any philosophy which may be 
justly described as a realistic philosophy, and to 
suggest the reasons why he regards Aristotle's Logic, on 
its material side, as having failed to culminate in a 
valid realism. 
The term common sense may, and has as a matter of 
fact, borne a variety of different meaningse In a 
highly technical sense, it may refer, as in Aristotle's 
psychology to that faculty whereby the common sensibles 
are perceived. Or, "the term common sense may be applied 
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to what Hobbes calls the cognitive faculty, or faculty 
of knowing, which is common to all human beings.nl 
From still another standpoint it might be considered as: 
That power of the mind which, by a kind 
of instinct or a short process of 
reasoning perceives truth, the relation 
of things, cause and effect, etc., and 
hence enables the possessor to discern 
what is right, useful, or proper and 
adopt the best means to accomplish his 
purpose. This definition is wonderfully 
correct. That kind of instinct, in fact, 
which the Scotch philosophers wrongly 
considered as blind is really nothing less 
than a short process of reasoning, which 
carries evidence within itself.2 
This last view regards .common sense as a process of 
reasoning which extends to every conclusion that is 
implicit but evident. 
The term "common sense" might again be used to desig-
nate that school of Philosophy founded by Thomas Reid 
(1710-1796) whose Epistemological approach was such that 
it tended to validate the realistic outlook of the 
ordinary man. The view of common sense taken by 
Brownson would seem to approximate more closely the view 
of Reid and the Scottish School generally, namely as 
designating, "the common or universal beliefs of mankind, 
1 Works, I, p. 5. 
9 
2 
•F. Louagets Philosophy," Catholic World, ~X (May, 1874), 
p. 239. 
the single spontaneous beliefs of Humanity.nl 
The general outlook of Brownson's philosophical 
position would, at this point, seem to indicate a 
fundamental agreement with Reid 1 s position, to the extent 
that Brownson interprets Reid as maintaining, 
that all reasoning must proceed from 
principles which reasoning does not 
furnish and cannot establish. These 
principles are the principles of common 
sense, the common notions or primitive 
beliefs of mankind.2 
Nonetheless, Brownson does not believe that Reid has been 
successful in his attempt to harmonize philosophy and 
common sense. In reference to Reid's position, relative 
to this consideration he declares that while Reid's 
philosophy is in the main practically 
sound, as far as it goes, ••• it does not 
go far enough to place metaphysical 
speculation, as was his wish, in complete 
harmony with common sense; for he did not 
scientifically vindicate what he calls 
common sense as the test or criterion 
of philosophical truth.3 
The tendency of .the professional philosopher is, for 
the most part, to view w~th a.combination of disdain and 
paternal condescension the common convictions of mankind. 
1 Works, I, p. 6. 
2 
386. Works, I, p. 
J Works, I, p. 386 .. 
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The reasons for this view are not difficult to ascertain. 
They are to be found primarily, if not exclusively, in the 
fact that spontaneous convictions are after all unexamined 
convictions and for this reason are not worthy of absolute 
trust and cannot attain the stature of philosophic truths, 
unless vindicated before the tribunal of reflective reason. 
Moreover, the philosopher is not unaware of the increasing 
number of such common convictions that have been overthrown 
with the advance of scientific knowledge. 
While virtually all philosophers reject, on principle, 
the spontaneous convictions of mankind as invalid, insofar 
as they are unexamined convictions, this is not to imply 
that they necessarily reject the content of these 
spontaneous convictions. If the content of these 
spontaneous certitudes is capable of withstanding the 
scrutiny of reflective reason, it will be accepted as 
philosophically valid. The view of most philosophers is 
no naive realism, either in the sense of limiting reality 
to its phenomenal manifestations and failing to realize 
that reality is deeper and richer than the superficial 
view taken by common sense, or in failing to discern, as 
will be indicated in a later chapter, that there may well 
be certain pre-empiriqal elements that are present in all 
knowledge and without which knowledge would be impossible. 
Even here, however, as we shall see, according to 
11 
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Brownson's views these pre-empirical elements are objective. 
In short, they are not creations of mind or categories of 
thought in any Kantian sense. 
It should be made clear, at this point, that it is 
not Brownson's intention to water-down philosophy to 
common sense. Rather: "Bring the masses up, if you will, 
enable them to comprehend the highest philosophy, if you 
can; but never talk of bringing philosophy down to vulgar 
capacities.n1 Moreover: 
We have no patience with men who talk 
of letting themselves down. We would 
not bring the great gods down to earth, 
even if we could but we would raise 
men to heaven, and enable them to hold 
fellowship with the Divinity. Philosophy 
is not, and never was, too high; but the 
people are, and ever have been, too low. 2 
Perhaps, on the other hand, not all men have the capacity 
for philosophic reflection, for relative to these common 




The masses, who see nothing mysterious 
in these truths and who have never thought 
of questioning them, do not wish to have 
them explained or verified. The explanation 
and verification, which is philosophy, are 
unintelligible to them.3 
I, p. 12. 
I, p. 12. 
I, pp. 14-15. 
Although it is by no means the exclusive concern of 
philosophy to validate, if possible, the objectivity of 
the. views of common sense, this is at least one of its 
functions. For 
we do not seek philosophy for the sake 
of instructing those masses; we do not 
need it, that we may communicate it to 
them; we merely desire to know whether 
their beliefs be well founded, whether 
relying, as they do, on common sense, 
following, as they do, the -teachings 
of the spontaneous reason, they are safe 
or not. Shall we pity or reverence 
them? War against them or become their 
allies? This is the problem. Philosophy 
is merely the solution we arrive at by 
reflection .. l 
In what does reflection consist? In explicating, 
clarifying or deducing the data contained implicitly 
in the subject matter of this reflective process. From 
what source is the truth of the subject matter to be 
reflected upon, made evident? IToximately it may be a 
conclusion of some further reasoning process, but 
ultimately its truth must rest on some basic intuition 
or intuitions. Now, if the basic intuion or intuitions 
which furnish the starting point of_knowledge are not 
objectively valid, then, as Brownson sees it, it is 
difficult, nay impossible, to determine what, if any, 
valid cognition can be ascertained as a result of an 
explication of these intuitions. This particular point 
1 . Works, I, p. 17. 
==~=~=~~~------------ --- -- ----- --- -· -------- ---.- ------------------ -------------------~~= 
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will be further developed when Brownsonts conception of 
logic 'is discussed. 
· Thus, although the man of common sense and the 
philosopher do hold certain truths in common, nonetheless 
philosophy is not common sense nor is common sense phi-
losophy. Since, even at this level the philosopher has 
arrived at his acceptance of these intuitive truths by 
way of reflective reason, whereas the man of common sense 
accepts them spontaneously. As Brownson himself asserts: 
Fhilosophy and common sense are not 
opposed to one another. There is no 
discrepancy between them. Common sense 
furnishes the Philosopher all his 
knowledge, all the data from which he 
reasons ••• Tb.e philosopher believes 
precisely the same things, as the common 
sense man, but he knows what he believes, 
and can tell wherefore he believes. The 
common sense man believes but does not 
comprehend; the philosopher comprehends, 
and therefore believes.l 
Therefore, relative to these common beliefs of mankind, 
14 
"Philosophy is not a contradiction of these beliefs, a 
substitution of something else for them, Qut an explanation 
and verification of them. 2 
It is at this point that we are able to discern the 
realistic tendency in Brownson's epistemological approach, 
which tendency pervades all his philosophical reflection. 
Although recognizing the superficial view of the man of 
1 Works, I, p. 6. 
2 Works, I, p. 6. 
common sense as distinct from the penetrating analysis 
of the philosopher, it is nonetheless his fundamental 
conviction that on the whole the spontaneous convictions 
15 
of mankind are true, if only, partial and superficial views 
of reality. It becomes the function of philosophy not 
only to penetrate to new and deeper dimensions of reality 
than are disclosed by these superficial views of reality, 
but likewise to vindicate by reflective reason, wherever 
possible, the common sense convictions of mankind. In 
short, its function is to convert spontaneous convictions 
into philosophic convictions. The realism in this view 
is apparen'!i to the extent that it tends to view the human 
mind as having the capacity to arrive at a grasp of things 
as they are in themselves. Although this grasp is super-
ficial, it is true as far as it goes. The mind is in 
conformity with reality, even if, at the level of the 
non•philosophic mind it be unwilling or unable to assign 
the explicit:-motives for these spontaneous convictions. 
This concern with the viewpoint of common sense and 
his consequent belief that it is one of the functions of 
philosophy to vindicate the views of common sense, 
appears with considerable frequency throughout Brownson's 
works. This will be particularly evident, in his analysis 
of thought into subject, objectt and relation. Such an 
analysis, he believes "stripped philosophy of its mystery, 
divested it of its endless abstractions and vain 
subtilties, and harmonized it with the common-sense of 
mankind."1 
Viewed from a slightly different perspective, 
Brownson regards the views of common sense as serving 
the function of a negative guide for the philosopher. 
For, in reference to certain schools of philosophy he 
states: 
None of these philosophers and schools 
are practically sceptical, and we call 
them so only in regard to the tendency 
or result of their. speculative systems. 
There is a common sense which directs, 
to a certain extent, most men in their 
practical judgments, and prevents them 
from running as wild in practice as in 
speculation.2 
This view of common sense as having a salutary effect to 
the extent that it serves as a negative guide, has ac-
cording to Brownson a parallel in an analogous way among 
Catholics, where; "speculation is held in check by 
theology, and philosophers are obliged to assert, whether 
logically or not, a sound ontology.") 
So strongly does Brownson defend the spontaneous 
reason of mankind that it leads him to reject, even at 
1 Works, V, p. 128. 
2 Works, I, p. 40J. 




the level of political theory, a fundamental tenet of 
Locke's philosophic position as being inconsistent with· 
a true democracy. In reference to an article in ~ 
Christian Examiner of November, 1837 on Locke and the 
Transcendentalists, he affirms: 
The educated, the scientific are prone 
to look upon ~he masses as possessing 
no ideas, as having no knowledge but 
that which they obtain from human 
teachers. This is peculiarly the case 
with Locke and his followers. According 
to them, the child receives no patrimony 
from his father; he is born into the 
world naked and destitute in soul as 
well as in body, and with no innate 
power to weave himself a garment. His 
mind is a tabula rasa, on which others 
indeed may write what they will, but 
upon which he himself can write nothing, 
save the summing up of what others have 
written thereon. Evil as well as good, 
falsehood as well as truth, may be 
written thereon. It depends wholly on 
the external circumstances, the quality 
of the masters secured, whether the 
mind's blank sheets shall be written 
over with truth or falsehood.l 




He would not, we presume, think of 
learning from them, or of verifying 
their beliefs; but merely of teaching 
them what they ought to believe. We 
bring not this as a charge against 
him. It speaks well for his goodness 
of heart, and proves him to be as 
good a democrat as a follower of Locke 
consistently can be.2 
Works, I, p. 15o 
Works, I, p. 16. 
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As might be anticipated in the light of Brownson's 
view of common sense, his democratic instincts recoil at 
such a conclusion. We should rather reverence than pity 
the masses for the truth they possess, for, 
these truths are not the peculiar 
possessions of the philosopher. They 
are the truths of the universal reason, 
and are the property alike of all men. 
They are taught to all men by the 
spontaneous reason1 which is the same in kind in every man. . . 
This attack on Locke and his followers is of particular 
interest by virtue of the fact that Locke has rather gener-
ally been regarded as one of the defenders of political 
democracy, primarily, in v~rtue of his Two Treatises on 
Government, published in 1689. 
In a final analysis,· relativ-e to these views of 
common sense, which views he specifies and defends in 
later articles, Brownson has this to say: 
1 
We cannot now undertake to prove that 
our solution is the true one; but the 
reflective reason has with us legitimated 
the teachings of the spontaneous reason, 
legitimated common sense, assured·us that 
it is the voice of the spontaneous reason, 
and that the spontaneous reason is the 
voice of God. True and holy for us then 
are the instincts of the masses; true 
and holy for us then are the universal 
beliefs of mankind.2 
Works, I, p. 14. 
2 Works, I, p. 17. 
Why Brownson so respected the common beliefs of 
mankind is not easy to determine. However, one author in 
an article contrasting the general viewpoints of Brownson 
and Emerson, has arrived at an explanation which seems 
quite plausible. In reference to Brownsonts position he 
states: 
Although the act of knowledge is 
realized in the individual, yet the 
individual mind neither constitutes 
its object nor apprehends it in virtue 
of a radical identity. Its objeot is 
the common world, which it shares with 
other minds. From this it appears 
clear to Brownson that the proper 
object of the mind is not addressed 
to the individual mind but to the 
intelligent faculty of the human 
nature in which the individual 
particupates; concretely, to humanity. 
The testimony of universal assent, 
consequently, gains precedence in his 
mind over individual experience.l 
If there is one thing for ~hich Brownson is noted 
among students of his works, it is for his intense 
interest and ability in logic. Not only his friends but 
his critics as well give ample testimony to the fact that 
"controversy was meat and drink to him; logic, not sweet 
reasonableness, was his weapon.n2 Also note the 
1 A. Robert Caponigri, "Brownson and Emerson: Nature 
and History," New England Quarterly, XVIII (September, 
1945), pp. 380-381. 
2 . ( Alvan s. Ryan (ed.), The Brownson Reader New York: 
F.J. Kenedy & Sons, 1955), p. 2. 
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following in this regard: 
I firmly believe that America is not 
proud enough of her Brownson. He is the 
keenest critic of the nineteenth century, 
an indomitable logician, a disinterested 
lover of the truth, more than a philosopher, 
a sage, as sharp as Aristotle, as lofty as 
Plato, the real Newman of America.l 
No man in America of the day handled the 
instrument of reason with more proficiency, 
or believed in it with more conviction; 
yet few men had careers less characterized 
by the stability supposed to come from 
reason. But his faith in logic rarely 
faltered.2 
His forte, however, or at least his 
greatest delight was logic and the 
critical analysis of ideas. Few men 
have been more adept than he in 
following an argument or a train of 
thought to its logical conclusion or 
in detecting and exposing the 
fallacies.in the popular opinions of 
the day. It was because of this love 
of logic and of clear, straight 
thinking that Hecker pronounced him 
essentially a man of the thirteenth 
century and atl anomaly among the 
scholars and divines of the modern 
age.3 
He is always seeking the truth, forever 
testing the grounds of his position, 
continually reviewing the foundations 
of his faith, or lack of it, and 
instantly rejecting, with courage, 
energy, and disinterestedness, whatever 
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1 D. J. Scannell O'Neill. (ed.), Watchwords from Dr. 
Brownson (Techney: Society of the Divine Work, 1910},p.8. 
2 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Orestes A. Brownson; A 
Pilgrim's Progress, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 
1939) pp. 291-292. 
3 Edward T. Harrington, Robert E. Lord, John E. Sexton, 
History of the Archdiocese of Boston (New York: 
Sheed & Ward, 1944), Vol. II, p. 372. 
does not stand the impact of the 
rigorous natural logic and the 
innate force of his mind.l 
21 
It is to be noted, however, that these encomiums have 
reference to Brownson's ability to draw from premises 
their logical conclusions; that is to say on logic 
considered on its formal side. However, Brownson himself 
is primarily interested in logic on its material side, 
that is, with the truth of the premises and likewise of 
the conclusion, which is consequent upon them. Brownson 
even goes so far as to declare that: 
Indeed, logic is the. only part of 
philosophy we set much store by, and if we 
enter into the discussion of the higher 
metaphysical problems, it is chiefly for 
the sake of logic because we cannot 
otherwise make sure of a logic which 2 conforms to the real order of things. 
Why this interest in logic? Fundamentally, it 
would seem, because of his intensely realistic outlook 
which manifests itself, at this point, in a tendency to 
regard logic, if not exclusively, yet primarily on its 
material rather than on its formal side. This is 
particularly evident in the distinction which he makes 
between logic as an art and as a science. By logic 
considered as an art he understands, 
1 
the intellectual application of 
principles, and is determined, not 
Thomas F. Coakley, ttOrestes A. Brownson,tt America, 
XV (September 16, 1916), P• 549. 
2 Works I, p. 280. 
by the human mind itself', but by the. 
real or intelligible order which 
exists and operates independently 
of the human mind. Its office is not 
to discover principles, but to apply 
them; not to invent truth but to 
demonstrate it.l 
On the other hand what of' the principles which logic ~s 
an art assumes or presupposes? This is a problem since, 
"no man can reason without data, principles, or what we 





The primum logicum is attainable 
neither deductively nor inductively; 
for neither deduction nor induction 
can proceed without a datum, something 
known, as its principium, or point of 
departure. Now without determining 
this, without fixing the first principles, 
which are neither subjective reason no~ 
its processes or modes of activity, we 
have no basis for our logic, and can 
have no logical science. We may, indeed, 
have logic as an art, but not as a science. 
This principle, or this Primum, that which 
logic presupposes, is the only point in 
our logical treatises that is defective, 
or inaccurately treated. There was no 
need of a new work on logic as an art, for 
to logic as an art nothing could be added, 
and nothing was needed to be added to it 
as practised in the schools. As an art it 
was perfected by the ancients. The defect 
is in logic as a science, and precisely 
in regard to its principle or foundation.3 
XIV, p. 152. 
I, p. 374. 
I, p. 374. 
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His interest is not with logic considered precisely 
as a sort of mental gymnastic, whereby we ultimately 
identity or diversify concepts, but rather with a logic 
that contor.ms to the real order of things. 
Otherwise: 
Your science is merely the science of 
conceptions, a science of abstractions, 
and whether it correspond or not to 
things as they really exist, independent 
ot our conceptions, or our subjective 
ideas, we, with the logic of the schools 
can never demonstrate or prove.l 
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Herein is implied, if not explicitly stated a clear-cut 
realistic view, to the extent that the mind has the 
capacity to know reality as it is in itself. Otherwise, 
why this condemnation of a logic which is merely a 
science of conceptions, it after all, the mind in knowing 
is limited to a mere awareness of its own conceptions? 
It is under the precise formality of material logic 
that Brownson accuses Aristotelian Logic, as a science 
of abstractions, 
1 
tor it takes its premises from the 
abstract not the concrete, and deals 
with conceptions instead of intuitions 
and therefore things existing a parte 
rei. A false view of reason is given 
rn-the outset, which renders all real 
science inexplicable, if not impossible.2 
Works, I, p. 498. 
2 Works, I, p. 498. 
The basic reason for this failure of Aristotelian Logic, 
as Brownson sees it, is that it places 
a great gulf between the mundus logicus 
and the mundus physious, or real world, 
which no art, or skill, or labor, can 
bridge over. All our ideas, and therefore 
all our science, are representative, 
vicarious, not real.l 
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It is the positing of a medium, the idea, as re-presentative 
and not as presentative, that is the difficulty to be over-
come if the mind is to escape the snare of the conceptual-
istic ou~look of such a logic. Since, if the idea is re-
presentative, it is neither the reality itself nor can 
the mind be said to have an immediate intuition of the 
real. If such is the case, how is the mind to bridge the 
gap; to know of its own conformity to reality in its 
conceptions? How know that this re-presentation is free 
of distortion, that it has objective value? In terms of 
such a logic this cannot be known, since Aristotle and his 
followers start "in the reflective reason, and of course, 
give us only an abstract universe, which is simply no 
universe at all."2 In consequence, there is "no _principium 
in the real world from which to set out.n3 
1 Works, I, p. 498. 
2 Works, I, 514. p. 
3 Works, I, p. 514. 
Was Brownson justified in his interpretation and 
criticism of Aristotle's position, at this point? This 
is a question-which· will be deferred until a later 
chapter wherein we will discuss in more detail Brownsonts 
criticism of Aristotle's material logic and his attack 
on the modified Aristotelianism of St. Thomas. 
How escape from this ~undus logicusn? This escape 
can only be accplhplished by way o'f a recognition of the 
fact that: 
All principles are intuitive, given 
intuitively, as the condition a priori 
of the existence and activity of the 
mind, and our knowledge never extends 
beyond what is embraced in our intuitions. 
Judgments without intuitions are blind, 
and of no value; conceptions where there 
is no object intuitively apprehended, 
are empty, mere forms of thought, in 
which nothing existing a parte rei is 
thought.l 
It is this neglect, on the part of many philosophers, to 
admit that principles are given and not acquired, that 
serves as a chronic irritant to Brownson's mindq 
1 
2 
Every philosopher knows that principles 
are given, not acquired, because the 
mind cannot operate without them, and 
yet it is rare to find one who does not 
virtually deny it the moment he begins 
to philosophize, or to construct his 
system of the universe.2 
Works, I, p. 515. 
Works, I, pp. 514-515. 
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While the above quotation might seem to manifest a 
Platonic influence, this would hardly seem to be the 
case, since, as will be indicated in another context, 
Brownson explicitly rejects Plato's theory as to the 
manner in which the mind grasps ideas. 
If principles are given, 
why then start with a mental creation, 
which can be only a pure conception or 
abstraction, and attempt to give the 
lie to the axiom, Ex nihilo nihil fit? 
Why doom ourselves, as Pharaoh doomed 
the children of Israel, to .make brick 
without straw, when straw is abundant 
and within our reach?l · 
Is this position of Brownson a naive realism or 
what might better be described as an identification of 
philosophy and common sense? The prima facie evidence 
might seem to support this view. However, this would 
' hardly seem to be the case if we consider the previous 
distinctions which he has drawn between philosophy and 
common sense. Certainly this acceptance of principles 
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as given and not acquired, might be identified with common 
sense to the extent that they are accepted unreflectively 
by the man on the street. Nevertheless this does not 
preclude the philosopher, gua philosopher, from recognizing 
as a result of reflection, that without these principles 
as given the mind is unable to operate. That is to say 
1 Works, I, P• 515. 
that they furnish the starting point, without which 
knowledge is impossible and reality unintelligible. This 
would seem to be correct interpretation of Brownson's 
position when viewed in the light of his distinction 
between philosophy and common sense, as well as his 
discussion of the relation of principles and method, 
which is to follow in a later chapter. 
If one is to obtain the real one must not begin with 
reflection, since as the very word indicates to reflect 
is as it were to bend back upon, to re-examine what has 
been given directly or immediately in terms of some sort 
of intuition. Otherwise, there would be nothing to re-
flect upon. That this is Brownson's outlook may be • 
substantiated by his defense, of a portion at least, of 
a work by Maret published in Paris in 1856 and entitled; 
' Philosophie et Religion. Dignite de la Raison humaine 
' t f 
et Necessite de la Revelation Divine. He finds great 
merit in the work because of its 
adQpting and defending the intuitive 
method, which requares us to treat the 
dialectic and syllogistic methods as 
secondary, or as simply two forms of 
reasoning, operating on intuitive data 
and never transcending them.l 
Relative to deduction: 
T.he syllogism, or methoA of deduction, 
1 Works, I, pp. 440-441. 
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is simply analysis, and can give only 
the contents of the subject analyzed • 
••• It distinguishes, clears up, or 
draws forth the matter contained in 
them, and renders explicit what before 
was implicit, but it can do nothing 
more.l 
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Nor is induction of any more value in this respect, for, 
it cannot ascend to or introduce to the 
mind a universal not given intuitively 
along with the particulars. Both 
processes are legitimate, are necessary 
in this place; but both are secondary, 
both are in the reflective order, and 
dependent on intuition without or 
beyond which neither o-f them can operate. 2 
Brownson believes that it is precisely the failure of the 
schoolmen·, followers of the peripatetics, to perceive 
that the principles of reality which are, in Brownson's 
view, the principle of.any sound logic, must be intuitively 
grounded that has led to the inability of their systems of 
philosophy to culminate in,,a valid realism. 
~escinding from the discussion of material logic, 
it is to be noted that despite the pra_ise that has been 
heaped upon Brownson for his application of the principles 
of formal logic, still this praise was by no means unanimous. 
He was frequently charged with being a logic-chopper. Even 
Lowell found his method an apt subject for satire in one 
of his poems. 
l 
2 
The worst of it is, that his logicts so 
strong, 
Works, I, p. 441. 
Works, I, p. 441. 
That of two sides he commonly chooses the 
wrong; 
If there is only one, why he'll split it 
in two, -
And first pummel this half, then that, 
black and blue. 
That white's white needs no proof, but it 
takes a deep fellow 
To prove i 1t jet-black, and that jet black is yellow. 
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So critical are his opponents of this apparently 
exclusive method of approach, that he feels called upon to 
indicate his recognition of the fact that man is not merely 
a logic machin.e. For, we find the assertion that: 
We. are ourselves supposed to have no 
heart,and are regarded as a mere logic-
grinder, logic-chopper, or dialectic 
gladiator; and therefore our inability to 
accept M. Gratry's doctrine will most 
likely be ascribed to our own psycho-
logical defects. But be this as it may, 
we can understand very well that man is 
not all dry intellect. We can imagine 
that he has a heart, and that this heart 
craves beatitude, - nay, that its deepest 
want is to love, and that all love seeks 
to lose itself in the beloved.2 
It may be assumed that because logic was his method, it 
was regarded by Brownson as the only legitimate method of 
approach. Yet, we find an increasing dissatisfaction 
with this method, if not from th.e standpoint of being 
legitimate in itself as a method toward the solution of 
1 James R. Lowell, A Fable for Critics {New York: 
G. P. Putnam, 1848), p. 34 .. 
2 Works, I, p. 339· 
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philosophic problems, nonetheless of little consequence 
in the concrete, as failing to convince the mind he was 
attempting to reach. This is true at least in Brownsonts 
approach in Apologetics, as indicated by a statement in 
a letter to Fr. Hewit in 1856, wherein he declares: ~y 
own method, I believe, is the worst of all,. that of 
logic.1 Brownson does not stand alone in this evaluation 
of his approach through logic. Schlesinger states in 
-·--.-,-.,.~,,._.-.~ ,.. .... • \5>'· • 
this regard that he "apotheosized logic and fell victim to 
its disastrous simplicityo For all its power his reasoning 
commanded respect rather than assent.n2 
Summary 
While distinguishing between common sense as the 
fruit of the spontaneous reason and philosophy as the 
fruit of the reflective reason, nonetheless, it is 
Brownson's conviction that the views of common sense have 
strong presumptive evidence in their favor. Hence, in 
Brownson's view, it is at least one of the duties of the 
philosopher to attempt to validate these same spontaneous 
1 
Henry F. Brownson, Orestes A. Brownson's Latter Life 
(Detroit: H.F- Brownson, 1900), p. 60. 
2 Schlesinger, p. 291. 
Q~nvictions to the extent possible, since theyare the 
truths of universal reason whioh is the same in kind in 
all men. 
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Although Brownson regards logic on its formal side 
as already perfected, he nevertheless maintains that 
there is a defect in material logic relative to its 
principles or foundation. It is under this precise 
formality that he attacks Aristotle's logic, as starting 
in the order of reflection, and in consequence of giving 
us merely a science of conceptions rather than a science 
of things existing a parte rei. If then one is to attain 
the real, one must begin not with reflection but rather 
with intuition by recognizing that principles are given 
not acquired, since the mind cannot operate without them, 
nor even engage in the search for them, unless it is 
already in possession of them. This is to say, that 
without these principles as given all knowledge is 
impossible and all reality unintelligible. 
...... -.· -. ·. . -
CHAPTER II 
BROWNSON'S EVALUATION OF SENSISM AND PSYCHOLOGISM AS 
METHODS OF APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHICAL FROBLEMS 
The preceding chapter has dealt with what might be 
termed, Brownsonts logical intuitionism, to the extent 
that Brownson regards the principles upon which logic 
rests, as in some sense intuitively given and not 
acquired. However, it is to be noted, as will be 
indicated, that while logically prior they are not 
psychologically prioro A more positive view of Brownson's 
psychological intuitionism, both in terms of its meaning 
and ground, will be discussed in detail in chapters four 
and fiveQ 
Granting Brownson's logical intuitionism our inquiry 
is now directed toward whether or not, in Brownson's view, 
the objectivity of the object given in thought can be 
established in terms of either the psychological or 
sensistic methods of approach. What precise meaning 
Brownson attaches to these terms will be indicated in the 
explication of his dissatisfaction with both of these 
methods. In any event, it is Brownson's view that neither 
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:;.. : ·~·· .......... ~· 
of these methods, as he understands them, are capable of 
establishing the objectivity of the object given in 
thought. The primary function of this chapter will then 
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be to clarity Brownson's fundamental reasons for rejecting, 
what he terms, the method of "exclusive psychology" and 
also the sensistic method of approach to philosophical 
problems; likewise, to suggest the lines along which 
Brownson will attempt to· escape the subjectivistic con-
clusions to which he regards both of these methods to 
logically lead. To what extent, if any, are the approaches 
of the philosopher and the psychologist similar ln relation 
to their respective problems? According to Brownson's view 
there is a similarity to the extent that 
both depend alike on intuitions for the 
intelligible, and both do and must work 
with and on materials supplied by them, 
and have and can have no materials not 
so supplied.l 
Here we find a restatement of his fundamental theory that 
all knowledge or whatever sort must, if it is to be 
fruitful, begin with intuitions. This being the case, 
wherein do the philosopher and the psychologist differ? 
Brownson contends that they differ to the extent that, 
the philosopher proceeds to construct 
his philosophy ontologically, as we 
say, that is, by contemplation of the 
1 Works, I p 235 , . . 
being, reality, or·objects revealed and 
self-affirmed in the intuitions; while 
the psychologue proceeds to construct 
philosophy psychologically, that is, by 
reflection on the intuitions themselves, 
taken as mere psychological facts or 
phenomena .. l: 
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Whether or not this is a valid.statement of the similarity 
and difference may be disputed, but at any event this is 
Brownson's position.. It is the viewpoint from which he 
will proceed to criticize any exclusively psychological 
approach to philosophical problems. 
The psychological approach is to some extent valid, 
and even necessary. For where else can we begin but from 
consciousness? To know is to be aware, and strictly 
speaking we can only be said to know something to the 
extent that we are in some manner conscious of it. Conse-
quently, "The error of the psychological method is not 
that it asserts the necessity of beginning our philoso-
phizing with the analysis of thought.n2 Again, in reference 
to Cousin's method he asserts: 
1 
He professed to attain to ontology from 
the phenomena of consciousness, or the 
facts revealed to consciousness; but he 
labors long and hard, as does every 
psychologist who admits ontology at all, 
to show, by a careful analysis and 
classification of these phenomena or 
facts, that there are among them some, 
Works, I, p. 235. 
2 Works, II, P• 322. 
at least, which are not derived from 
the soul itself, which do not depend 
on it, and do actually extend beyond 
the region of psychology, and lead at 
once into the ontological order. In 
other words, he claims to find in his 
psychological observations and analysis 
real ontological facts. It is from 
these, not from purely psychological 
phenomena, that he professes to rise 
to ontology. So understood, what is 
called the psychological method is 
strictly defensible. Every philosopher 
does and must begin by the analysis of 
thought, that is, in the language of 
Cousin, the fact of consciousne~s, and 
there is no other way possible. 
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It would seem evident in the light of the preceding 
quotation, that Brownson champions the psychological 
method in the sense he has indicated. Nevertheless, he 
has serious misgivings about this approach in any less 
restricted sense. This reluctance to accept the psycho-
logical method in any less restricted sen~e, is primarily 
due to Brownson's conviction that 
the psychologists proceed immediately 
from the analysis of thought to the 
analysis of the subject, that is, of 
the soul, and give us simply the. 
philosophy, as it may be called, of 
the Human Understanding, as do Locke 
and Hume; of the active powers of the 
soul as do Reid and Stewart; or of 
the Human Intellect as ~oes Dr. Forter, 
president of Yale College. This at 
best can give us, except by an 
inconsequence, ·only a science of 
abstractions, or the subjective forms 
of thought without any objective 
reality, or barely the Wissenschaftslehr, 
or the science of knowing, of Fichte, 
1 Works, II, pp. 310-311. 
the science of the instrument and 
method of science, not science itself, 
the science of empty forms, not the 
science of things.l 
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In terms of the psychological method how are we to 
attain the real, the extra-mental, the objective'? According 
to Brownson, any escape from the subjective is logically 
impossible in terms of such an exclusive met~od. The error 
of the psychological method, as he sees it, is 
in proceeding to study the facts of 
the human soul, as if man were an 
isolated existence,· and the only 
thing existing; and after having 
observed and classified these facts, 
either stopping with them, as does 
Sir William Hamilton, or proceeding 
by way of induction, as most psy-
chologists do, to the conclusion of 
ontological principles .;..· an induction 
which both Sir William Hamilton and 
Schelling have proved, in their criti-
cisms of Cousin's method, is invalid, 
because no induction is valid that 
concludes beyond the facts or particu-
lars from which it is made. The facts 
being all psychological, nothing not 
psychological can be concluded from 
them.2 . 
How is one to bridge the gap between the subjective 
and the objective'? In terms of the exclusively psycho-
logical method, there is no bridge of sufficient logical 
strength to bear the weight of this passage. 
1 
Ideas may be taken as the intelligible 
object itself, or as the mental 
Works, II, p. 46. 
2 Works, II, p. 322. · 
apprehension of it, either as the 
ontological reality, or as the 
psychological fact. If as the 
psychological fact, it is subjective; 
and then how prove or ascertain that 
there is an objective reality that 
corresponds to it, or that in appre-
hension any thing objective is 
apprehended? There is no logic by 
which the objective can be concluded 
from the subjective, as the interminable 
and always unsatisfactory discussions 
of psychologists on the question of 
certainty, or the validity of our sub-jective ideas or concepts amply prove. 
There is no bridge over which the mind 
can pass from the subjective to the 
objective.l 
It is this same type of approach that vitiates 
Descartes' philosophy; this exclusively subjective 
approach that leads to the Cartesian failure. 
Given our own personal existence 
alone as the principle or first 
truth, it follows that, at least 
in science, we are sufficient for 
ourselves. Then nothing distinguish-
able from ourselves is necessary to our 
thought, and there is no need of going 
out of ourselves to think. How, then, 
conclude that what in thought seems 
to be object is really any thing dis~ 
tinguishable from ourselves?2· 
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The subsequent failure of modern philosophical speculation 
has, according to Brownson, been due primarily to the fact 
that most modern philosophers have been 
misled by Descartes, who converted 
1 Works, II, p. 450. 
2 Works, II, p. 365. 
philosophy from a science of principles 
into a science of method, - from the 
science of human and divine things in 
the natural and intelligible order, 
into the science of knowing. They have 
been thus led to the investigation of 
conceptions instead of things, the 
object thought in the respect that 
it is the correlative of subject, 
instead of contemplating it in the 
respect that it is thing, and exists 
independent.of the thinking subject.l 
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Relative to this same consideration, Schlesinger interprets 
·Brownson, as believing that by following Descartes, 
Hume and Kant created problems of 
cognition which never should have 
been raised; and Reid, Hamilton, 
Cousin and Rosmini were wasting 
themselves in hunting answers for 
nonexistent questions. Philosophy 
was drowning in subjectivity.2 
Considered from an historical viewpoint, Brownson 
believes that the evils of· a philosophical system are 
best manifested through a study of its historical de-
velopment. 'Relative to this consideration he asserts: 
No philosopher is ever able to develop 
_his whole system and present it in all 
its parts or foresee all its logical 
consequences. It is only time that 
can do this, and the vices of a method 
or a system can be collected fully 
only from its historical developments.3 
1 Works, I, p. 404. 
2 Works, II, p. 372. 
3 Works, II, P• 372. 
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What has as a matter of fact been the historical evolution 
of the Cartesian method? If we can rely on Brownsonts 
historical analysis, what has actually occurred is that 
the disciples of Descartes~ who in 
France started with his psychological 
principle, ended in the pure sensism, 
or sensation transformed, of Condillac, 
and those who in ~ermany started with the 
same-principle ended in the absolute 
egoism of Fichte, who completed the 
subjectivism of Kant, and reached the 
point where egoism and pant~eism become 
identical.l · 
'Prescinding from what· has. as a matter of fact been 
the actual historical evolution of the exclusively psycholo-
gical method of approach in philosophy, what are the 
conclusions to which such a method logically leads? It 
would seem that for Brownson, there is virtually an 
identity between what has.as a matter of fact actually 
occurred and what ought logically to occur. For: 
Exclusive psychology, as has been 
~hown over and over again, can give 
U$ only the subj ecti visqi. of Kant·, or 
the egoism of Fichte, resulting 
necessarily in the nihilism, or 
identi~y of being and not being of 
Hegel. · 
In brief, whoever starts with "the soul or subject as his 
primum, as does Descartes, inevitably falls, if logical, 
into egoism, scepticism, nihilism, as has been proved 
1 Works, II, p. 372. 
2 Works, II, p. 365 • 
.. ·- ---·--·· -· -- --·---~------- ------·-·-... -.----
over and over in the Review."1 
If there is no logical escape from subjectivism in 
terms of the psychological method, how account for the 
fact that many philosophers have claimed to attain the 
extra-mental? This can be accounted for by the fact that 
many philosophers have surreptitiously assumed what the 
logic of their method does not permit, and in consequence 
have appeared to escape subjectivism. As Brownson 
declares: 
Indeed most psychologists assert 
more truth than their method allows, 
are better than their systems. 
Especially is this the case with 
Descartes. On his own system, 
logically developed, he could assert 
no reality but his own individual 
soul or personal existence; yet, in 
point of fact, he asserts nearly all 
that the Catholic theologian asserts, 
but he does iii inconsist.ently, il-
logically·, unscientifically, and this 
leads his followers to deny everything 
not assertable by.his method.2 
While Brownson does not develop this latter point, 
what he appears to have in min~, is that Descartes would 
seem convinced that he has established the extra mental 
existence of such entities as God and the material uni-
verse. Although, Brownson does not regard these con-
clusions as valid inferences in terms of the Cartesian 
1 Works, II, p. 480. 
2 Works, II, p. 366. 
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method. Whatever may be the secondary difficulties 
inherent in the psychological approach, Brownson regards 
the primary difficulty of this inability to escape 
subjectivism, as due to a failure to recognize that the 
non-psychical can in no valid manner be inferred from the 
psychical. 
The psychologist fails in his 
analysis of thought to .detect as an 
original and indestructible element 
of thought a non-psychical element, 
the object which stands over against 
it, distinct from it, and except in 
conjunction with which there is and 
can be no psychical activity or action. 
What the psychologist overlooks is 
the fact that the psychical and the 
non-psychical, as the conditions of 
the soul's activity and consciousness 
of itself, are both given together in 
one and the same intuitive fact, and 
therefore that neither is obtained as 
an element of thought or science from 
the other. The objective validity of 
our knowledge rests on the non-psychical 
element of thought, not the psychical.l 
In stating that, "knowledge-rests on the non-psychical 
element of thought," Brownson would not seem to be implying 
that thought, as thought, ·can be non-psychical, since this 
would be a patent contradiction. Rather, what he would 
seem to be attempting to express, although som~what 
awkwardly at this point, is that the object given in 
thought is a real object having an existence a parte rei 
1 Works, II, p. 45. 
and hence not a creation of the mind. For the moment, 
Brownson's view in this regard might be epitomized by 
stating: 
The soul cannot act without. the 
object, nor unless the object is 
placed in relation with it; 
consequently the soul can no more 
create the relation than it can 
create the object or itself.l 
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In a more specific manner, Brownson directs the same basic 
criticism against Descartes.. He felt that Descartes was 
close to the truth, and he might have obtained it 
if he had analyzed the fact of 
consciousness in relation to the 
1 
2 
object as carefully as he did in 
relation to the subject, he would 
have escaped his fatal error. He 
was right when he said, Cogito, 
ergo sum; but he did not discover 
the whole truth. It·is true, I 
find "I am" in "L:think"; but it 
is equally true that I always, in 
the same act, in the same cogito, 
find another existence, which is 
not myself, but distinguished from 
me. Cogito ergo sum, is true; and 
Cogito, ergo est is equally true; 
for both are contained simultaneously 
and indissolubly in Cogito. Here is 
the fact that Descartes overlooked. 
He attempted to.deduce id est from· 
ego sum, which is imposs~ble; but 
both were given him primitively in 
the fact of consciousness, and he 
had no occasion to attempt to infer 
one from the other.2 
Works, II, p. 44. 
Works, I, pp. 152-153. 
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Brownson's conviction that the psychical and non-psychical 
are given together in one and the same intuitive fact; is 
the fundamental viewpoint around which Brownson will state 
in positive terms his realistic view, relative to the 
objective validity of the object given in thought. This 
is a view which will be presented in detail in a later 
chapter dealing with subject and object, and their relation 
in thought •. 
. Brownson's realism is here evident at least negatively, 
to the extent of his condemnation of the psychological 
method as failing to establish the objective validity of 
our conceptions. In a more positive way, relative to the 
object of thought he asserts: "~e object, then, must be 
other than the subject, and,always, as Cousin truly says, 
le non-moi, that is, neither the soul nor its product.1 
Tf the psychological approach is to be regarded as a 
failure, might not some other approach be more satisfactory 
toward the solution of philosophic problems? Perhaps! 
Unfortunately, this does not lie in the approach taken by 
Sensism, which system Brownson understands as being held 
by one who takes 
1 
the point of view of the senses, that 
is of sensibility, we shall recognize 
no objects as really existing, except 
such as do, or such as may, affect 
the external organs of sense. We shall 
Works, II, p. 455. 
then assume as valid only those 
cognitions which have their origin 
in sensation alone, and attempt ~o 
explain the world, man, and God, by 
means of mere sensations.l 
Brownson discovers in John Locke's philosophy what 
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he believes to be the fundamental failing of sensism in 
its attempt to attain the extra-mental.· This lack of 
success is due to the fact that "Locke does not teach that 
we perceive the object, but an idea or notion of the 
object."2 This being the case, how again escape the 
subjective; how demonstrate the objectivity of. the concept? 
Is a logical escape possible in a system such as Locke's 
which, 
makes all our knowledge begin in 
sensation, and sensation is with him 
the simple capacity of receiving 
impressions of external objects. 
The root of all science is ·in sensation. 
His formula is really, Sentio, ergo sum~ 
I feel, therefore.I am; and, when 
transferred to the object, it is 
Sentio,_ ergo est, - I feel it, therefore 
it iS?) 




Sensation is nothing but a mode or 
affection of the subject, - is the 
subject, in fact, Now from this 
it is impossible to conclude to any 
existence but that of the sensation 
itself. Hence all knowledge is 
necessarily restricted to what Hume 
would call momentary "Impressions." 
I, P• 131. 
I, p. 69. 
I, p. 160. 
And this is what Berkeley and 
Hume, coming after Locke, and 
adopting his premises, but with 
superior sagacity and greater 
logical acumen, have easily 
demonstrated.l 
In brief, it is Brownson's conviction herein that "We 
can arrive at knowledge, by starting from. I ~' no 
better than we can by starting from. I think .. "2 
In fairness to Locke, it must be admitted that 
1 
2 
Locke does not confine, officially 
the objects of science to objects 
which are perceptible by external 
sense. He admits and contends for 
quite another world, but he recognizes 
in the soul no innate capacity to 
seize intuitively this other world, 
nor a capacity to detect it in the 
sensible phenomena; he attains to it 
solely by reflection; that is, dia-
lectically. He concludes from. the 
sensible world to the non-sensible. 
Thus,God is inferred from. the 
phenomena of nature, immortality 
from. the phenomena of the soul, and 
the promises to be read in the bible. 
So that all in his system. which . 
transcends pure sensation, and the 
consciousness thereof, is merely 
logic and not science. Certainly 
it is not we who condemn dialectics, 
or affirm. that what is logically true 
can ever be without sc.ientific validity; 
but from. pure sensation we cannot 
logically conclude to any thing, either 
in the direction of the subject or in 
that of the object, beyond sensation. 
Now, in Locke's premises, unquestionably, 
as a .matter of fact, there is, besides 
sensation, both subject and object; 
Works, I, p. 161. 
Works, I, p. 161. 
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but officially, under the point . 
of view of his system, there is 
nothing but the sensation itself.1 
It is highly questionable as to whether Brownson was 
correct in his contention that the existence of God was, 
' 
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for Locke, an inference from the phenomena of nature. 
Rather, it would seem quite clear that Locke's proof of 
Godts existence is not by way of inference from the 
phenomena of nature but via the intuition or direct ap-
prehension of his own existence. Hence, it would seem 
that Locke's doctrine of knowledge might, from one aspect, 
be best summarized by stating that forLocke, we know our 
own existence intuitively; our knowledge of God's existence 
is demonstrative via the direct apprehension of our own 
existence; and our knowledge of the material world is 
sensitive. 2 
Presoinding from this apparent misinterpretation, we 
find Brownson recurring to his realistic position, namely, 
that if the mind is to grasp reality it must begin with 
some primary intuition or intuitions of the real. Re-
flection can, as has already been mentioned previously, 
only draw out or reveal explicitly what is given intuitively, 
1 Works, I, pp. 160-161. 
2 Consult in this regard the fourth book of Locke's Essay 
concerning Human Understanding. 
In short, the dialectical process can only turn virtual, 
potential, or implicit knowledge into formal, actual, or 
explicit knowledge and it can do no more. 
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If Brownson's analysis is correct, Skepticism general-
ly follows the investigation into the. validity of reason. 
It is for this reason that whether we begin with the 
psychological approach of Descartes or the sensistic 
approach of Locke there is no logical escape, since 
turn which way we will, by natural 
reason alone there is no escape, as 
she herself asserts; because it is 
demonstrably evident that we have 
nothing but reason with which to 
verify reason, and in every effort 
to verify it we must begin by assuming 
it.l 
Hence for Brownson, the failure of Sensism, at least as 
presented by Locke, is fundamentally the same as that of 
Psychologism and logically culminates in Skepticism. 
' 
The inability of these methods to validate the objec-
tivity of the object given in thought, is due in no small 
measure to a disregard of the ftact that principles must 
precede method and not conversely. "It is not the method 
that finds and settles the principles, but the principles 
that disclose and determine the method."2 The reason for 
the truth of this assertion is, according to Brownson, due 
1 Works, V, pp. 508-509. 
2 Works, I, p. 409. 
to the tact that 
method is the application of principles, 
and presupposes them, and till they are 
determined it is impossible to determine 
the method to be adopted or pursued. 
The human mind has a method given in 
its very constitution, and we cannot 
treat the question of method till we 
have ascertained the principles of that 
constitution. lTinciples are and must 
be given by the Creator of the mind 
itself. To treat the question of method 
before we have ascertained what principles 
are there given, is to proceed in the dark 
and to lose our way.l 
It is tor this precise reason that the inductive 
method while proper and even necessary in the physical 
sciences, is not applicable as a philosophical methodo 
The inductive method 
presupposes and demands principles to 
validate the inductions, it is not 
applicable to the study of philosophy, 
which, tor our present purpose, may be 
defined the science of principles, and 
therefore, of the principles of science 
and religion, so tar as religion has a 
rational or scientific basis.2 




in seeking to determine the principles 
by the method, instead of determining 
the method by the principles. It puts 
to use a homely illustration, the cart 
before the horse. The mind must be in 
possession of principles, before it is 
capable of any operation to obtain them, 
or by which they may be obtained.3 
\ 
II, p. 231. 
II, p. 449. 
II, p. 449. 
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Granting, for the moment, that Brownson's position 
is correct, what is the origin of these principles? How 
are they to be discovered? 
Not by reasoning, not by a logical 
process, for without them, no reasoning, 
no logical process is possible, and no 
such thing as proof or demonstration 
conceivable. They must, then, precede 
reasoning, be intuitive, that is, evident 
of themselves.l 
A question quite naturally occurs at this point, 
namely, whether these principles are already formulated 
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and explicitly known by the mind from the very dawn of its 
conscious awareness? If this is not the case, as it clearly 
is not in terms of Brownson's outlook, does not this presup-
pose a method for discovering these principles? Yes, if by 
method is understood only that the mind comes to an explicit 
formulation of these principles by way of reflection, which 
reflection is occasioned by experience in some form. This 
is a point to which we shall return in our treatment of 
the· positive basis of Brownson's intui tionistic position. 
In any event, it is Brownson's conviction that it has 
. 
been this neglect of both Psychologism and Sensism to 
recognize that principles are given and not acquired that 
has been the stumbling block of the great bulk of modern 
philosophy. This is a neglect which must logically culmi-
nate, as it has in fact, in skepticism. As Brownson 
1 Works, V, p. 136. 
sees it: 
The supposed tabula rasa is simply 
no mind at all. Principles must be 
given, not found or obtained. We 
cannot even doubt without them, for 
doubt is itself a mental act, and 
therefore the principles themselves, 
without which no doubt or denial is 
possible, are not and cannot be denied 
or doubted; for even in denying or 
doubting the mind affirms them. 
Principles, again, cannot be given 
the mind without it possessing.them, 
and for the mind to possess a thing 
is to know it. As the principles 
create or consitute the mind, the 
mind always knows them, and what it 
knows it does not and cannot doubt. 
The philosopher, as distinguished 
from the sophist, does not start from 
doubt, and doubt of very thing till 
he has found something which he cannot 
doubt; but he starts from the principles 
themselves, which being given, are nota 
per se, or self•evident, and therefore 
need no proof - in tact, are provable 
only from the absurd conse~uences which 
would follow their denial. 
Since Descartes starts from this universal doubt, may we 
conclude that Descartes was numbered among those whom 
Brownson considered sophists and not philosophers? e>r, 
on the other hand, was Brownsonts identification of 
sophistry with the position of those who start with such 
5o 
a method rather an extreme view, which view Brownson might 
be willing to modify, if his attention was explicitly 
directed to it? While an affirmative answer to either or 
both of these questions might be looked for, such was 
1 Works, II, p. 363. 
evidently not the case; for, we find Brownson in another 
context expressing dissatisfaction with two philosophers 
for what he regards as their admiration of Descartes. 
In this regard Brownson declares: •we are sorry to find 
Balmes forming a favorable estimate of Descartes, and we 
t 
cannot excuse Pere Gratry's excessive admiration of this 
shallow sophist. 1 
Moreover, Brownson is not here opposing Locke's 
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theory of the tabula rasa, to the extent that he interprets 
Locke as understanding, "perfectly well, that before sensi-
ble experience there are no facts of consciousness. The 
sensibility has always been acted upon before we have an 
idea. Hence no innate ideas. So far Loc~e was right.n2 
Rather, Brownson believes that the general failure of the 
sensistic method of Locke, at this point, is due in no 
small measure to the fact that because the sensation is 
chronologically prior to the idea, Locke 
concludes that it is its cause, and 
does not inquire, whether analysis 
might not detect in the idea an 
element or elements which sensation 
could not furnish, but which must 
have been furnished by the mind 
itself.3. 
1 Works, I, p. 440. 
2 Works, II, pp. 543-544. 
3 Works, II, p. 544. 
Further Brownson declares: 
Undoubtedly there can be no idea 
no fact of consciousness, in whi~h 
there is not an element derived from 
sensation. But is the sensible element 
the whole of the fact? Have we any 
purely simple ideas? Are not all ideas, 
is not every fact of consciousness 
complex? And into every fact of 
consciousness does there not enter 
an element which can by no means 
have a sensible origin? Now these 
are the questions the sensists should 
ask. But instead of these questions, 
they ask, have we any ideas or facts 
of consciousness that are wholly of 
a rational origin, in which the senses 
have no share? Unable to find any 
fact of consciousness in which sen-
sibility does not intervene, they 
rashly conclude that all phenomena, 
and the whole of every phenomena of 
consciousness, are derived from 
sensation.l 
Brownson herewith proceeds to an analysis of the data of 
consciousness, which analysis does in his view, indicate 
the existence in consciousness of certain elements which 
are of a non-sensible or pre-empirical origin. After a 
rather lengthy discussion relative to our idea of cause 
wherein he attempts to indicate that the idea of cause 
as a creative force or power or agency is not of sensible 
origin, to the extent that our senses note only ~he 
antecedent phenomena, he asserts that: 
If the understanding were previously 
furnished with the idea, we could 
easily conceive of its applying it 
1 Works, II, p. 544. 
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to the relation of the phenomena in 
question: but we confess that we cannot 
conceive how an understanding made up 
of purely sensible elements as it must 
be if sensism be true, can infer a non-
sensible idea from merely sensible 
phenomena. The logic by which it can 
be done we have not yet learned.l 
This conviction of Brownson that there are certain non-
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sensible elements in the knowledge situation is a consider-
ation to which we. shall turn our attention, more explicitly, 
in discussing Brownson's evaluation of Kant's position, in 
the following chapter. 
Returning to our main consideration, it is Brownson's 
contention that it is this dominant concern of modern 
philosophers with treating the problem of method before 
that of principles, which results in the fact that they 
deal '~ith logical abstractions instead of realities, and 
give us a mundus logicus, diverse from the mundus physicus 
or real world."2 Consequently, modern philosophers are, 
obliged to proceed blindly, to deal 
with unrealities, and not only to 
place their philosophy out of the 
reach of the common mind, but in 
eternal opposition to common·sense. 
The philosophy they build up with 
infinite labor and pains is no science 
of the living world, of concrete 
reality, but of logical abstractions, 
which. are purely mental creations~ 
without real existence in nature./ 
1 Works, II, p. 545. 
2 Works, II, p. 232. 
3 Works, II, p. 232. 
SUMMARY 
Brownson condemns what he labels as the method of 
"exclusive psychology," which method he regards as a re-
flection on intuitions, considered as mere psychological 
facts. It is under this precise formality that he attacks 
the respective positions of Descartes and Locke, to the 
extent that he believes that in virtue of such a method 
it is impossible to attain the real, the objective, the 
extra-mental. For, if nothing distinguishable from 
ourselves is necessary to thought, how is it possible to 
conclude that the object given in thought is anything 
really obJective to the self? Locke was no more justified 
in ultimately concluding "id est" from "sentio" that 
was Descartes from. "cogito." 
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On the more positive side, it is Brownson's conviction 
that the que.stion of principles should precede that of 
method; for method consists in the application of princi-
ples, and until they are determined it is not possible to 
determine the method. This should not be understood as 
indicating that in Brownson's view these same principles 
are psychologically prior to experience, Rather, they 
are logically prior. This is a point which will be 
considered in more detail in chapters four and five, in 
a consideration of the positive basis of Brownson's 
intuitionistic views. 
CHAPTER III 
TEE INFLUENCE OF K.ANTI.AN IDEALISM IN TEE DEVELOPMENT OF 
BROWNSON1 S REALISM 
Closely allied to his attack on psychologism and 
sensism, is Brownsonts castigation of Kantianism in 
particular and the whole trend of German philosophy in 
general. This attack can be adequately comprehended, 
only if we keep in mind Brownsonts abhorrence of 
Skepticism, and consequently of any system which he 
regarded as having its logical culmination therein. As 
he himself states: 
It was never in my nature, any more 
than it is in that of the human race, 
to take up with a purely negative 
system. My craving to believe was 
always strong, and it never was my 
misfortune to be of a skeptical turn 
of mind.l 
Now Brownson, despite his agreement with Kant in many ways, 
believes that in a last analysis, ~e have found nothing 
but bald atheism, and cold and heartless scepticism 
erected into a system bearing all the imposing forms of 
. "2 sc~enceb . 
1 Works, V, p. 39. 
2 Works, I, p. 213. 
~~.c.;·~~-.~---~ ·- ~--. 
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It might be questioned whether Brownson's acquaintanae 
with Kant was sufficient ~o justify so critical an eval-
uation of Kant·' s position. While such m~gb.t be the aase, 
and while recognizing that pure motive is one thing and 
achievement another, such a deficiency of comprehension 
would not seem in any event, to flow from any failure on 
Brownson's part to master Kant. For, relative to Kant's 
doctrine, Brownson declares: 
We have aimed to aomprehend his 
doatrine·, aimed to set 1 t forth 
aorrectly, and to meet it fairly. 
If we have done him any injustice 
it has been unintentional.~ 
Again: 
There may be depths in the Critic we 
have not sounded, diamonds that we 
have not discovered; but we have 
sounded to the depth of our line, 
and we have searched diligently for 
the gems which might be concealed 
at the bottom. tt2 
There would seem to be considerable extrinsic 
evidence to support Brownson's own contention that he was 
a Kantian scholar. In fact, so intense was Brownson's 
interest in Kant that his son Henry states that: '~early 
all through the year 1844, the great subject of talk in 
the dinng-room was Kant.n3 So great was Brownson's 
1 Works, I, p. 213. 
2 Works, I, p. 213. 
3 Henry F. Brownson, orestes A. Brownson's Early Life 
(Detroit: H. F .. B~ownson, 1898), p. 413. 
interest in Kant that some of it could be said to have 
rubbed off on his children to the extent that even they 
discussed the categories and the Ding - an - sich. 1 
t 
Rene Wellek states that Brownson's acquaintance with 
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Kant was such that uhe·alone of all the Transcendentalists 
seems to have been seriously disturbed by the problem of 
knowledge and truth and he alone made a close examination 
of Kantts actual text.n2 Further in reference to 
Brownson he states that, tthe has come, at least, to actual 
grips with the text of Kant, with his dialectics and logic, 
as no contemporary in America did."3 T.hat Brownson had a 
deep respect for and an intense interest in Kant's position 
is further evidenced by his dec~aration, contained in a 
critical study of a certain author, that this same author, 
"has never profited by the study of Kant's Critik der 
reinen Vernunft, which it is necessary for every man who 
would write or talk on philosophy in our days, throughly 
to master. 4 
It has, however, been suggested by one author that 
1 Henry F. Brownson, Orestes A. Brownson's Early Life 
(Detroit: H. F. Brownson, 1898), p. 413. 
2 Wellek, pp. 669-670. 
3 Wellek, pp. 673-674. 
4 Works, I, p. 508. 
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Brownson's interest in Kant served more of a utilitarian 
than a speculative end. That is to say, he was interested 
in Kant's position, or more accurately the refutation of 
Kant's position, to the extent that if he succeeded in his 
refutation this achievement would remove the last main 
obstacle to his acceptance of Catholicism. 
He had long been worried by the 
problem of guaranteeing the reality 
of knowledge. Until he answered it, 
he could not be sure that Catholicism 
would give him any more certainty than 
Transcendentalism. The discouraging 
doctrines of Kant, who had argued away 
the possibility of reaching absolute 
truth, still stood between Brownson 
and his sanctuary.l 
To what extent this latter may or may not have been ~ 
motive is questionable. However, it would seem that his 
interest in Kant was in its outset, at any event, more 
positive in nature. This would seem evident in virtue of 
Brownson's statement that ~e took up his work with a 
profound reverence for it. We had been accustomed, by 
those whose opinions we most valued, to look upon Kant as 
the great metaphysician of modern times."2 
In any event, if Brownson is correct, Kant's funda-
mental philosophical problem was occasioned by his rec-
ognition of the difficulty inherent in Locke's theory, in 
1 Schlesinger, pp. 177-~78. 
2 Works, I, p. 213. 
regard to the tabula rasa. 
If the human mind be in its or~g~n 
a mere blank sheet, as Locke represents 
it, incapable of furnishing from its 
own resources any element of experience, 
we must admit with Hume that no ex-
perience is possible, and that every 
sane philosopher must need by a sceptic.1 
All that Brownson would seem to have in mind, although 
perhaps not clearly, stated above, is that 
if we admit the possibility of 
experience, we must admit certain 
a priori conditions of experience; 
that is, we must admit in the mind, 
prior to experience, certain inherent 
qualities, properties, laws, elements, 
by virtue of which experience is 
rendered possible.2 
T.his being the case, it became Kant's problem to analyze, 
nthe pure reason, that is, to ascertain the possibility 
of experience, and the conditions without which it cannot 
take place."3 In other words, he is attempting to de-
termine: WWhat are these a priori conditions, qualities, 
properties, elements, ideas, forms, categories, or 
whatever else they may be termed, and without which no 
experience can take place."4 
Even though, for Kant, these forms or elements, 
1 Works, II, p. 536. 
2 Works, II, PP• 536-537. 
3 Works, II, 536. pp. 
4 Works~ II, pp. 536. 
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"precede experience, since they are essential to 
experience,n1 this is not to imply that, nwe seize them 
by a priori reasoning.n2 Although Kantts approach is 
through an analysis of what is in reason previous to any 
experience, nevertheless, he 
does not profess to give this account 
before experience has developed the 
~eason, much less without the aid of 
experience. He seeks by experience, 
by experiment, by a careful analysis 
of the facts of consciousness, as 
they actually present themselves to 
the eye of the psychological observer, 
to distinguish the rational elements 
of those facts, from the empirical 
elements which they also contain, to 
trace the non-empirical elements to 
their source, and to give us their 
real character. His method, therefore 
is, as we have said, as truly the 
experimental method as that of Bacon 
or Locke.3 
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Brownson is throughly in sympathy with Kant's position 
relative to the necessity of certain a priori forms or 
elements which are antecedent to all knowledge, and without 






Kant has settled, if it was not 
settled before him, that certain 
conditions a priori of all ex-
perience are indispensable, that 
the mind before it can act or form 
any judgment a posteriori, must in 
II, p. 536. 
II, p. 536 .. 
II, p. 536. 
some way be placed in possession 
of certain first principles or 
necessary truths, which he calls judgments a priori, for in every 
synthetic judgment a posteriori, 
there is always a judgment a priori,. 
something added, which is not derived 
from experience, and therefore must 
have preceded it. The presence of 
this a priori and non-empirical 
element in all our judgment a 
.posteriori is unquestionable~l 
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This truth seems apparent to Brownson, since how else would 
it be possible to conceive of the universal and necessary? 
For, universality and necessity cannot be 
derived analytically from the 
empirical fact, nor is it obtained 
by generalization from the particu-
lar act of causation, for the 
general is never deducible from 
the particular or the necessary 
from the contingent, since withou~ 
them, the particular and contingent 
.can neither exist nor be conceivedi 
The universal and the necessary, 
then, must be given prior to the 
empirical fact, - principles 
before experience, before the mind 
has acted or can act.2 
Herein we find Brownson recurring to an old theme 
mentioned several times in the preceding chapters, namely, 
that principles must precede experience; a belief to which 
he returns time and time again throughout his works. 
Brownson seems convinced that Kant has 
fully demonstrated that in every 
fact of experience there enters 
1 Works, I, p. 508. 
2 Works, I, p. 508. 
a non-empirical element, and, if he 
holds with Leibnitz that that element 
is the human understanding itself, he 
has still demonstrated that it is not 
an abstraction or generalization ot 
the concrete qualities ot the objects 
presented by experience.l 
Not only is Brownson in agreement with Kant relative to 
the tact that there must be some a priori or non-
empirical elements in human knowledge, but we find as 
well a basic agreement on the distinction between 
analytic and synthetic judgments. As regards this dis-
tinction Brownson was, tor Brownson, unusually generous 
in his praise ot Kant's stando Pertinent to this dis-
tinction Brownson asserts: 
Kant is admirable, and his distinction 
between analytic and synthetic judgments, 
from experience and synthetic judgments 
a priori,though not absolutely new in 
the history of philosophy, is ot great 
importance, was never more finely 
marked, and leaves nothing on that 
head to be desired.2 
Nor are these the only points ot agreement with Kant, tor 
Brownson likewise accepts a further point wherein he 
interprets Kant as not denying 
1 
2 
the existence ot the object as a 
thing existing apart from the subject; 
tor, apart from the subject, it can 
be no object ot conception, and therefore 
can neither be denied or affirmed. It 
may, tor ought we know, exist really 
independently ot us, but not formally; 
Works, II, Po 297. 
Works, I, p. 388. 
--~--~~-~~-~--~--=--~=-=-~-
62 
for it exists formally only in 
the intuition. 
Relative to this consideration, Brownson's acceptance-is 
unequivocal, for he states explicitly: "That the formal 
existence of some objects of knowledge may be said to be 
subjective, we are not disposed to deny,n2 since, 
"conceptions without intuitions are void."3 
What then of the objectivity, if any, of the forms 
and the objects of cognition? Kant 
assumes that the forms, under which 
all objects are mentally apprehended, 
are without any foundation, actual 
or virtual, in the thing apprehended; 
both the forms and the object are 
then reduced to mere empty conceptions, 
or mere modes of the subject, from 
which, if formally, they are nevertheless 
really indistinguishable.4 





the capacity of the human mind to 
cognize the noumenon, and conceding 
only its capacity to cognize the 
phenomenon, and therefore, the 
object only so far forth as object, 
not as thing, contends that the 
categories are derived from the 
subject, and are the a priori forms 
of the pure understanding, which it 
imposes on the object conceived. 
They are the forms under which the 
object is cognized, not bec;ause they 
I, p. 187. 
I, p. 187. 
I, p. 18$. 
I, p. 188. 
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are the necessary forms of the object 
considered as thing existing objectively 
in re, but because they are the necessarr 
forms of the human understanding itself. 
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While in evident agreement with Kant relative both to the 
necessity of a priori elements in knowledge and to the 
nature of the synthetic a priori judgment, to the extent 
that its universality and necessity is in no manner 
derivable from experience, it is nonetheless relative to 
the objectivity of the content of the a priori judgment 
that we find Brownson parting company with Kant. This is 
a parting which is clear-cut and final and which brooks of 
no further meeting. This Kantian conception of what 
Brownson considers to be the complete subjectivity of the 
categories is.~oo much for Brownson's realistic mind to 
endure. Since, if such were the case, how would it be 
possible to escape the subjectivity or·a Locke, Descartes, 
Hume, etc.? For Brownson the answer is wholly in the 
negative; and try as we may there is and can be no logi-
cal escape. So much so is Brownson convinced of this, 
that he contends that Kant has in fact made no philo-
sophic advance over his predecessors. All Kant has done 
is recognize Leibnitz's additimn to Aristotle's maxim, 
namely that 
nothing can be in the mind but what 
is first in the senses, - except the 
mind itself. Here is the germ of 
1 Works, I, p. 203. 
the Critik der reinen Vernunft, and 
all that Kant has done has been to 
develop and systematize the doctrinr 
contained in this celebrated maxim. 
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In consequence, if there is any advantage in the 
sensistic approach, it lies, ·according to Brownson, with 
Locke in virtue of his contention that, reflection from 
sensible data is capable of extending human knowledge to 
objects transcending the limits of sensation, 2 which fact, 
~ant denies, and labors at length to refute, in his 
'Transcendental Dialectics. 1 3 Hence, 
the charge of sensism against Locke 
comes with an ill grace from a 
follower of Kant; for, so far as 
concerns the objects of knowledge, 
the Englishman is much less liable 
to it than the German.4 
As a result, Kant's thesis is not a refutation of Hume's 
position as many believe.to be the case, rather, 
we regard it as the most masterly 
defense of Hume that man may be 
expected to produce. If Kant is 
right, man is incapable of demon-
strating the reality of an ex-
istence outside of the subject.';: 
and the subject, for want of a 
resisting medium, finally loses 
all apperception of itself, for 
Kant contends that the me can have 
intuition of itself onlYin the 
intuition of the diverse, that is, 
1 
183. Works, I, p. 
2 Works, I, 183. p. 
3 Works, I, p. 183. 
4 Works, I, p. 183 .. 
of the not me; and so all science 
vanishes, all certainty disappears, 
the sun goes out, the bright stars 
are extinguished, and we are afloat 
in the darkness, on the wild and 
tempest-roused ocean of universal 
Doubt and Nescience.l 
A question quite naturally arises at this point as 
to what extent, if any, Brownson was acquainted with 
Kant's other works and in particular with the Critique of 
Practical Reason. It would seem that Brownson had some 
acquaintance with this later Critique, since in an essay 
written as early as 1842, Brownson declares that Kant 
"asserts the impotency of reason to carry us out of the 
sphere of the ~."2 .In a footnote in reference to this 
statement Brownson declares: 
We know very well that this was not 
the real doctrine of Kant; that it 
was only demonstrated by him to be 
the result, to which all philosophy 
must come that is based on pure 
reason. He himself relied on practical 
reason, ••• and his-purpose of writing 
critiques of pure reason, was to demon-
strate the unsatisfactory character of 
all purely metaphysical specUlations. 
A wise man, after all, was that same 
Emanuel Kant.3 
In another context we find Brownson casting riducule, at 
least by implication, on Kant's motive in writing the 
1 Works, I, Pe 185. 
2 Works, IV, P• 355. 
3 Works, IV, p. 355. 
66 
67 
Critique of Practical Reason, to the extent that Brownson 
quotes Heinrich Heine as suggesting the possibility that 
Kant may have undertaken this work through "fear of' the 
police.n1 
This neglect on Brownson's part to give any serious 
consideration to the Critique of' Practical Reason was, 
one suspects, due to Brownson's conviction that Kant's 
conclusions herein were essentially invalid to the extent 
that they could not·, in Kant's view, be grounded in the 
"pure reason". This suspicion is founded on the fact that 
Brownson tends to identify Kant's ttpractical reason" with 
Hume's "common sense". For, Brownson explicitly declares: 
The practical reason of' the one, 
is nothing but the common sense of' 
the other. Both deny the impos-
sibility [possibiliti] of' demon-
strating external reality from the 
point of' view of pure reason; the 
one resting it on the irresisti-
bility of the "categories" of' reason, 
which is purely subjective, and 
therefore no authority out of' the 
subject itself; and the other, on 
a ~belief" of which we can never 
get rid, but for which we have no 
scientific basis.2 
In any event, returning to a consideration of' the 
Kantian Categories, Brownson contends that Kant although 
1 Works, I, p. 186. 
2 Works, IV, p. 391. 
succeeding in establishing their necessity for thought, 
has not, contrary to his belief, succeeded in proving 
that the categories are forms of the subject. 
All he proves is that there is and 
aan be no fact of htiman knowledge 
without them, which may be true with-
out their being subjective~ He proves, 
if you will, that they are the constituent 
principles of the human understanding, in 
the sense that the human understanding 
cannot exist and operate without their 
initiative and concurrence; but this no 
more proves that they are forms of the 
subject than the fact that the creature 
can neither exist nor act without the 
creative and concurrent act of the 
Creator proves that the Creator is an 
inherent law or form of the creature.l 
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Hence, the question for philo~ophy at this point might be 
stated as follows: 
Are these ideas or categories, which 
precede and enter into every fact of 
experience, forms of the subject or 
human understanding, as Kant alleges, 
or are they objective and real, and 
though necessary to the existence and 
operation of the human mind, are yet 
really distinct from it, and independent 
of it, as much so as if no human mind 
had been created?2 -
Brownson•s rejection of the Kantian categories as 
purely subjective may, perhaps, be discerned most clearly 
in his discussion of causality. At the outset Brownson 
contends that nHume has settled it forever that the 
1 Works, II, p. 299. 
2 Works, II, p. 299. 
judgment of causality cannot be obtained from sensible 
experience."1 This is a conviction from which Brownson 
never departs, for he accepts Hume's doctrine that 
sensible experience furnishes "what we are accustomed to 
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call cause and effect only under the relation of time, the 
one as preceding and the other as following, never as 
necessarily connected."2 Hence, "all we do or can obtain 
is a cognition of uniform precedence and consequence.n3 
In justice to Hume, however, one must bear in mind 
that Hume's 
specialty does not consist in denying 
the necessary connection between cause 
and effect~ or the reality of the causal 
power, as his adversaries have foolishly 
imagined, but in showing that it cannot 
be derived from sensible experience, or 
asserted on the principles of the 
empirical or sensist philosophy. In 
this he was unquestionably right; and 
no one, on the principles of that 
philosophy, has ever been able, or 
ever will be able to refute him.4 
Granting that Hume has sufficiently demonstrated that 
the causal nexus is' not derivable from experience, what 
is its origin? In reply to this quest·ion Brownson's 
agreement with Kant could scarcely be more evident, for 
1 Works, I, p. 402. 
2 Works, I, p. 383. 
3 Works, I, 384. p. 
4 Works, I, pp. 385-386. 
the statement that 
whatever happens must have a cause, 
is a synthetic judgment a priori, 
because the predicate, must have a 
cause, is added to the subject, 
whatever happens, and because of 
the judgment involves the conception 
of necessity, not in any way derivable 
from experience. The characteristic 
of synthetic judgments a priori is 
this conception of necessity.! 
As a result, 
we can never assert any particular 
act of causation without adding to 
it the conception of universal and 
necessary cause, expressed in the 
axiom, Every effect must have .a 
cause, or, Nothing can begin to 
exist without a causeo2 
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As early as 1839, and apparently prior to his making 
any serious study of Kant, Brownson had come to the same 
fundamental convictione In an analysis of the notion of 
~ause and of the principle of causality, in an article 
entitled "The Eclectic Philosophy" he states relative to 
the concept of cause, 
1 
that we conceive of cause always as 
something which creates, or produces 
effect; and that this idea, whether 
it be true or false, cannot be derived 
from the experience of the senses, nor 
from the experience of the activity; 
but must be derived from the intelli-
gence, the reason,-or whatever that 
is in us, by virtue of which we are 
Works, I, pp. 385-386. 
2 Works, I, p. 508. 
knowing, as well as feeling and 
acting beings. It must therefore 
be an intuition of the reason. It 
is the reason that sees the relation 
of cause and effect in the phenomena 
presented by experience; and the 
reason that furnishes us the principle, 
that nothing can begin to exist but by 
virtue of a cause. If we are correct 
in this, it must be admitted, that 
there are facts in the consciousness 
which have not an empirical origin, 
but a rational origin.l 
This latter would seem to indicate Brownson's con-
viction, previous to any detailed study of Kant, that 
there were certain a priori elements in human knowledge. 
I.n consequence, it may well be that this acceptance of 
the Kantian categories as a priori, was due in no small 
measure, to this previous conviction, which conviction 
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was formalized and confirmed in Kant's theory. Yfuile this 
is a matter of conjecture, it is not pure conjecture, since 
this conviction of Brownson's would seem, as far as we can 
discern from his writings, to antedate his study of Kant. 
We are now in a position to inquire whether Brownson 
accepts the Kantian categories only in principle, to the 
extent that he recognizes that in general there must be 
some a priori elements in human knowledge, or, on the 
other hand, does he accept Kant's specific list of 
categores? The prima facie evidence would seem to indicate 
1 Works, II, p. ~49. 
that Brownson does accept Kant's list of the categories, 
f·or' in reference to the categories he declares: 
We are here far from attempting 
to draw up a complete list of the 
Ideas of Reason. That work has 
been done, and so done as not to 
need revision, by Kant in his 
Critique of Fure Reason.l 
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A year later, in 1844, he qualifies his acceptance of the 
categories, to the extent that: 
Their exactness we are not 
disposed to question; but it may 
be asked, if their number cannot 
be reduced. From the point of 
view of logic, it strikes us that 
they may be reduced to two, namely, 
.subject and predicate; and from the 
point of view of ontology, to ideal 
and actual, general and particular, 
necessary and ~ontingent, being 
and phenomena. 
In a final analysis, it would seem, that Brownson 
reduces the categories to two, namely, necessary and con-
tingent, finding their real synthesis via the creative 
act of Being. This is a theory which will be examined in 
detail in the two following chapters. Moreover, it will 
likewise be indicated that the priority of the categories 
is, for Brownson, a logical rather than a psychological 
priority. 
In any event, the critical problem for Brownson, 
1 Works, I, p. 117. 
2 Works, I, pp. 201-202. 
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from this point onward, consists in attempting to discover 
a means of escape from the subjectivity of the Kantian 
categories. While he accepts Kant's categories to the 
extent already discussed, nevertheless, one thing at least 
is clear, namely, that "Kant's forms are purely subjective, 
whereas Brownson's ·principles of thought, the necessary 
pre-empirical element in all actual thinking are un-
questionably objective."1 He believes that ~antian 
subjectivism is refuted and the objectivity of knowledge 
guaranteed by placing the synthetic a priori judgment on 
the side of the object.n2 
In reference to the pre-empirical element in knowledge 
Brownson himself declares: "We place it on the side of the 
object, and hold that it is that without which the object 





Again, these pre-empirical elements 
are intuitive because they are 
the necessary conditions a priori 
of experience or the soul's intel-
lectual action; and they are · 
objective, since otherwise they 
could not be intuitive, for 
intuition is the act of the object, 
not of the subject.4 
Raemers, pp. 67-68. 
Farrell, p. 129. 
Works, II, p. 52. 
Works, II, p. 56 .. 
It is the fact that Brownson regards intuition as 
the act of the object, and this together with his belief 
that the subject and the object are given simultaneously 
in one and the same intuition that furnishes Brownson 
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with what he regards as the only legitimate escape from 
the subjectivity of the Kantian categories. This is a 
theory to which we will return in more detail in our next 
chapter in a discussion of the object of thought. 
Brownson's conviction of the objectivity of knowledge 
is never more clearly discernible in his writings then 
when he states: 
We may say, "my actions, my crimes, 
my virtues," for we consider ourselves 
very justly as their cause; we may 
even say, "my error," for our errors 
are in some degree attributable to 
ourselves; but who dares say" my truth"? 
Who does not feel who does not know, 
that the truth is not his, - is nobody's 
but independent of everybody? If, then, 
we are conscious that the conceptions of 
the reason are not ours, that the truths 
it reveals are not our truths, are not 
truths which are not in any sense de-
pendent on us, we must admit that the 
reason is independent of us, and, though 
appearing in us, is not ours, is not our 
self.l 
Brownson's statement that, "reason is independent of us," 
might permit of a multiplicity of varying interpretations. 
However, his actual.meaning would seem to find clarifi-
cation in the distinction he makes several times between 
1 Orestes A. Brownson, "Cousin's Philosophy," The Christian 
Examiner, XXI (September, 1836), p. 44. 
subjective and· objective reason, e. g., 
reason in man, or reason as a faculty 
of the soul, is, among other things, 
the power to perceive necessary truths. 
This is the subjective reason, ••• But 
reason may also be taken objectively, 
as the object of reason as subject, 
that is~ as the necessary truths or 
ideas themselves.l 
Again, in one sense, the word reason may be taken as 
referring to the 
world of absolute ideas, immaterial 
and necessary truth; in the other 
sense, the faculty or power by which 
we recognize this absolute world. 
In the first it is impersonal and 
objective; in the second personal 
and subjective.2 
It seems sufficiently clear in the light of this 
distinction, that in referring to the fact that "reason 
is independent of us," Brownson intends to refer to 
objective reason, as he understands the term. Moreover, 
relative to this same consideration, Brownson maintains 
that Kant confounds subjective and objective reason, 
by absorbing the absolute or 
transcendental reason in reason 
as a faculty of human nature, and 
thus lays the foundation of his 
peculiar kind of idealism, which 
prepares the way for the egoism 
of his disciple, Fichte.3 
1 Works, XIV, p. 322. 
2 
Works, IV, p. 342. 
3 Works, IV, p. 342. 
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., 
Frescinding from the problem of· the objectivity of 
knowledge, Brownson believes that from another viewpoint 
Kant had set for himself an unanswerable problem, since 
to ask if the human mind be capable 
of science is absurd; for we have 
only the human mind with which to 
answer the question. And it needs 
science to answer this question, 
as much as it does to answer any 
other question.l 
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Was Brownson fair in his criticism of German ~hiloso-
phy in general, and Kant in particular? The scope of this 
chapter will hardly permit of a definitive answer; however, 
the evidence would seem to indicate the fact that Brownson 
had a scholarly interest in German philosophy, and in 
consequence made an earnest attempt to understand the 
respective positions of these philosophers and in par-
ticular that of Kant. Whatever may be his accomplish-
ments or defects in this regard we will attempt to assess 
in our critical summary. For the moment, however, there 
would. seem to be a good deal of truth in wha.t Wellek has 
to say when he states: 
Brownson's criticisms of German 
philosophy cannot always be justi-
fied; he surely overstressed the 
purely negative critical side of 
Kant and misunderstood the Hegelian 
dialectics, but within limits he 
presented the case against German 
philosophy forcefully and consistent-
ly from the point of view of an 
1 Works, I, p. 162. 
objective intuitivism which deplored 
the Whole turn modern philosophy had 
taken since Descartesol 
SUMM:ARY 
This chapter has been concerned with Brownson's 
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critical analysis of Kant's position, particularly in 
reference to Kant's view that there are certain a priori 
elements in the knowledge situation. Brownson is in 
fundamental agreement with Kant's position relative to 
the necessity of certain a priori forms or elements which 
are antecedent to all knowledge, and without which 
knowledge would be impossibleo However, for Brownson, as 
already indicated, these principles are logically, if not 
psychologically prior to experience. 
Despite this agreement with Kant that there are 
certain a priori elements in the knowledge situation, 
Brownson is nonetheless unwilling to accept, what he 
interprets to be Kant's position namely, that of the 
complete subjectivity of the categories. That is, he 
refuses to accept the thesis that the categories are the 
pure forms of the understanding which it imposes on the 
object conceived, not because they are the necessary forms 
1 Wellek, p. 676. 
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of the object in se, but simply because they are the neces-
sary forms of the understanding itself. If Kant is correct 
in his contention that the forms lind·er which objects are 
mentally grasped are without any foundation in things 
themselves, then Brownson is unable to discern, on the 
basis of such a position, any logical escape from Skepticism. 
So much is Brownson convinced of this that he maintains 
that Kant's position, rather than being a refutation of 
Hume, is rather the "most m.asterfultt defense of Hume that 
has been produced. 
All that Kant has suceeded in proving, according to 
Brownson, is that the categories are necessary principles 
of the understanding; to the extent that there can be no 
knowledge without them. However, we cannot on this basis 
logically conclude that they are pure forms of the subject 
without any foundation in re. In rejecting the Kantian 
categories, as being purely subjective forms of the human 
understanding, Brownson hints at what will be his own 
method in attempting to escape from the subjectivity of 
the Kantian categories, namely, a placing of the a priori 
elements on the side of the object rather than on the side 
of the subject, together with his theory of ideal intuition 
as the act of the object. 
CHAPrER IV 
THE IDEAL AND THE EMPIRICAL AND THEIR RELATION IN 
BROWNSON'S .PHILOSOPHY 
Having rejected the epistemological approach of 
Descartes, Locke, Kant, and the German philosophers in 
general, because of the belief that their approaches 
logically lead to Skepticism, what is to be Brownson's 
method of escape from the subjectivism which he regards 
as necessarily inherent in these systems? It will be 
through an attempt to establish the objectivity of the 
pre-empirical elements of thought and of the object of 
thought itself by way of Brownson's theory of intuition 
as an act of the object. This may be regarded as an 
effort which is commendable in itself independently of 
its success or failure, since any attempt to escape the 
negativism of Skepticism and to place human knowledge on 
a firm foundation is certainly a worthy if not a necessary 
philosophic project. 
As previously mentioned, Brownson regards it as an 
indisputable fact that if one begins with the exclusively 
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psychological method, then: 
Again: 
There is no passage possible between 
the subjective and objective. There 
is no possible equation between me 
and not me by which one may be obtained 
from the other. It is impossible to 
conclude from my own existence to that 
of another. There is here no room for 
Logic. Logic can operate only on data 
previously assumed or established; and 
it never does and never can operate 
with only a single factor.l 
How prove that in any fact of knowledge 
there is cognition of an object that 
exists distinct from and independent of 
the subject? Here is the pons asinorum 
of the exclusive psychologists. There 
is no crossing the bridge from the sub-jective to the objective, for there is 
no bridge there, and subject and object 
must both be given simultaneously in one 
and the same act, or neither is given.2 
If one is to avoid the intellectual suicide of 
Skepticism, one must approach from another avenue and 
recognize as did Cousin, that thought is not a simple but 
rather a 
complex fact, composed of three 
inseparable elements, subject, object 
and form. He asserts that the subject 
is always the soul, of ourselves 
thinking; the object is always distinct 
from the soul, and standing over 
against it; and the form is always 
1 Works, I, p. 63. 
2 Works, II, p. 391. 
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the relation of the subject and 
object.l 
Were one to deny any of these three elements there could 
be no thought. 
Remove the subject, and there is 
no thought, for there evidently can 
be no thought where there is no 
thinker; remove the object, and 
there is equally no thought, for 
to think nothing is simple not to 
think; and finally, deny the re-
lation of subject and object, and 
you also deny all thought, for 
certainly the soul cannot apprehend 
an object or an object be presented 
to the soul with no relation between 
them.2 
Therefore, if philosophers would only begin in what 
Brownson calls the fact of life, instead of trying to 
begin with abstractions, 
1 
2 
they would have found, as data 
already furnished to their hands, 
both the objective and the subjective; 
and finding them both. in the inde-
structible synthesis of thought, ~hey 
would never have conceived the problem -
The one being given, how to obtain the 
other? In point of fact, this problem 
is really inconceivable, and philosophers 
have been for ages asking, not so much 
an unanswerable, as, if we may so speak, 
an unaskable question; for the one term 
is never found without the other, or 
conceived of, ·save in conjunction with 
the other. This is what we must mean 
when we say that we never find ourselves. 
but as the subject of the phenomenon, 
and never as subject without finding 
ourselves in conjunction with that 
Works, II, p. 42. 
Works, II, p. 42. 
81 
82 
which is not ourselves, as object. 1 
This latter quotation can hardly be advanced as any 
strict demonstration of the objectivity of the object 
given in thought, when treated out of the context of the 
whole of Brownson's philosophical essays. It must rather 
be viewed in conjunction with Brownson's view of the 
presentation of the object. ~e regards thought as 
the product of two activities acting 
and meeting from opposite directions. 
But. what is not or does not exist, 
cannot act. The object in every 
intuition is therefore real; for, if j.t were not, it could not present 
itself, there could be no thought, 
since the soul can act only in 
conjunction with its object.2 
This is to say that it is the fact that "the object 
actively concurs in the production of thought that es-
tablishes it reality, since what is not, or has no real 
existence, cannot act, cannot present or affirm itselt.n3 
Again, relative to the object, it "must exist a parte rei, 
since, if it did not, it could not actually concur with 
the subject in the production of thoughto"4 It is then, 
this active concurrence of the object in the tact of 
knowledge which would seem to establish its reality. 
However, even Brownson's belief in the active concurrence 
1 Works, I, P• 66. 
2 Works, II, 454. P• 
3 Works, II, p. 44o 
4 Works, II, P• 341. 
.. -- --------~-.------~ ...::. . _:_· ----=----.-
of the object given in thought, would itself seem to be 
grounded on a more fundamental conviction and to be 
made as logical inference therefrom; the conviction 
namely, that God alone can be His own object. For; as 
Brownson asserts: 
God alone suffices, or can suffice, 
for his own thought, and needs 
nothing but himself for his thought 
or his science. He knows himself in 
himself, and is in himself the infinite 
Intelligible, and the infinite Intelligens. 
He knows in himself all his works from 
beginning to end, for he has made them, 
and all events, for he has decreed them. 
There is for him no medium of science 
distinguishable from himself; for he is, 
as the theologians say, the ade~uate 
object of his own intelligence. 
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Hence, for Brownson: "Only God, who is infinite, and 
being in its plenitude, can be at once subject and object 
of his own intelligence, or know himself in himself."2 
One cannot but suspect that at this point Brownson 1 s 
contention that God alone is the adequate object of his 
own Intellect flows mor.e from a theological ~han from a 
philosophic conviction. This would seem particularly 
evident, both from the previous assertion that "the 
theologians say", and this together with his declaration: 
The verbum mentis, that is, a complete 
1 Works, II, p. 340. 
2 Works, II, p. 455. 
thought, is the product of two factors, 
in the language of the schoolmen, of 
the species impressa, and the species 
expressa. The species impressa must 
be furnished by the object; the species 
expressa is the action of the intellect 
and constitutes the verbum mentis, 
because the mind is dependent, and is 
not able of itself alone to generate the 
verbum mentis, or to think; otherwise it 
would generate the Word, as in the Blessed 
Trinity that Father generates the Son or 
Word.l 
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It would seem that Brownson's conviction of the reality 
of the object of thought is grounded on a twofold consid-
eration; the one theological, as already indicated, and 
the other based on a consideration of man as a dependent 
existent. In reference to this aspect of dependency, he 
asserts: 
Further: 
Man being a creature, and therefore 
dependent for his existence, his 
life, and all his operations, interior 
and exterior, on the support and active 
concurrence of that which is hot himself, 
does not and cannot suffice for his 
thought, and he does not and cannot 
think in and of himself alone, in any 
manner, mode, form, or degree, or with-
out the active presence and concurrence 
of the object.2 
Man, whatever else he may be, is a 
dependent existence, and as dependent 
in all his acts or operations as he 
1 Works, II, pp. 490-491. 
2 Works, II, pp. 340-341. 
is in his simple existence itselfo He can 
in no case be his own object; he cannot 
look into his own eyes and see himself 
in himself, and he can know or be conscious 
of his own existence only as he finds it 
reflected as in a mirror from the object, 
or that which is not himself.l . 
Despite Brownson's attempt to establish the reality 
of the object of thought, it is extremely doubtful if he 
was himself convinced that he had, or as a matter of 
fact that anyone could demonstrate its reality. As he 
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states in one of his reviews; "The reviewer concedes that 
objective reality cannot be established in a logical way.n2 
It is relative to this point that the intensely realistic 
outlook of Brownson's mind, is unusually and forcefully 
manifest. It is the tendency to accept the reality of 
what appears, as evident, even though it is incapable of 
any strict demonstration. The fundamental reason for this 
conviction, as previously indicated, is the fact that 
Brownson believes, and logically enough, that if everything 
requires demonstration then nothing is demonstrable. In 
this regard Brownson declares: 
1 
2 
Every fact is incapable of proof just 
in proportion to its certainty. A 
proposition is demonstrated by being 
resolved into another proposition more 
ultimate, or by being shown to be 
Works, II, p. 455. 
Works, II, p. 341. 
involved in another proposition held 
to be true. But when the proposition 
is itself ultimate, when there is no 
proposition more ultimate into which 
it can be resolved, or from which it 
can be obtained, it is, and must needs 
be, incapable of demonstration. But 
then it needs no demonstration. It is 
certain of itself, and one of the grounds 
of certainty in regard to other propo-
sitions. Now, the ground, we assume 
is that both the me and not me are 
ultimate, and both being found in the 
same phenomenon as the essential condi-
tions of its production, are incapable 
of demonstration or o·f proof, but are 
sufficiently evident without either.l 
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This brings us to a basic consideration in the 
epistemological view of Brownson, namely, a distinction 
between intuition and reflection. This is a distinction 
which is indispensable to any adequate view of the pro-
cedure by which Brownson attempts to attain the real. For 
it is, in a last,analysis, on the basis of an intuition 
that Brownson rests his realism. His view is: 
In intuition the principal and primary 
actor is the intelligible object; in 
reflection it is the intelligent sub-ject. In the intuitive order the 
object presents itself as it is, with 
its own characteristics; in the re-
flective order it is represented with 
the limitations and c~aracteristics of 
the thinking subject. 
Hence, intuition is the activity of the object, an 
activity in the absence of which human knowledge is im-
possible. This is not to imply that the subject does 
1 Works, I, p. 67. 
2 Works, II, p. 464. 
nothing in the intuitive situ~tion, but simply that the 
intuition presupposes on the p~rt of the object intuited 
an activity whereby it presents or affirms i ts.elf to the 
cognitive subject. So understood, Brownson regards 
intuition as an activity which must precede reflection 
to the extent that, as already stated in some detail in 
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a previous chapter, to re-flect there must be some object 
intuitively given which is the subject of any reflective 
process. 
This foregoing is perhaps more intelligible if we 
consider the distinction wnich Brownson draws between 
what he calls empirical intuition and ideal intuitiono 
The one, as the immediate presentation 
of the object; the other, as its 
immediate or direct apprehension, in 
which sense it stands opposed to 
discursion. The first we call ideal 
intuition, the second we call empirical 
intuition, and is impossible without 
ideal intuitionol. 
Ideal intuition would seem to imply the direct presentation 
of the object, though not its conscious grasp by the intel-
lect. 
1 
Ideal intuition is not perception of 
cognition. Perception is empirical, 
whether mediate or immediate, and 
whatever its object or its sphere, 
and in it the soul is always the 
percipient agent. Intuition of the 
Works, II, p. 454. 
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ideal is solely the act of the 
object, and in relation to it the 
intellect is passive.l 
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'What is actually presented to the intellect by the 
ideal object? The pre-empirical elements of thought; and 
by these pre-empirical elements of thought, Brownson seems 
to understand something similar to 
What the Greeks called principles, and 
the Latins primordial or first principles, 
called by some 'first truths','necessary 
truths'; by others, 'necessary ideas', 
'absolute ideas', 'necessary and immutable 
ideas·'; by St. Augustine, 'the principles 
of things'; by·St. Thomas, if we recollect 
right, 'first or necessary truths'.2 
Again, interpreted more in the light of modern philosophy, 
Brownson understands by these p;re-empirical elements 
something analogous to those truths which Descartes treats 
1 
as innate, - born in and with us; 
Old Ralph Cudworth holds them to be 
the mind itself pretended, though we 
do not exactly know what that means; 
Lei bni tz holds them to be eternal 
verities, that is, the principles 
alike of science and things, and would 
seem to teach that the mind actually 
perceives or apprehends them; ••• Locke 
endeavors to make out that they are 
obtained by reflection, that is, 
reasoning, operating on sensible ~; 
Hume says no man can disbelieve them, 
but no one can prove them - from 
sensible experience; Dr. Thomas Reid 
makes them ''the constituent principles 
of·belief," "the constituent principles 
of human nature,""the principles of 
common sense, and needing no proof;" 
. Works, II, p. 53. 
2 Works, II, p. 499. 
Kant makes them the forms of the 
understanding, supplied by the 
understanding ftself, on the occasion 
of experience. 
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In other words, those same truths, concerning which all 
agree, "that it is only by virtue of possessing them that 
the mind is cognitive or the soul is capable of any act or 
fact of knowledge or experience.n2 Ultimately then, by 
ideal intuition Brownson understands: "The giving of these 
principles, or a priori ideas, by the direct action of 
the object is what we call intuition, and ideal intuition, 
as distinguished from perception or empirical intuition. 
It is this ideal intuition that renders the soul intelli-
gent.n3 
Ideal intuition is not, therefore, knowledge in the 
strict sense; it is rather the presentation of the 
necessary pre-empirical elements of thought by the ideal 
object. It is the presentation of those pre-empirical 
elements which render knowledge possible, and which are 
prior to all actual thought. Empirical intuition, by 
contrast, would seem to be more closely allied to the 
more commonly accepted meaning of intuition, namely, as 
the intellectual assent given by the mind on the basis of 
evidence presented by the objects of experience. 
1 Works, II, pp. 499-500. 
2 Works, II, p. 499. 
3 Works, II, p. 501. 
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This theory of ideal intuition becomes intelligible, 
only if we bear two facts in mind: first, Brownson's 
agreement with Hume that principles are not capable of 
being derived from experience, since no strict universals 
can be concluded from particulars, and, secondly, his agree-
ment with Kant that there are certain pre-empirical elements 
which must precede experience, and without which no ex-
perience is possible. The question for Brownson, then, 
revolves around the objectivity of the pre-empirical ele-
ments. With Kant they are purely subjective, and it 
becomes Brownson's problem to establish their objectivity. 
Their objectivity is established if we agree with Brownson's 
contention, that they are given by the active concurrence 
of the object in ideal intuition. But, what is this ideal 
object whose active concurrence furnishes the mind with 
its principle of operation? This is a question whose 
answer we will defer until our next chapter, for the 
reason that its complete intelligibility can only be 
grasped in the light of a discussion of Brownson's views 
relative to our knowledge of Godts existence. 
It might be suspected that Brownson regards the pre-
empirical elements of thought as having a chronological 
priority over experience. However, such is hardly the 
case; rather, he holds that their priority is logical, for 
the ideal and the empirical are never given separately and 
it is the work of the reflective reason to distinguish 
them. That this is Brownson's view is particularly 
evident in his statement: 
We have nowhere found or.asserted the 
ideal alone as the object in thought. 
We have found and asserted it only as 
the ideal element of the object, which 
must in principle precede the empirical 
element, but it is never given separately 
from it, and it takes both the ideal and 
the empirical in their relation to 
constitute the object in any actual 
thought. The ideal and the empirical 
elements of the complex object are 
distinguished by the intellectus agens, 
or reflection, in which the soul acts, 
never by intuition, ideal or empirical, 
in either of which the action originates 
with the object.l 
Again, relative to this same point he asserts: 
We have never held, but have always 
denied the Platonic doctrine that in 
intuition ideas are given as pure 
ideas or separately from phantasms 
or species; for man is neither God 
nor pure spirit. But though dis-
tinguished by reflection, or ab~ 
stracted by the intellectus agens 
from the sensible phantasms, or 
intelligible species, they must be 
really presented, that is, intuitively 
given, or else they could not be ab-
stracted, divided, or separated from 
them by reflection; for reflection 
though it may contain less, can never 
contain more than intuition.2 
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Further, in opposition to Plato's doctrine of Ideas we find 
Brownson asserting that, while there is presented to the 
1 Works, II, P• 74. 
2 Works, II, p. 479. 
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intellect an ideal or intelligible element, it is never 
presented nby itself alone, as pure idea, as ~ato, 
according to Aristotle, held, but enveloped, so to say, 
in the species, from which the active intellect separates 
or disengages it.n1 
It is to be noted that these last two quotations 
indicating his rejection of Plato's theory as to how the 
mind knows Ideas appeared in articles written in 1873-1874o 
However, Brownson has serious misgivings about accepting 
Aristotle's interpretation of Plato's theory relative to 
our knowledge of Ideas; this reluctance to accept Aristotle's 
interpretation appears in an article written approximately 
twenty years previously in 1854, wherein Brownson declares: 
Aristotle represents Plato as teaching 
that we have immediate intuition of 
intelligibles as separate from all 
apprehension of the sensible. We are 
far from being satisfied that F1ato 
held this, and certainly though we 
have been a somewhat diligent student 
of his works, we have never found it 
in them. Plato's problem, as we under-
stand it, was not so much how we know, 
or by what faculty we are first placed 
in relation with reality, as what we 
must know in order to have real science. 
He placed science in the knowledge of 
the essences of things, which he called 
ideas, not in the knowledge of their 
exterior or sensible forms, which are 
variable and corruptible. But that 
these ideas are apprehensible in 
themselves without apprehension of the 
1 Works, II, p. 457. 
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of the sensible to which they are 
joined, we have not found him teaching. 1 
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Whatever assessment we may make of Brownson's interpretation 
of Plato's doctrine at this point at least one thing is 
~lear, namely, that Brownson himself is convinced that the 
ideal or intelligible while logically is never psychologi-
cally prior to the empirical, but is given along with the 
empirical and can only be disengaged from it by reflection. 
In addition to this statement that the ideal can 
only be separated from the empirical by reflection, it is 
interesting to note Brownson's recurrence to the logical 
consideration that it is the function of reflection merely 
to disengage or explicate what is given directly in intu-
ition, and that it can do no more. This is a consideration 
which will be of capital importance in his discussion of 
our knowledge of God's existence. 
Thus, the a priori or pre-empirical elements have an 
objective status, even though, they must in some manner be 
disengaged from the empirical by reflection. If this 
writer's interpretation is correct, and it would seem to 
be the only valid explanation in the light of Brownson~s 
over-all philosophic position, these pre-empirical 
principles are given to the mind by the activity of the 
ideal object, which object is independent of the finite 
mind, but remain unformulated by the mind until such time 
1 Works, I, p. 286. 
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as some experience occasions their explicit formulation; 
and are in consequence logically if not psychologically 
prior to experience. This is to say that, while implicit 
in the human mind from its creation they never rise to the 
level of conscious awareness, except as a result of re-
flection, which reflection is occasioned by experience in 
some form. This is not to imply that they are inductive 
generalizations based on experience, for this view 
Brownson has unequivocally rejected, but simply that 
experience is the occasion of their explicit formulation. 
That this is Brownson's meaning would seem to be borne out 
by the following: 
Ideal intuition is a real affirmation 
to the mind by the act of the ideal 
itself, but it is not perception or 
distinct cognition, because, as we have 
said, it is not given separately, but 
only as the ideal or a priori element 
of the object, and is never intuitively 
distinguished or distinguishable from 
it.l 
Why cannot the ideal .be an object of thought when 
separated from the empirical element? Because, man is not 
a pure spirit, nbut spirit or soul united to body, and 
cannot directly perceive, as maintained by Plato, the old 
Gnostics or Pneumatioi, the modern Transcendentalists;n2 
1 Works, II, PP• 75-76. 
2 Works, II, p. 52. 
Ag~in, in an article discussing Newman's theological 
position we find a reiteration of/ the same point when 
Brownson declares: 
We deny, that reflection takes the 
principles immediately from in-
tuition, because intuition is always 
indistinct and indeterminate, and 
because man is not a pure intelligence, 
but an intelligence united to a body, 
and has never in this life that sort 
of intuitive vision of intelligibles 
which supersedes reflection as 
essential to distinct science.l 
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In the light of the foregoing, it would seem evident 
why Brownson believes that the question of principles 
must precede that of method. As the mind cannot operate 
without principles, then principles must precede method, 
and in consequence method becomes the application of 
principles, and the principles are not discoverable by the 
method. That this is Brownson's position is clearly 
discernible when in relation to the intellect he states 
that, 
as destitute of the intelligible, it 
cannot go forth, either spontaneously 
or at the command of the will, to 
seek the intelligible, the principles, 
which method is subsequently to apply. 
The principles are not and cannot be 
sought, for. the mind without them is 
incapable of action, and therefore 
incapable of seeking. Hence it is 
never we who seek or who find them, 
but they, who find us, reveal and 
1 Works, III, p. 1)8. 
self-affirm themselves.in direct 
i~tuition. It is they that affirm 
themselves, not we who affirm them; 
and they affirm themselves in affirm-
ing their own intelligibility, for 
what is not is not intelligible, and 
therefore no object of intuition.l 
Brownson's statement above, that principles affirm them-
selves in direct intuition might easily lend itself to 
the interpretation that he is herein tending to hyposta-
tize principles, and that in consequence he regards them 
in some sense, as active entities in their own right. 
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That such is not the case will be indicated in the following 
chapter, wherein, it will be pointed out that Brownson 
identifies these same ~inciples with the ideal object, 
which ideal object he ultimately identifies with God. 
With such an intuitionistic view Brownson must, as 
he does in fact, hold that principles are self-evident, and 
when we declare that a truth is of this nature, "no further 
evidence is possible or conceivable."2 But, are there not 
false intuitions? Have not men frequently, as has been 
amply demonstrated throughout the history of philosophy, 
held as self-evident, propositions which have as a matter 
of fact been shown to be false? Certainly! However.,. be 
this as it may, if we interpret Brownson correctly it is 
1 Works, I, p. 235. 
2 Works, XIV, p. 353. 
not the intuition which is false, but the conception. In 
reference to a theological work by w. G. Ward we find 
Brownson asserting in this regard: 
The moment you assert the possibility 
of false intuitions, then you deny that 
intuitions carry with them their own 
evidence, or that the fact of intuition 
by itself alone is a sufficient affir-
mation of the objective truth. The 
author falls into this error by con-
founding intuition which is and always 
must be true, and present the truth 
a parte rei, with conception, which 
may indeed be false, as well as obscure, 
indistinct and inadequate; for it is 
an act sometimes of the imagination, 
sometimes of the reflective reason, 
and is subject to all1the infi~mities of the human subject. 
Succinctly stated, Brownson's position at this point 
would seem to be that while intuitions cannot themselves 
be false, nonetheless it is possible_ to be in error 
relative to their interpretation, either through imagi-
nation or through the conclusion which reason infers on 
the basis of the data presented in intuition. This can 
come about through a misinterpretation of the data of 
conscious awareness, analogous to the manner in which the 
insane habitually misinterpret this same data. A mis-
interpretation is possible, since, conceptions presuppose 
intuitions; and consequently, cannot be the idea or 
1 Works, XIV, p. 353. 
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1 primitive data themselves." 
If a conception is an intuition interpreted, when 
do we know that an intuition has not been interpreted? 
In other words, what is the criterion for distinguishing 
a conception from an intuition? Strictly speaking, for 
Brownson, there is no criterion, since "intuition equals 
intuition, and what have we or can we have more certain 
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than intuition with which to verify intuition?"2 In short, 
"no evidence distinct from the intuition can be more evident 
than the intuition itself.n3 
While this inability to lay down a criterion for 
distinguishing ari intuition from a conception might be 
considered a fundamental weakness from the standpoint of 
a non-intuitionistic system, still from the viewpoint of 
an intuitionistic system itself, it would seem to be 
logically consistent. To attempt via reflection to 
discover a criterion for so called self-evident truths is 
simply to say that they are not self-evident, and to 
involve oneself in an infinite regress. This would seem 
to be the case since a second criterion would be necessary 
to validate the first and so ad-infinitum, unless, some 
1 Works, II, P• 478. 
2 Works, XIV, 352. p. 
3 Works, XIV, 353. p. 
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criterion is ultimately self-evident, in which case 
something is self-evident and we have returned to our 
starting point. While Brownson does not bring this whole 
matter out as pointedly as we have attempted to do, 
nonetheless, we feel that the foregoing expresses his basic 
outlook at this point. Brownson was too much of a logician 
to allow himself to be entrapped in an infinite regress of 
demonstration, which regress must logically, if not psycho-
logicall~ crulminate in Skepticism. 
Even granting Brownson's contention that there are 
no false intuitions, he has failed to make clear at this 
point the means by which one is able to distinguish false 
conceptions of intuitional content from true conceptions. 
Some method of distinguishing the two would seem necessary 
to the extent that all formulations of intuitional content 
must be conceptual. However, in a later context Brownson 
does shed some light on this problem ~ his conception 
of the function of language. 
From still another viewpoint there can be no false 
intuitions, since as already indicated, Brownson identifies 
intuition with the act of the object presenting or affirm-
ing itself to the intellect. Now, only what is can act 
or present itself for the obvious reason that agere 
sequitur esse. Thus, abstractions are nullities when 
considered apart from concrete entities and therefore, 
abstraction is the work of the 
reflective understanding in dis-
tinction from the intuitive, and 
reflection can operate only on 
objects furnished by intuition. 
What is no object of intuition, can 
be no object of reflection, and only 
the real or what really is or exists, 
can be an object of intuition.l 
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Brownson's confidence in intuition never waivered, 
·either as regards its ability to furnish the only logical 
escape from the subjectivism of modern philosophy or its 
capacity to furnish the mind with an order of truth·which 
could not be directly apprehended by the senses. Still, 
he never allows this confidence to degenerate into a vague, 
unphilosophical, half-mystical, sentimentalism as did many 
of his contemporaries. In short, he did not place ·in it 
the extreme confidence which the Transcendentalists did. 
In one of the earliest editions of the Boston Quarterly 
Review we find the following: 
1 
So far as Transcendentalism is 
understood to be the recognition in 
man of the capacity of knowing truth 
intuitively, or of attaining to a 
scientific knowledge of an order of 
existence transcending the reach of 
the senses, and of which we can have 
no sensible experience, we are 
Transcendentalists. But when it is 
understood to mean, that feeling is 
to be placed above reason, dreaming 
above reflection, and instinctive 
Works, II, P• 483. 
) 
intimation above scientific exposition; 
in a word, when it means the substitu-
tion of a lawless fancy for an enlightened 
understanding ••• we must disown it, and 
deny that we are Transcendentalis1is.l 
SUMMARY 
Brownson's contention has been that the method of 
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"exclusive psychology" is unable to establish the reality 
of the object given in thought. Its reality can be 
established by way of a recognition that the soul can only 
act in conjunction with an object, which object must exist 
a parte rei. For, in Brownson's view, only an infinite 
being can be the object of his own intelligence. In a 
last analysis, it is the active concurrence of the object 
in the knowledge situation that establishes its reality, 
since only an existing thing can act, can present itself'. 
Hence, intuition consists in the activity of the object 
presenting or affirming itself. 
This presentation of the object Brownson further 
designates as ideal intuition in opposition to empirical 
1 Orestes A. Brownson, "Two Articles from The Princeton 
Review," Boston Q.uarterly Review, III {JUly, 1840), 
pp. 332-323. 
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intuition, by which he understands the direct grasp or 
apprehension of' the object by the intelligent subject. 
Ideal intuition is not knowledge in the strict sense but 
only the presentation by the ideal object of' the necessary 
pre-empirical elements of thought, which elements though 
logically, are never psychologically prior to experience. 
In the following chapter an attempt will be made to 
elucidate the meaning which Brownson attaches to the term 
"ideal object J'; and to indicate his conviction of' the 
identity of the "ideal object" with God. However, in 
Brownson's view, as will be indicated, the explicit rec-
ognition of this same identity will not itself be intuitive, 
but will be grasped only as a result of reflection. 
CHAl'TER V 
ONTOLOGISM AND CREATIONISM AS THE BASIS OF BROWNSON'S 
REALISM 
While Brownson's philosophic works have on the whole 
been largely neglected, nonetheless two points which have 
been treated at considerable length are his Ontologism 
and his Creationism. Why then are they introduced? ~e­
cisely because they serve a double function in his realism 
and if neglected they would leave his position fundamentally 
unintelligible. They serve the positive function of es-
tablishing the objective validity of the objects of thought 
and likewise they serve, in a manner of speaking, as the 
tools which Brownson will utilize in his·attempt to escape 
the subjectivistic conclusions to which he regards the 
method of "exclusive psychology" to lead. 
The term Ontologism may be used either to designate 
any theory which maintains that the human mind has some 
sort of direct or immediate intuition of God, or, to 
designate any theory that maintains that the human mind has 
some sort of direct or immediate intuition of God, as God. 
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What we shall attempt to indicate is that if the term 
Ontologism is taken in the former sense then Brownson is 
clearly an Ontologist, but if taken in the latter sense 
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then Brownson is, obviously, not an Ontologist. T.he main 
concern herein is not, however, with this particular problem, 
which problem has been discussed ad nauseam among Brownson 
scholars.1 Rather, this problem will be treated only to 
the extent necessary to explicate Brownson's epistemological 
realism. 
In lieu of any detailed discussion, a summary will be 
made of the external and the internal evidence relative to 
this question, with particular reference to the internal 
evidence. By the internal evidence is to be understood 
herein merely the evidence which can be gleamed from from 
Brownson's writings themselves and by the external evidence 
simply the views which others have taken relative to 
Brownson's position in the matter under consideration. 
However, the concern will be primarily with the internal 
evidence, since an author's position can best be evaluated 
from a consideration of what he himself alleges, although 
the external evidence will not be minimized, since as 
evidence it is not without some value. Moreover, for the 
1 For a detailed discussion of this controversy we recommend 
to the reader two works in particular, namely, America's 
Foremost Philosopher and Orestes A. Brownson's Approach to 




purpose at hand a consideration of the internal evidence 
will be amply sufficient to manifest the fundamental 
basis of Brownson 1 s realism even apart from any detailed 
analysis of the external evidence. 
At the outset, it is at least clear that Brownson 
regards any a posteriori argument for God's existence, as 
invalid. His objection to the a posteriori argument is in 
substance a restatement and synthesis of the respective 
positions of Hume and Kanto Humets influence is apparent 
to the extent that he believes Hume has established the 
fact that we can conclude nothing from sensibles alone, 
"because they have in themselves no nexus as Hume has 
clearly demonstrated, that binds them to the necessary.nl 
Further: 
The effect in its character of effect, 
the character in which it must be 
asserted, if anything is to be con-
cluded from it, is no more a sensible 
intuition than the cause. The effect 
as external object strikes the senses, 
but as effect it does not.2 
What Brownson would seem to have in mind at this point is 
the fact that the senses as such never reveal to us effect 
as effect any more than they reveal to us cause as cause. 
1 Works, I, p. 247o 






The relation of effect belongs to the intelligible order 
as much as does the relation of cause. Hence if the mind 
was not, in some manner, aware of this 'intelligible relation 
then the sensible affection would remain only a sensible 
affection "from which nothing is concludable.n1 
The Kantian influence manifests itself, at this point, 
when Brownson affirms: 
The objection to all arguments of 
this sort, that is to say, to all 
psychological, cosmological, and 
teleological arguments, which depend 
on the principle of cause and effect, 
is, that they all beg the guestion, or 
take for granted what requires to be 
proved. They all assume that the soul 
and cosmos ar~ effects.2 
Moreover: 
Men must hold the principle of causality, 
must believe in a first cause and final 
cause, and in the necessary relation of 
cause and effect, before they can either 
intellectually apprehend order, design, 
wisdom, or goodness, in nature, or dream 
of inferring the existence of God from 
them, and therefore must really believe 
in necessary and eternal being, cause 
and end of all things, that is to say, 
in God himself.3 
This denial of the ability of the mind to conclude 
the necessary from the contingent, is ultimately grounded 
1 
246. Works, I, p. 
2 Works, II, p. 34. 
3 Works, I, p. 261. 
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in the logical consideration, frequently stated herein, 
namely, that: "Demonstration does not supply new matter; 
it only clears up and establishes the matter already 
intuitively apprehended, and never enables us to assert 
any existence not apprehended in the intuition. n1 
Therefore, similar to the manner in which the mind 
intuits principles, which according to Brownson, are not 
acquired but given, likewise unless the mind has in some 
manner intuition of God's existence, then it is logically 
impossible to demonstrate His existence. For, God must 
be the object of which "we have immediate intuition in 
every process of reasoning, and without which no such 
process would be possible or conceivable,n2 This intuition 
of God's existence as essential to the very process of 
demonstration itself Brownson argues for in virtue of a 
consideration of the minds apprehension of the necessary 




We have immediate intuition of cause 
and effect, and of the necessary re-
lation of the one to the other, and 
we could not perform a single act of 
reasoning if we had not. In the 
syllogism we hold there is necessary 
Works, III, p. 131. 
Works, I, p. 270. 
nexus between the premises and the 
conclusion, and in all languages 
the conclusion is said to follow 
necessarily from the premises. Here 
is evidently apprehension of the 
necessary. But the necessary, as 
the:·eternal, wherever we encounter 
it, must have a real entity, - is 
in the language of the schools, 
ens necessarium, necessary entity, 
and therefore God.l 
Brownson's method of arguing for the identity of the 
necessary and God is a point to which attention will be 
directed more specifically in another context in this 
same chapter. 
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It is precisely at this point that Brownson's thesis 
seems to oppose the view of a good many Christian theo-
logians, namely, that the existence of God is demonstrable, 
in some manner at least, from the contingent beings of 
experience. Does Brownson hold for a two-fold truth? 
May what is true in theology be false in philosophy? Such 
a conclusion is hardly in keeping with Brownson's logical 
mind. How is it possible to avoid such a conclusion, 
particularly in virtue of St. Paul's position that the 
"Invisibilia ipsius, a creatura mundi per ea quae facta 
sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur"? 2 !}is interpretation of 
St. Paul's position is, in substance, that St. :Paul is 
not attempting to establish the fact that God is, in the 
1 Works, I, pp. 269-270• 
2 I Rom. 20. 
sense that the existence of God is a logical inference 
from the things that are made, but rather that from a 
consideration of the things that are made we can gain 
some knowledge of what God is. For Brownson states · 
explicitly "The Apostle does not tell us that the ex-
istence of God is a logical conclusion from cosmological 
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or psychological facts or from 'the things that are made.'"l 
Rather, "St. Paul appeals to the things that are made not 
to prove that God is, but to show what he is, or rathert 
2 if we may so express ourselves, to prove that he is God." 
Granted that "'the invisible things of him, even his 
eternal power and divinity, are clearly seen from the 
creation. of the world, being understood by the things that 
are made,'"3 nonetheless, this manifestation is evident 
only to those who have "already learned that he is,"4 and 
they are the ones who are, "intent on answering the question, 
Quid est Deus? not the question, An sit Deus?"5 
Not only would the prima facie evidence seem to indi-
cate that Brownson was an Ontologist, but there is likewise 
1 Works, II, p. 39. 
2 Works, II, p. 305. 
3 Works, II, p. 4.39. 
4 Works, II, P• 439. 
5 Works, II, p. 4.39. 
considerable extrinsi~ evidence to support this view. 
Even his son, Henry, in his biography admits at least 
that "Brownson from 1842-1844 should be classed as an 
ontologist.n1 Further, v. G. Michel in a work entitled, 
The Critical Principles of Orestes A. Brownson asserts, 
in reference to Brownson's views of art: "Considered in 
this light the examination of Brownson's ontology, which 
is really ontologism, should give us some indication of 
the value of what he says about art.n2 The author of 
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another article wished to be understood as "dissenting from 
even the mitigated system of ont_ologism which Brownson 
adopted • • ,3 Moreover, Brownson was constantly at war with 
editors and contributors of various periodicals, particu-
larly such publications as the London Month, Catholic 
World and the Dublin Review, which were constantly 
questioning his orthodoxy, both theological and philo-
sophical. Especially was this true relative to his 
Ontologistic leanings. 
However, there are still others who have defended 
Brownson from the charge of Ontologism• One of his biogra-
phers states that, "the common charge of ontologism -
1 Henry F. Brownson, orestes A. Brownson's Middle Life 
(Detroit: H.F.Brownson, 1899), p. 43. 
2 Virgil G. Michel, The Critical Principles of Orestes A. 
Brownson (Washington, D.c.: The Catholic University of 
America Press, 1918), p. 43. 
3 "Brownson's Works," The Month, XLVII (March, 1883}, p. 430.· 
which is still brought against him to his damage - cannot 
be substantiated."1 Whereas another author declares: 
"Brownson does not assert any immediate intuition of God 
by the soul in the subjective sense of intuition as we 
understand this term."2 
There are innumerable statements in Brownson's 
writings which would seem to indicate his ontologistic 
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views when wrestled free of their context, but that this 
process is hardly fair is admitted by all scholars of worth. 
The simple fact would seem to be that Brownson was more 
familiar with ontologism than was any man in his day. More-
over, Brownson on many occasions decries ontologism from 
the standpoint of its tendency to culminate in pantheism. 
For example: "\Vhen we begin with the object, the not me, 
taking our point of sight in God, as do the larger part of 
the theologians, we necessarily end in Pantheism, with 
Spinoza."3 OI; more explicitly stated, if the mind has an 
immediate perception of ens or being, 
and that ens or being is God, you 
cannot conclude from the perception 
or intuition of God, if we have it, 
the existence of the soul; for that 
would imply that creation of con-
tingent existences is necessary: 
1 Theodore Maynard, Orestes Brownson: Yankee, Radical, 
Catholic (New York: The Macmillan Co., 194.3), p. XI. 
2 Raemers, P. 185 • 
.3 Works, I, p. 64. 
which is a contradiction in terms, 
since it makes contingent existence 
necessary and not contingent, and 
asserts pure pantheism.l 
Relative to this consideration as to whether or not 
Brownson was an ontologist, this writer cannot but agree 
with Raemers, when he states: "The point we would make 
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here is that Brownson abominated the doctrine of ontologism, 
that he was quick to detect it in the writings of others 
and to condemn it.n2 The agreement with Raemers at this 
point, is not to be interpreted as a denial of the fact 
that Brownson held to some sort of immediate intuition of 
God, for Brownson himself asserts: 
From the fact that we assert direct 
and immediate intuition of God, it 
must not be inferred that we assert, 
or intend to assert, either that we 
Eee God intuitively by himself alone, 
or as he is in himself.3 
The question would seem to revolve around the meaning 
which Brownson attaches to, "direct and immediate intuition." 
He certainly does not mean that intuitive vision which is 
associated with the blessed in heaven, and which is termed 
by theologians the beatific vision. Brownson constantly 
maintains that this is not his meantng. Thus: 
No man in his senses maintains that 
1 Works, II, p. 509. 
2 Raemers, P. 80. 
3 Works, I, p. 251. 
Again: 
the intuitive vision of God enjoyed 
by the Blest is possible by the simple 
light of natural reason, or even by 
natural reason illumined by the 
supernatural light of faithol 
The objection, that the doctrine that 
we have intuition of most perfect being 
assumes that we have the intuitive 
vision of God even in this life, cannot 
stand, because that vision is vision of 
God as he is in himself, and this asserts 
only intuition of him as idea, which we 
even know not by intuition is God.2 
11.3 
We are now in a position to discern what Brownson does 
not mean by "immediate intuition", but what we are primarily 
interested in is precisely what he does mean by this direct 
intuition of God's existence. It is intuition of God as 
the ideal, and, "To have intuition of God as the ideal, 
the intelligible, is, in our judgment, something very 
different from having intuition of him as he is in himself.".3 
This intuition, while intuition of God, is intuition of Him 
only as the ideal, which ideal is not known explicitly as 




The idea i~ intuitive; and we know 
by intuition that which is God, and 
that he is would be indemonstrable 
if we did not; but we do not know by 
intuition that what is affirmed or 
I, p. 442. 
II, p • .306. 
I, p. .3.36. 
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presented in intuition is God.l 
That is to say, that: "We know by intuition that which is 
God, but not that it is God."2 
In asserting that in ideal intuition we have in-
tuition of God only "as idea", Brownson is making reference 
to the minds grasp of those "ideas or truths which are the 
a priori condition of every thought, o~ every empirical 
perception or cognition.n3 Hence, the intuition is only 
intuition of the universal and necessary in the knowledge 
situation, In stating that our intuition of God is only 
"intuition of him as idea," and in consequence that in 
intuition we know, "that which is God but not that it is 
God," Brownson should not be interpreted as meaning that 
from our idea of God it is possible to infer the existence 
of God. While similar in some respects to St. Anselm's 
ontological argument it is by no means a perfectly identical 
position. Brownson's conviction would seem to be that in 
the intuition of universal and necessary truths the in-
tuition is of God to the extent that the universal and 
necessary are identically God, however, and this is the 
point Brownson never ceases to insist on, namely, that 
1 
Works, II, P• 304. 
2 Works, II, p. 304. 
3 Works, II, p. 476. 
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the mind in the intuitive situation is not explicitly 
aware of the identity of the universal and necessary with 
God. 
Again, this is not to imply that the ideal is psy-
chologically prior to the empirical, but rather that the 
ideal is given along with the empirical and is separated 
from it only by reflection. For, Brownson declares in one 
form or another throughout his essays that "the ideal and 
the empirical elements of the complex object are dis-
tinguished by the intellectus agens or reflection."1 
This latter should not be interpreted as signifying that 
the ideal, the universal and necessary, are inferred from 
the empirical, but simply that they are given along with 
it. For in Brownson's view universality and necessity 
cannot be "derived analytically from the empirical fact. n2 
Further, "in every synthetic judgment a posteriori there 
is always a judgment a priori, something added, which is 
not derived from experience.n3 
One is now in a position to ask; how is the ideal 
known as God? This identification is the result of 
1 Works, II, p .. 74. 
2 Works, I, P• 508. 
3 Works, I, p. 508. 
reflection or reasoning, through what . .might be termed a 
double identification. The method of demonstrating the 
existence of God 
consists in identifying," by reflection 
and reasoning, the necessary ideas or 
ideal intuitiqn with real, necessary, 
universal, eternal and immutable peing, 
and real and necessary being in which 
they are all identified with God ••• 
This is J~nown only by reflection and 
reasoning, dis~ngaging the ideal from 
the empirical. 
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Further, in an attempt to prove that he does not hold that 
the mind has immediate and habitual cognition of God as 
God, he asserts: 
We simply hold that the mind has 
direct intuition of the ideal, which 
we prove by reflection or reasoning, that 
is discursively, is, in the last analysis, 
necessary and real being, and therefore 
God, who is Ens necessarium et reale.2. 
A little reflection should now aid us in integrating 
many of the aspects of Brownson's realistic outlook 
previously mentioned in a somewhat disparate manner, which 
presentation was necessitated to a great extent by the 
particular method of approach selected. First, how know 
that ·the object given in ideal intuition is real? If the 
reader will recall, Brownson maintains that the object of 
every intuition is real. The reason for his convlction is 
1 Works, II, pp. 437-438. 
2 Works, II, p. 479. 
as previously indicated, that he regards ideal intuition 
as the act of the object presenting or affi~ming itself; 
but, only the real can act, can affirm itself, since, what 
is not cannot act. 
Hence we say in the intuition of 
the necessary and eternal ideas, 
real and necessary being is given 
as the ideal, and therefore, that 
we have actual intuition of real 
and necessary being, though not 
explicitly as being.l 
This is to say, that while for Brownson the intuition is 
of real and necessary being the explicit awareness of 
this fact is not a matter of direct and immediate 
consciousness. Rather the identity of the universal and 
necessary given in ideal intuition is explicitly known 
as God only by virtue of reflection. That this is 
Brownson's meaning would seem evident in the following: 
1 
While we assert intuition of God 
in every intellectual act, and that 
the soul in the intuition really 
apprehends God, we yet maintain, ••• 
that it does not intuitively advert 
to the fact that what it apprehends 
is God intuitively, it does not take 
note intuitively that it apprehends 
him. It comes to know this only 
subsequently, by means of. reflection 
on the intuition repeated in language, 
the indispensable instrument of all 
reflection.2 
Works, II, p. 478. 
2 Works, III, p. 130. 
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As a result of reflection, the mind recognizes that 
there can be no necessary, eternal, 
universal, and immutable creatures, 
what is not God, and yet exists is 
creature, and what is neither God 
nor creature is nothing, and is 
neither knowable nor thinkable.l 
Is it possible that the necessary, eternal, universal, 
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and immutable is the Platonic Idea? Despite his Platonic 
leanings Brownson is unwilling to accept such a conclusion, 
since, in his view, such a position logically leads to 
Pantheism. 
Plato made all science consist in 
the intuition or knowledge of ideas, 
and ideas were in fact the only 
reality he recognized. All else he 
regarded as merely phenomenal. The 
idea in his system is the divine 
paradigm, or archetype in the divine 
mind or reason, and therefore God 
himself; for whatever is in God, or 
the divine reason, is God. Hence 
St. Thomas says, Idea in Deo nihil 
est aliud guam essentia Dei. Plato, 
then, must have regarded God as all 
and the only reality, and the universe 
merely as phenomenal, of which God is 
the substance or2subject, which is sheer pantheism. 
If the ideal is not the Platonic Idea what is it? 
It is, "God as the intelligible or as facing the hi.unan 
intellect."3 Although Brownson regards the Intelligible 
as God, one must bear in mind that in his interpretation 
1 Works, II, p. 477. 
2 Works, III, p. 127. 
3 Works, II, p. 478. 
of ideal intuition, it is not the mind 
that by its own inherent power immedi-
ately seized hold of the Intelligible, 
but the Intelligible immediately af-
firming itself and thereby constituting 
our intelligence. Henpe, the intuition 
is primarily an ontological fact, though 
affirming simultaneously the ontological 
and the psychological.l 
Consequently, the simple fact of the matter is that, 
the Intelligible is God creating, and 
in the fact of intuition he creates our 
intellect, or makes it an actually exist-
ing intellect, capable of acting, of 
apprehending. Our intellect is created, 
constituted in the fact of intuition, 
and cannot be conceived as acting or even 
existing prior to it. In like manner as 
we depend on God, as being, for our 
existence, do we depend on him, as the 
Intelligible, for our intelligence, and 
he is as immanent and must be as immanent 2 in us under the one relation as the other. 
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\Vhile Brownson refers to God as "immanent in us," this 
immanence is not to be given a pantheistic interpretation, 
for, as will be indicated in a later context, Brownson 
understands this not as an immanence in being but rather 
as a conserving immanence. What Brownson means here, it 
would seem, is that the actual object which gives to the 
mind its universal and necessary ideas, truths, principles, 
or whatever they may be designated, is God the Creator in 
1 Works, I, p. 454. 
2works, I, p. 454. 
the very act of creating the human intellect. For, 
Brownson declares that, "God himself supplies them in 
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the natural order by his immediate presence in reason as 
its creator, its light, and its object."l The preceding 
quotation bears a striking similarity to St. Augustine's 
theory of divine illumination. This is a point which will 
be discussed in another context in the following chapter. 
Finally, in this same connection Brownson asserts: 
The object is ens necessarium et reale, 
real and necessary being; and it is its 
creative act that gives the mind, as we 
have so often explained, the principles 
of science, which are at the same time 
the principles of all the knowable and 
of all the real.a 
It is under this precise formality that Brownson 
attempts to escape from the subjectivity of the Kantian 
categories. Since, assuming that ideal intuition is the 
act of the object, God, affirming Himself to the intellect, 
as the Intelligible, then the universal and necessary 
elements of the a.priori judgment are objective, as 
identified with God and given to the mind in its creation. 
If such were not the case, the mind would be unable to 
act, would in fact not be mind at all, 
because.the first principles of all 
1 Works, I, p. 486. 
2 Works, II, p. 523. 
science are those which create and 
constitute the human intellect itself, 
or man as an intellectual or rational 
existence, capable of knowing and under-
standing. The mind, destitute of princi-
ples, cannot seek principles, and ignorant 
of them it cannot recognize them, or know 
them to be principles. Principles, then 
must be given antecedently to all our 
mental operations, and be constitutive 
of the human reason or understanding, and 
therefore given by the Creator himself, 
and as given by him they are a priori, 
ideal, apodictic, not empirical, 
contingent, or doubtful, since, as 
doubt is a mental operation, we co~ld 
not even doubt if we had them not. 
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In stating that ttintuition of the ideal is solely the act 
of the objecttt what Brownson would seem to mean, is, that 
the ideal object which is identically God, must in creating 
intellect give it the very principles which constitute it 
intellect. That is to say, that God must confer on 
intellect those principles or truths without which intellect 
would simply not be intellect. This would seem to be the 
substance of what Brownson has in mind when he states 
above that these same principles, "must be constitutive of 
the human reason or understanding, and therefore given by 
the Creator himself." 
Here it might be well to focus our attention on two 
particular points in Brownson's epistemological position, 
which were discussed in a preceding chapter, namely, that 
. the object of thought consists of three inseparable 
l Works, II, P• 233. 
elements, the ideal, the empirical, and their relation, 
and also the fact that 
ideal intuition is not perception 
or cognition. :Perception is emp:i:ric-
al, whether mediate· or immediate, and 
whatever its object or its sphere, 
and in it the soul is always the 
percipient agent. Intuition of the 
ideal is solely the act of the object, 
and in relation to it the intellect 
is passive.l 
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If one fails to bear these two factors in mind, one is apt 
to mutilate his theory and misinterpret him as declaring 
that the ideal is psychologically prior to and independent 
of the empirical. That such a position was completely 
foreign to the thought of Brownson is evident in his 
assertion that 
cognition or perception is an act 
of the soul in concurrence with the 
object, and the soul, through the 
forma corporis, or informing principle 
of the body, never in this life acts 
without the body, and consequently 
can perceive the ideal only as sensibly 
represented.2 
What Brownson means by ideal intuition is then, "the 
presentation or affirmation of the object by itself or 
its placing itself by its own act in relation to the intel-
lect as the a priori condition of perception."3 However, 
1 Works, II, p. 53. 
2 Works, II, 52-53. pp. 
3 Works, II, p. 54. 
this should not be understood to mean that the ideal is 
inf~rred from the empirical, rather it is more accurately 
said to be separated or disengaged from it. 
But as the soul cannot act without 
the body, the intelligible cannot 
be presented save as sensible re-
presented, and therefore only in 
the phantasmata or sensible species, 
from which the active intellect abstracts, 
divides, disengages or separates - not 
infers - them.I 
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The foregoing consideration_of Brovynson's ontologistic 
and creationistic views furnishes us with a focal point 
from which attention may be directed to a consideration 
of Brownson's positive convictions relative to the validity 
of the judgment of causality. Although this matter was 
touched on in a preceding discussion of Brownson's relation 
to Kant, nonetheless, if Brownson's thesis relative to the 
judgment of causality is to find any integration with his 
overall realistic position, it needs must be discussed 
after an expression of his ontologistic and creationistic 
views, since only then is it fully intelligible. 
As far back as 1844, in his articles on Kant's phi-
losophy we find Brownson attempting to formulate a solu-
tion which will guarantee the objective value of this 
judgment, which solution although not undergoing any 
radical change, will be given a more concrete and explicit 
1 Works, II, p. 54. 
formulation in a later stage of Brownson's philosophical 
development. As against Kant, he asserts: 
The ideal is always in the actual, 
so in the intuition of the actual 
we have intuition of the ideal. Hence 
it is, that, in the cognition of effect, 
I have always the conception of cause. 
Consequently, the element which Kant 
assumes to be out of the fact of ex-
perience, and to be added a priori in 
the synthesis, does not lie out of the 
fact of experience, and is, in fact, 
not a synthetic judgment, but an 
analytic judgment, or, if synthetic, 
it is synthetic a posteriori.l 
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Brownson's ultimate solution appears most clearly, 
eleven years later, in 1855. In an article entitled, "The 
Problem of Causality", he declares that we have this 
judgment because 
God reveals or affirms himself to 
our noetic faculty, and affirms 
himself as creating existences or 
the universe and we assist, if we 
may use a Gallicism, at the spectacle 
of creation. The origin of the judgment is in intuition of the 
creative act of God, and is therefore, 
though, indemonstrable, except ~ 
conseguentiis, objectively evident, 
and therefore knowledge, not merely 
belief.2 
Even were one to grant Brownson's contention that the 
mind has some sort of intuition of God's creative act, 
the problem still remains as to what justification exists 
1 Works, I, p. 211. 
2 Works, I, p. 406. 
for the application of this principle to the universe of 
non-necessary beings. Relative to this same application 
Brownson affirms: 
The judgment of causality in the 
order of second causes copies or 
imitates the judgment in the order 
of the first cause, and like that judgment has one ter~ necessary, the 
other contingent. When we see an 
event happen, we judge at once that 
it has a cause; for we know, as it 
happens, that it is in the order of 
contingents, and that contingents 
cannot come into existence uncaused, 
since they are not God, and nothing 
not God can exist but by his causative 
or creative act. So far then, as the judgment affirms that the event has 
had a cause, it repeats the primitive judgment, and is infallible; but so 
far as it assigns this or that par-
ticular cause for this or that par-
ticular event, it depends on ex-
perience, and may or may not be just. 
Here the judgment is not apodictic, 
and has only probabilitl, or what is 
called moral certainty. 
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Brownson's meaning herein would seem to be that if a 
thing begins to exist it is in the order of the contingent. 
In consequence, its existence is intelligible only in refer-
ence to a producing cause or causes. Thus, the contingent 
stands in a necessary objective relation to a producing 
cause or causes and without this necessary_relation its 
existence is unintelligible. 
1 Works, I, p. 406. 
SUMMARY 
This chapter has developed Brownson's conviction 
that in ideal intuition, which is the act of the object 
presenting or affirming itself, the mind intuits the 
universal and necessary. However, the universal and 
necessary or the a priori elements in the knowledge 
situation while logically prior to the empirical are not 
psychologically prior. Moreover, the universal and 
necessary are, for Brownson, identical with God, although 
the explicit knowledge of this identity is itself not 
intuitive but is known only as a result. of reflection. 
The foregoing should not be interpreted as meaning that 
our knowledge is, literally, God, but rather that in 
intuiting the universal and necessary the mind intuits 
that which is God. 
It is by way of ideal intuition, considered as the 
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act of the ideal object, God presenting or affirming Himself 
under the formality of the universal and necessary, that 
Brownson hopes to give an objective status to the Kantian 
categories. For, if only the real can present or affirm 
itself, and if there can be no universal and necessary 
creature, then the universal and necessary are identically 
real being, God, and consequently not purely subjective 
127 
categories of thought in any Kantian sense. 
Finally, Brownson attempts to indicate the objective 
validity of the principle of causality by way of a consider-
ation of the creative act of Necessary Being creating con-
tingents, or, as Brownson prefers to label them, existences. 
Now, the judgment of causality, at the level of second 
causes, imitates the judgment at the level of the first 
cause to the extent that the existence of any reality 
which comes to be is intelligible only in virtue of its 
owing its existence to the productive influence of some 
producing cause or causes. In brief, whatever does not 
have existence of itself must have a received or participated 
existence, otherwise it would always and necessarily have 
existed. 
CHAl'TER VI 
BROWNSON'S CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE MODIFIED ARISTOTELIANISM 
OF ST. THOMAS 
Brownson's contention 'is that the mind has intuition 
of the creative act of Necessary Being, and that this 
intuition gives to the mind the first principles of 
reality. These principles are, "being, existence, and the 
creative act of being, whence the ideal formula or judgment, 
Being creates existences.n1 If we do not lose sight of 
Brownson's theory that the object of every intuition is 
real, since only the real is intelligible, then the princi-
ples of science and the principles of things must be 
identical. In his attempt to escape the subjective we 
find Brownson asserting in this regard: 
1 
2 
Only what is or exists is intelligible 
or cognizable, things are and can be 
known, if known at all, only as they 
are, not as they are not. Hence we 
maintain that the principles of science 
and the principles of things are 
identical. Nothing can be true in the 
order of science that is not true in 
the order of being.2 
Works, II, p. 393. 
Works, II, p. 517. 
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Brownson is unusually severe in his rejection of 
any system which, in his view, maintains that there is a 
discrepancy between the principles of thought and the 
principles of reality. The reason for this severity of 
criticism is not difficult to determine, when viewed in the 
light of his intensely realistic outlook, together with his 
fear of the subjectivism to which he regards such a position 
to lead. This intensely realistic outlook is particUlarly 
evident in Brownson's declaration that: 
By denying the identify of the 
principles of science and the 
principles of things ••• science may 
be unreal, and, therefore, no 
evidence or proof of the reality 
of its object .1 
Moreover, 
if the soul can think, that is 
know, in any instance, without 
thinking or knowing any object 
really, actually existing out or 
independent of itself, as it must 
if it can know possibles or ab-
stractions, by what possible 
process can it prove that there 
is anything actually existing 
outside of itself.2 
Negatively viewed, Brownson's declaration of the 
identity of these same principles would seem to be condition-
ed to a considerable extent, by his abhorrrence of the sub-
jectivism to which he regards such a theory inevitably to 
1 Works, II, p. 509. 
2 Works, II, p. 509. 
lead. This can be seen in Brownson's rejection of the 
subjectivity of the Kantian categories; since Brownson 
is unable to perceive any logical means of attaining the 
real, the objective, if, the laws of thought or principles 
of the understanding or whatever they may be designated, 
are pure a priori forms of the understanding applicable 
only to phenomena. However, Brownsont s view is not wholly 
negative, and when considered in a .more positive light, 
his conviction of the identity of these principles is 
grounded on the theory that "The soul is an intelligent 
existence, and the principles, causes, and conditions of 
her existence are the principles, causes and conditions of 
her intelligence, and therefore of her actual knowledge.nl 
What Brownson would seem to have in mind herein, is 
that as the soul depends for its existence on the creative 
act of Necessary Being, and it might be added, on creation 
as a continuous process, then: 
Prescind the act, and existence is 
gone, is annihilated. This the 
creative act is not actus transciens, 
but is substans, substantial, that 
which stands under and supports the 
substantia or existence, that is to 
say, actus creativus is identically 
actus conservativus. Hence we say 
not only that God created existences, 
but that he creates existences, for 
1 Works, II, p. 393. 
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his creative act is an ever-present 
act.l 
While the above might, rather easily, lend itself to 
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a pantheistic interpretation or equally to an interpretation 
in favor of some form of Absolute Idealism, nonetheless, 
it would be unjust to interpret Brownson as defending 
either of these positions. Such interpretation would be 
unjust to the extent that we find Brownson explicitly 
stating: 
We call the creative act actus 
imm.anens, - not immanent in the 
sense that it produces only within 
the actor, for the creative act is 
essentially actus ad extra, but 
immanent in the effect, as that which 
produces and sustains it, - simply 
what theologians mean when they say 
God is present, efficaciously present 
in all his works ••• This is what and 
all we mean when we say that actus 
creativus is actus imm.anens, not 
actus transiens.2 
Further, Brownson declares in reference to actus imm.anens: 
1 
We do not mean that it is actus 
immanens in the sense in Which the 
generation of the Word or the 
procession of the Holy Ghost is 
actus immanens; but that it is an 
act that remains in its effect as 
long as the effect remains, as its 
substans, that which makes it from 
nothing what it is, and holds it 
from dropping into nothing again. 
The error of Spinoza was not in 
Works, I, p. 435. 
2 Works, I, p. 435o 
terming God causa immanens, but 
in making him immanent as the 
substance, or, as we say, immanent 
in his being, not simply immanent 
by his act. By assuming the immanence 
to be that of God in his being, or 
substance, in his language, Spinoza 
placed existences in God, and made 
them merely modes, affections, or 
attributes of the Divine being.l 
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What Brownson would seem to have in mind in referring 
to creation as a continuous process, is, that if the 
creator were to withdraw his conserving influence the 
creature would simply cease to exist, be annihilated, as 
Brownson affirms: 
The creative act does not simply 
produce its effect and pass over or 
from it, or cease with its simple 
production; for the cessation or 
passing over of the act would not 
leave the effect independent or a 
quasi -independent existence, but 
would be the cessation or annihilation 
of the effect. Between being and 
existence there is only the creative 
act, and only the creative act between 
existence and nothing.2 , · 
Again, relative to the same consideration, although in 
another context, Brownson asserts: 
1 
The creative act is an ever-present 
act, - a continuous act. To suppose 
it suspended, is to suppose the 
existence it places to be annihilated; 
for creatures have no life or being in 
or from themselves. 'In him we live, 
and move, and have our being.'3 
Works, I, pp. 435-436. 
2 Works, I, p. 435. 
3 Works, III, p. 577. 
Now, in an analogous manner the soul depends for 
its intellectual activity on the same continuous creative 
act. Consequently, as its coming to be is by virtue of 
the creative act of Necessary Being,. likewise the f'irst 
principles of its knowledge, although only impl·ici tly and 
indistinctly known, are, 'Being creates existence'. This 
is not to be interpreted as meaning that 
the mind is able in the. first moment of 
intellectual life to say to itself, or 
to others, God creates existences. This 
is the real formula which expresses in 
principle the entire real order, but it 
is the formula to which the principles 
given in intuition are reduced by re-
flection.l · 
Hence, these principle~ are both alike the principles of 
things and the primitive data of thought. 
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Might not all science be deduced in a mathematical 
way from the ideal formula, intuitively given? While this 
might seem to be the logical conclusion to which Brownson 
was led, it was not his actual conclusion. Rather: "We 
cannot deduce, after the manner of the geometricians, any 
actual existence or fact from the formula, nor any of the 
sciences."2 The reason that we cannot make this deduction 
1 Works, II, p. 401. 
2 Works, II, p. 374. 
is that: 
There is an empirical element in 
all the sciences, and none of them 
can be constructed by logical 
deduction even from a true ideal 
formula, and to deny every thing 
not logically deducible from it 
would leave us in the purely ideal, 
and practically very little better 1 off than Descartes himself left us. 
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In a last analysis, all that the ideal formula give us is 
"the principles of science, but not the sciences; the law 
which governs the explication of facts, not the facts them-
selves.n2 
In the light of the foregoing considerations, one 
discovers a vantage point from which to focus attention on 
and to elucidate Brownson's thesis relative to Aristotle's 
position. Brownson's concern with logic was discussed at 
some length in our first chapter. It was pointed out that 
while he regards logic as an already perfected art, he is 
more interested in logic on its material rather than on 
its formal side, on logic as a science, as he describes ito 
In brief, his concern is with a logic which is not merely 
a science of conceptions or abstractions, but rather with 
a logic which conforms to the real order of things. 
From the focal point of his basic intuitionistic 
outlook he attacks Aristotle's logic as being ultimately 
1 Works, II, p. 374. 
2 Works, II, P• 374. 
l_ -------- ----~---~------- ... --~-------~----~~---;_-...:.._--_----------------------------=-=-=-----------,;__··----·,;.;;---;;_;;;_·-...;_-..:;-.;;.:_.,--
involved in a fundamental logical inconsistency. This 
logical inconsistency is due, as Brownson sees it, to 
the fact that Aristotle and the medieval scholastics as 
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well, attempted to arrive at the universal by induction 
from particulars, whereas, the very principles at which 
they arrive by the inductive process, were necessarily 
presupposed in the very process of reasoning through which 
the mind supposedly obtained them. The Scholastics follow-
ing Aristotle tell us that: 
Experience furnishes the particulars, 
and reason by way of induction obtains 
from them the universals, which re-
applied to particulars, give sapientia, 
or wisdom, the end of all philosophy. 
But they also tell us that all reasoning, 
all demonstration, proceeds from uni-
versals to particulars! So they assume 
universals in order to get particulars, 
and particulars in order to get uni-
versals. They prove their particulars 
by their universals, and their universals 
by their particulars. The universals 
are obtained by reasoning, and yet fhere 
is no reasoning without universals. 
If Brownson is correct in his contention that 
principles cannot be obtained by induction from particulars, 
then it is obvious why Brownson regards the knowledge of 
principles as necessarily intuitive, as given and not 
acquired. Hence, if they are known at all, they must be 
known intuitively. 
1 Works, I, pp. 288-289. 
Moreover, Brownson is dissatisfied with what he 
regards as the subjectivistic tendency of Aristotle's po-
sition, to ~he extent that he interprets Aristotle as 
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having interposed a medium between the intelligent subject 
and its object, namely, the phantasm or intelligible species. 
In reference to this view of Aristotle, Brownson maintains: 
It does not bring us face to face 
with reality, although no man ever 
labored harder to find a logic which 
would do so; it always interposes a 
mundus logicus between the reason 
and the real world, and deals with 
the lifeless forms of abstract 
thought, instead of the living form 
of things.l 
Now, if the following interpretation is correct, Brownson 
contends that since, for Aristotle, the idea is not the 
thing itself nor the direct intuition of the thing how do 
we know that this vicarious likeness, is as the reality 
itself, assuming even that there is anything of which it 
is a representation? How then escape the snares of an 
exclusive subjectivity? It is this interposing of a medium 
between reality and the mind that renders, according to 
Brownson, any logical escape impossible. Again, in the 
same vein, Brownson deolares.in relation to Aristotle's 
position: 
1 
Always is there interposed between the 
cognitive subject and the intelligible 
object a world of phantasms and 
Works, I, p. 281 .. 
intelligible species, which are 
neither God nor creature, neither 
nothing nor yet something, but ~ 
tertium guid, by means of which in 
some unintelligible way the cognitive 
subject comes into relation with the 
cognizable object~l 
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Is Brownson correct in interpreting Aristotle in this 
manner? Is not Aristotle's logic more realistic than 
Brownson is willing to admit? It would certainly seem 
that Aristotlets logic is fundamentally realistic in many 
respects. For example, Aristotle's categories would seem 
to be categories of reality and not categories which the 
mind imposes on experience. In this same connection, 
Aristotle would certainly seem convinced of the extra-
mental reality of substance. Again, in referenc·e to the 
universal Aristotle's position would seem realistic, to 
the extent that for Aristotle the mind abstracts the real 
essence of objectively existing entities.2 Nonetheless, 
Brownson's criticism of Aristotlets position would seem 
fair enough, if one considers the specific level at which 
his criticism is directed. This is to say,_ Brownson 
recognizes Aristotlets desire to attain the real, the ob-
jective, the extra-mental, yet he sees no valid method of 
attaining the real if the phantasm and intelligible species 
serve as media in the knowledge process. 
1 Works, I, pp. 281-282. 
2 For a good treatment of the realism of Aristotle's logic 
the reader might consult the following: Francis H. Parker, 
Henry B. Veatch, Logic as a Human Instrument (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1959. 
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It is Brownson's belief that the Aristotelian theory 
of phantasms and intelligible species has already been 
sufficiently disproved, for we find him asserting: 
Reid dispelled, forever, the Peripatetic 
phantasms, and proved that in sensibles 
we perceive the things themselves, not 
their images, phantasms, or immaterial 
representatives, Malebranche, after 
Plato and St. Augustine and others, had 
previously done the same thing in regard 
to the non-sensible world.l 
From the foregoing, it should not be inferred that 
Brownson holds that the intellect can, without any sensi-
ble medium, directly apprehend the intelligible, for, 
~e readily concede that the intelligible is never intui-
tively apprehended by itself alone, and it is always 
presented to us along with the sensible."2 If the intelli-
gible is not directly presented and 
1 
2 
actually and immediately apprehended, 
it cannot be obtained at all. The 
analysis of sensation can give only 
sensation, or the sensible object. 
To hold the intelligible, or to 
contemplate it by itself, we must 
undoubtedly separate it from the 
sensible phenomenon as st. Thomas 
teaches. But if it was not originally 
distinct from the sensible element of 
the phenomenon we could not separate 
or distinguish it, and all we should 
Works, I, p. 449. 
Works, I, p. 319. 
have for it would be a simple 
mental abstraction, formed by the 
mind, and without the least con-
ceivable objective value ••• Man is 
intellective as well as sensitive . 
by nature; and if so, he must be 
as capable of intelligible as of 
sensible intuitions.! 
This separation of the intelligible is not an 
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inference from the sensible; it is rather a process whereby 
it is disengaged from the sensible by reflection. It is 
in this sense that Brownson interprets St. Thomas and in 
consequence declares: 
St. Thomas never really taught 
the sensist doctrine which some 
would father upon him, that the 
intelligible is merely inferred 
or concluded from sensible data. 
All he taught was that the 
intelligible is never apprehended 
without the sensible, and that, to 
be distinctly apprehended, it must 
be abstracted, that is, separated 
or distinguished by reflection, 
from the phantasms along with which 
it was originally presented, which 
is p2ecisely the doctrine we contend 
for. 
Despite a certain vagueness, Brownson does attempt to give 
an account of the manner in which the intelligible is sepa-
rated from the sensible. It is accomplished by language, 
since, for this process of separating or distinguishing, 
1 Works, I, pp. 319-320. 
2 Works, I, pp. 321-322. 
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"language is necessary."! Again: "Language, that is, a 
sensible sign of some sort, is necessary, not to present, 
but to ~-present or represent the purely intelligible.n2 
Further: 
This sensible representation is not 
furnished by the sensible species or 
phantasms, for in. them the intelligible 
is presented, not represented, -
presented to the intuitive, nor represented 
to the reflective understanding. It is 
impossible for man himself to furnish the 
medium of sensible representation, and 
it cannot be furnished by the objects 
themselves, for the precise work to be 
done is to separate the purely intelli-
gible from the sensible species, or the 
sensible, in the intuition or appre-
hension of objects themselves. The 
Creator then must furnish it, and he 
does furnish it in language, which is 
the sensible sign, symbol, or repre-
sentation of the intelligible.3 
How concretely this separation of the intelligible from · 
the sensible takes place is not clear. It is not, in any 
event, the intellect agens, as created intellect in the 
Aristotelian or Thomistic sense that accomplishes this 
feat, since, "we reject the intellectus agens of the 
Scholastics, as a created light, or participated reason, 
and therefore the intelligible species and phantasms.n4 
1 Works, I, 313. p. 
2 Works, I, 309. p. 
3 Works, I, p. 304. 
4 Works, I, p. 304. 
1 
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This follows logically enough if we accept Brownson's 
assertion that the "the intelligible is itself by its own 
light intelligible in actu, and it is the concurrence of 
its intelligibility in actu with our own intellective 
faculty that forms the intuition."1 We are, at this 
juncture, faced with Brownson's. thesis which he has so 
frequently reiterated, namely, that ideal intuition is 
the act of the ideal object, God, presenting or affirming 
Himself to the human intellect via the act of creation. 
What Brownson has in mind in his statement that 
language is necessary in the disengagement of the intelli-
gible from the sensible, would seem, to find expressi~n in 
an essay published in 1869. In this essay, he declares in 
reference to the intuition of the intelligible: 
For this order of truth the only 
sensible representation is language, 
which is the sensible sign of im-
material or ideal truth. We arrive 
·at this order of reality or truth 
only through the medium of language 
which embodies it; that is to say, 
only through the medium of tradition, 
or of a teacher. So far we accord 
with the traditionalists. We do not 
believe that, if God had left men in 
the beginning without any instruction 
or language in which the ideas are 
embodied, they would' ever have been 
able to assert the existence of God, 
the immateriality of the soul, and 
the liberty or free will of man - the 
Works, I, p. 304. 
three great ideal truths which the 
Holy See requires us to maintain can 
be proved with certainty by reason; 
and we do not hold that, like the 
revealed mysteries, they are supra-
rational truth, and to be taken only 
on the authority of a supernatural 
revelation. If God had not infused 
the knowledge of them into the first 
of the race along with language, which 
he also infused.into Adam, we should 
never by our reason and instincts 
alone have found them out, or distinctly 
apprehended them; we are able to verify 
or prove them with certainty by our 
natural reason, in which respect we 
accord with those whom the tradition-
alists call rationalists.l 
In this discussion of the function of language in 
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the disengagement of the intelligible from the sensible, 
one detects a certain uneasiness on Brownson's parto This 
' 
uneasiness is indicated by the fact that immediately follow-
ing the preceding statement Brownson decleares:·nwe. have 
studiously avoided, as far as possible, the metaphysics of 
the subject we have been considering, and perhaps have, in 
consequence, kept too near its surface."2 However, despite 
this uneasiness, one discovers in the same context, a 
statement which if not fully intelligible at this level, 
wi+~, it rus tp be hoped, take on more intelligibility after 
the chapter on faith and reason, which is to follow. In 
1 Works, IX, pp. 397-398. 
2 Works, IX, p. 398. 
this context Brownson declares: 
We know spirit only as sensibly 
represented by language. Let 
language be corrupted, and our 
knowledge of ideal or non-sensible 
truth, or philosophy, will also be 
corrupted, mutilated or perverted. 
This will be still more the case 
with the superintelligible truth 
supernaturally revealed, which is 
apprehensible only through the medium 
of language. Hence St. Paul is careful 
to admonish St. Timothy to hold fast 
'the form of sound words', and hence, 
too, the necessity, if God makes us 
a revelation of spiritual things, 
that he should provide an infallible 
living teacher to preserve the in-
fallibility of the language in which 
it is made. We may see here, too, 
the reason why the infallible church 
is hardly less necessary to the 
philosopher than to the theologian. 
Where faith and theology are preserved 
in their purity and integrity, philosophy 
will not be able to stray far from the 
truth·, and where philosophy is sound, 
the sciences will not long be unsound. 
The aberrations of philosophy are due 
almost solely to the neglect of philo-
sophers to study it in its relation 
with the dogmatic teaching of the 
church.l 
Although referring to language above, what Brownson would 
seem to have in mind is not language but rather meaning. 
In short, that the meaning of words should not be cor-
rupted. 
Brownson's problem is here again fundamentally an 
1 Works, IX, pp. 398-399. 
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epistemological problem; a rejection of the mediating 
phantasms and species, by virtue of a conviction that, 
if knowledge is through these media, we are unable, 
logically at any event, to obtain the real. This outlook 
is particularly manifest in the statement: 
We know St. Thomas asserts that the 
intelligible form or species is that 
by which the mind attains to the 
intelligible, not that in which it 
terminates; but we do not know that 
either he or his master, Aristotle, 
proves it, or proves that the 
intellect attains, in any instance 
whatever, to any thing in the intelli-
gible order beyond the intelligible 
form or species, or in the sensible 
world beyond the phantasms furnished 
by the senses. It is one thing to 
assert, on the strength of theology, 
or the common belief of mankind, an 
intelligible and a sensible world 
existing a parte rei, and another 
to prove it by our logic or our 
philosophy ••• But as what is immedi-
ately present to the mind is the 
image, form, or species, not the 
thing itself, how is the mind to 
know that there is any thing there, 
that the whole world is not merely 
ideal, mere form, or species? This 
question is unanswerable on the 
peripatetic philosophy, as taught 
by st. Thomas, or as taught in our 
modern schools, as the interminable 1 disputes respecting it fully evince4 
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What Brownson would seem to be attempting to indicate, 
at this point, is that he has discovered in the works of 
1 Works, I, p. 510. 
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both Aristotle and St. Thomas a certain ambiguity relative 
to the function of the phantasm and intelligible form or 
species. This ambiguity, one suspects, lies in Brownson's 
inability to discover any clear-cut thesis in either 
Aristotle or St. Thomas indicating whether the phantasms 
and intelligible forms are the direct and immediate 
objects of knowledge, or, merely the vehicle of knowledge 
by which the mind directly and immediately perceives things, 
objects, extra-mental realities, the not-me, or whatever 
it may be designated. In short, are the phantasm and 
intelligible species the medium quod or the medium guo; 
are they that which we know, or, the means by which we 
know? If the former, we are faced with the problem, indi-
cated by Brownson, of demonstrating that these representa-
tions are true and accurate representations, that they have 
objective validity. If the latter, how demonstrate it? 
One suspects, rather strongly, that the· above statement of 
the problem is precisely what Brownson has in mind when he 
refers to the "interminable disputes" that have arisen. 
If the.phantasm and intelligible species are merely 
the medium guo why are sense and phantasm necessary at all? 
The answer would seem to be found in the fact that, for 
Brownson as indicated in another context, man is not a pure 
spirit and consequently sense and phantasm are necessary 
conditions of his perception of objects. However, and this 
is the key point, the sensible affection or phantasm while 
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necessary to present the object, does not itself rise to 
the level of conscious awareness in perception. In brief, 
the direct and immediate object of consciousness is the 
object and not the subjective affection as sucho 
If the intelligible is intelligible by its own light; 
then it cannot be a created light but must be uncreatedQ 
But, there can be but one uncreated, God, and he alone is 
intelligible in himself, because: 
Only a being that has the reason of 
his existence in himself can suffice 
for himself; only a being who is 
intelligence in himself can be his 
own object, or sufficient in himself 
for his own intelligence. Hence 
only God is intelligible in himself. 1 
Since on Brownsonts view, the created intellect cannot be 
its own light, illuminating the object, then this lumen 
rationis must be on the side of the object. Hence: 
1 
The intellectus agens, supposed to 
furnish the representative ideas, 
if not the human intellect, as Sto 
Thomas certainly did not hold it to 
be, is itself the idea, and the idea 
is not the representative of the 
intelligible reality, but that reality 
itself •••• Hence the intellectus agens 
of Aristotle and the schoolm~n is 
identically the Intelligible, or God 
affirming Him~elf intuitively as the 
Intelligible. 
Works, II, p. 258. 
2 Works, I, p. 449. 
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Brownson's identification of the intellectus agens with 
God, might, permit of various interpretations conceivably, 
even of some submerging of human individuality in the 
Divine. However, in the context of Brownson's overall 
position such an interpretation seems highl.y improbable. 
All that Brownson .would seem to be attempting to indicate 
herein, as elsewhere, is his opposition to any epistemo-
logical position which holds that the direct object or 
conscious awareness is not the object but rather its 
representation. It is to be regretted that the terminology 
in which Brownson does, at times, attempt to express his 
conviction of the mindts direct and immediate perception 
of the object, might, lend itself rather readily to an 
interpretation in terms of some form of Pantheism or 
Absolute Idealism. However, despite this lack of termi-
nological exactness Brownson never maintains that the 
knowing subject and the known object are entitatively 
identical. 
It is of interest to note, that while the preceding 
quotation appears in an article written in 1857, and at 
this time Brownson felt certain that St. Thomas did not 
identify the intellectus agens with the human intellect, 
his certitude of this apparently diminished considerably 
with the passage of time. In 1860,.as well as at other 
times thereafter, he seems to be uncertain of what 
Aristotle and St. Thomas actually meant by the intellectus 
agens; for example, when he inquires in reference to 
St. Thomas: 
But does he distinguish this light 
of reason from God, and hold it to 
be aliguid creatum, something created, 
distinguishable from the light of God, 
as the creature from the creator? On 
this point we are in doubt, and both St. 
Thomas and Aristotle seem to leave the 
matter in a most perplexing obseurity.1 
Ultimately then, for Brownson, the lumen rationis 
is identically God, the intelligible. This is to affirm: 
To intellectual vision as to external, 
there are necessary the intellect, 
the object, and the lighto As to 
the purely intelligible, Being, it 
is intelligible per se, by its own 
light, and a mediating light distinct 
from the mind and the object is needed 
only in apprehending existences, and 
the light by which we see these in 
the same Divine Light of Being, 
diffused over them by the Divine 
creative act.2 
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He is careful however to avoid, the imputation of Ontologism, 
for he maintains that while the mediating light which renders 
the subject intelligent, and the object intelligible is 
identically God the Creator, nonetheless, 
1 
we apprehend not the purely 
intelligible in itself, owning to 
its excess of light and our weakness, 
we apprehend God only in the light 
of his creative act, and therefore 
Works, I, p. 512. 
2 Works, I, p. 304. 
only in relation to the things he 
has made. But as the light proceeds 
from his essence, and is simply his 
relation ad extra to the things he 
had made, in apprehending it we do 
really apprehend him. We apprehend 
them, not by their phantasms, but by 
his light, which through the creative 
act illumines them. And thus, while 
we maintain that we do really apprehend 
him, we do not pretend any more than 
our scholastic friends that we apprehend 
him separate from this apprehension of 
his works.l 
Again, in reference to our intuitive apprehension of God, 
we see his essence only extrinsically, 
only in its relation to creatures, not 
intrinsically, as it is in itself; and 
therefore we are quite willing to say 
that we see God only in seeing his works 
as in external vision we see light only 
in seeing the object it illunines and 
renders visible.2 
What Brownson would s-eem to be asserting herein is 
149 
that we see things not in God but ~ God. That is to say 
that, the mind is directly and immediately aware of things 
and not their vicarious images or representations, which 
representations would serve as a medium in the knowledge 
process. The only medium which Brownson will admit is 
the lumen rationis, which he has identified with God. If 
our understanding of Brownson is accurate, then it is this 
same lumen rationis or Divine-illumination, which illuminates 
both the intellect, constituting it intelligent, and likewise 
1 Works, I, pp. 304-305. 
2 Works, I, pp. 465-466. 
the object rendering it intelligible. However, as is 
always the case for Brownson, the explicit awareness of 
the lumen rationis, as identically God, is not directly 
intuited as God, but is known as God only as a result of 
reasoning or reflection. Nonetheless, in perceiving 
things we can be said to perceive God, analogous to the 
manner in which in sensible vision it can be said that 
in perceiving sensible objects we perceive the physical 
light which illumines them. 
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It is interesting to observe, at this stage, the 
general similarity of Brownson's theory of Divine illumi-
nation with that of St. Augustine. Augustine frequently 
refers to God in such terms as the spiritual light of the 
soul that makes the things of the spirit actually intelli-
. 1 g~ble. It is this similarity which is at least one of 
the points we believe that Brownson has in mind when after 
having expressed his admiration of St. Thomas, he neverthe-
less declares that, "St. Augustine is more congenial to the 
age in which we live, and, we confess it, to our mind and 
temperament."2 
Perhaps, while close to Augustine•s theory of Divine 
illumination Brownson would seem, in certain respects, to 
be even closer to Malebranche. This suspicion finds some 
1 Cf. St. Augustine, e.g., Soliloq., 6-7, 13-15; 
De Trinitate, XII, c. 1-7. 
2 
Works, VIII, p. 271. 
confirmation in the fact that not infrequently throughout 
his works, one discovers such statements as the following: 
"P~re Malebranche we respect as a philosopher", 1 again: 
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"Malebranche was, we admit, a great philosophical genius .. " 2 
Despite this admiration for Malebrariche, Brownson nonethe-
less is unwilling to accept Malebranche's position, and he 
explicitly declares in this regard: 
Malebranche says truly, that it is 
by God that we see creatures, but 
having assumed very unnecessarily 
that we see God without creatures, 
and that it is in him that we see 
creatures, he was unable to affirm 
logically any actual creatures at all; 
for creatures seen in God are their ideas 
or archetypes, possible creatures, not 
actually existing creatures. He had a 
possible creator and a possible creation, 
nothing more, and in order to explain our 
perception of actual existences he was 
obliged to resort to what is called 
occasionalism, and to assume that our 
idea of things are produced in us by 
the immediate and direct action of 
God on occasion of our impressions 
and sensations.) 
Again, in the same vein but in another context Brownson 
asserts in relation to Malebranche: 
1 
His well known Visio in Deo, or 
Vision in God, which would be 
true enough if we had the vision of 
the blest, and could see God as he 
is in himself; for God sees or 
knows all things in himself, and 
has no need to go out of himself 
to know any thing he has 
Works, I, Po 440. 
2 Works, I, p. 409. 
3 Works, I, p. 348. 
made. But this is not the case 
with us. We do not see things 
themselves in.God, but only their 
idea of possibility. From the 
idea of God we may declare his 
ability to create, and that the 
type of all creatable things must 
be in him; but as creation is on 
his part a free 1 not a necessary 
act, we can, as Malebranche was 
told at the time, see a possible, 
but not an actual universe; hence, 
by his vision in God, he attained 
only to a pure idealism, in which 
nothing actually distinguishable 
from God was apprehended or 
asserted.l 
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Consequently, Brownson finds himself unable to "accept the 
' theory of Fere Malebranche, that we see all things in God. 
"We see things per Deum, not in Deo. We see in Deo only 
Deum •. "2 
Viewed more positively, Brownson's rejection of the 
vision in God as propounded by Malebranche, would seem 
to be ultimately grounded on Brownson's basic intuitionistic 
outlook. Relative to the philosophical problem of discern-
ing a passage from the idea of creature to that of God, 
or conversely, from the idea of God to that of creature, 
Brownson declares that there is no passage possible or for 
that matter no passage needed, for: 
1 
2 
both terms in their real relation 
are given immediately and simul-
taneously in the primitive intuition, 
and neither is left to be deduced 
Works, II, 371-37?. 
Works, I, p. 428. 
from the other. We never thin~ God 
without thinking creature, nor creature 
without thinking God. The one term 
is never apprehended without the other, 
and never .the one save by the appre-
hension of the other, any more than 
we can apprehend the light without the 
body illuminated, or the body without 
the light that illuminates it.l 
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In any event, returning to our previous consideration 
Brownson contends that the Scholastics, as followers of 
Aristotle, "having placed the princi;pium of our cognition 
in sense, were obliged to assume intelligibles or uni-
versals only as abstracted from the phantasmata or sensible 
species in which they are originally presented. 2 This 
doctrine while it follows logically if we place the 
principle of cognition in sense, is not the true doctrine, 
rather, the truth is that the principle of cognition is 
in the mind. Brownson refuses to accept the theory that 
our cognition begins in sense, or 
the sensible species. The argument 
from the union of soul and body 
admits a double application, and 
if it proves that we can have no 
intellections without sensations, 
it proves equally that we can have 
no sensations without intellections, 
no sensible intuition without intelli-
gible intuition.3 
One finds, in this same connection, a more explicit 
statement of Brownson's meaning when he declares: 
It is the intellect that gives to 
1 Works, I, P• 349. 
2 Works, I, p. 288. 
3 Works, I, p. 287. 
sensation its form of cognition, 
or that renders it actual perception 
of the objects of sense. Without 
intelligible intuition, sensation 
is a mere organic affection, and 
no actual perception at all. Cog-
nition is the basis of all sensible 
perception, for whatever the objects 
or conditions of knowledge, the 
cognitive faculty is one and the 
same. We have.not; as Aristotle 
perhaps heldt one faculty 6alled 
sense by which we know particulars, 
and another called intellect, by which 
we know universals. We know both 
corporeals and incorporeals, sensibles 
and intelligibles, by the intellective 
faculty, the former through sensible 
affection, and the latter on the 
occasion of such affection, or more 
simply, in conjunction with the 
former. ~operly, then, though 
both the universal and the particu-
lar, the intelligible and the 
sensible, ar~ presented simultane~ 
ously in one and the same intuition, 
the principium or our cognition, is 
in the intellect, not in the senses, 
for till the intellect is reached 
there is no commencement of cognition.1 
Thi_s placing of the principle of cognition in sense 
is, in Brownson's view, due to.the tact that: noutside 
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of Judaism, the tradition of creation was lost in the 
ancient world.n2 Consequently, one will search in vain 
to discover any recognition of it nin Plato or Aristotle, 
or in any of the old Gentile philosophers.n3 As a 
1 Works, I, p. 287. 
2 Works, II, p. 400. 
3 Works, II, p. 400. 
result: 
The Scholastics were misled by 
Aristotle, who, denying creation 
and asserting an eternal matter 
extra Deum, in which he placed the 
possibility of determinate things, 
was obliged to place the principium 
in matter, that is, in the potential, 
which, since not actual, should be 
regarded as nothing at all.,l. 
155 
Brownson finds great difficulty in comprehending the 
failure of the scholastics to avoid this error, since 
they were not ignorant that the 
possibility of things is in the 
Divine essence, and that the 
potential in that it is simply 
potential is a nullity. To say 
of anything that it is potential, 
is simply saying that it does not 
exist, but that God has power, if 
he chooses to create ito2 
Ultimately, Brownson is resting his realism on 
intuitionistic grounds. This is perhpas, never more 
obvious than when we find him declaring: 
Either we have intuition of the 
creative act of real and necessary 
being, as well as of real and 
necessary being itself, or it 
surpasses the power of human 
reason to prove creation; and if 
creation is not proved, Pantheis.m 
is not and cannot be refuted.3 
The early fathers and the scholastics as well were saved 
from Pantheism only via their theology and because they 
1 Works, I, PPo 287-288o 
2 Works, I, p. 288. 
3 Works, I, 371. p. 
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were not called upon to "combat directly philosophical 
~ntheism, they did not perceive the full defect of the 
Flatonic or Aristotelian logic, nor feel the necessity of 
di •t ttl amen ng 1. • 
In the light of the preceding discussion Brownson's 
reason for combatting Aristotle's logic, as not conform-
ing to the order of reality should be apparent, since there 
"can be no true logic that does not make the intuition of 
the creative act of God enter into its principium.n2 Hence, 
the ideal formula Ens creat existentias presents to the mind, 
Being, the primum ontologicum, and existences, the primum 
psycholo~icum in their real union by way of the creative 
act of Being. It is this formula which must be given 
intuitively if knowledge is to attain the real. 
SUMMARY 
Brownson's contention here, as previously, is that 
principles cannot be obtained by induction from particu-
lars. Hence, principles are necessarily intuitive, are 
gi~en and not acquired. If one is to attain the real, the 
1 Works, I, p. 371. 
2 
Works, I, p. 371. 
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objective, the extra-mental, then the principles of science 
must be the principles of things. It is, in Brownson's 
view, the failure of .Arist.otle as well as that of those 
medieval scholastics who were his followers, to recognize 
that principles are given and not acquired that involved 
them in a vicious circle to the extent that they were 
forced to assume universals in order to get particulars 
and particulars in order to get universals. 
In Brownson's view the primary intuition Which the 
human mind has is that of the creative act of being. 
Hence, the primary principle which expresses the real 
order is the principle that "Being creates existences.n 
This is not to imply that the mind is explicitly aware 
of this judgment at the dawn of its intellectual life, but 
simply that it is the "ideal formula,. to which all other 
intuitive principles can be reduced by reflection. This 
method of reducing the other intuitive principles to the 
primary intuition is be.st exemplified at the end of the 
preceding chapter, whereinBrownson is attempting to point 
out the manner in which, he believes, that the principles 
of causality can be so reduced by reflectionQ 
From the focal point of his basic intuitionistic 
outlook Brownson charges both Aristotle and St. Thomas 
with employing the method of "exclusive psychology" to the 
extent that he regards both as placing the phantasm and 
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intelligible species as media between the mind and its 
object. If such is a true account of what occurs in the 
process of knowing, then Brownson is unable to discern 
any manner of establishing that the extra-mental is, as 
these phantasms and species represent them to be. In 
consequence, Brownson sees no escape, in terms of such a 
theory, from that type of Idealist dilemma which he has 
opposed so violently from the outset. 
Brownson rejects the notion that it is the "intellectus 
agens," the active intellect of Aristotle and St. Thomas, 
as something created, which renders the potentially intelli-
gible actually intelligible. Rather, in Brownson's view, 
the intelligible is intelligible by its own light. 
Brownson now proceeds to identify the "intellectus agens" 
with God, to the extent that the only medium he will admit 
as interposing itself between the intelligent subject and 
the intelligible object is the "lumen Dei," rendering the 
intellect actually intelligent and the object actually 
intelligible. Hence, if the mind is in dire~t contact 
with things via the Divine illumination, there is no 
necessity to inquire whether things are as their subjective 
representations, since, in such a view, the minq directly 
perceives things and not their images or representations. 
While Brownson is here close to Malebranche's 
ontologism, he nonetheless rejects Malebranche's ~vision 
in God" and maintains, contrary to Malebranohet that we 
see things not "in God" but rather "by God". This is to 
say that we know God in knowing creatures, analogous to 
the manner in which in sensible vision, it can be said 
that in perceiving sensible objects we can be said to 
perceive the physical light which illumines them. 
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In Brownson's view, the intelligible is presented 
together with the sensible. However, in order for the 
intelligible to become an object of explicit and reflective 
thought there needs must be some symbol by which the intelli-
gible can be ~-presented. This ~-presentation is brought 
about by language which is the indispensable sign or symbol 
of the intelligible if reflective thought is to occur. 
CHAPTER VII 
FAITH AND REASON IN BROWNSON'S REALISM 
This attack on Aristotle and even St. Thomas at 
times is indicative of Brownson's independence of mind, 
in matters philosophical, at any event. Brownson was 
received into the Catholic Church in 1844 by Bishop 
Fitzpatrick, and it might be suspected that he would have 
bent his neck to the yoke of authority, however, this was 
not to be the case. This should not be interpreted as 
indicating ~ny reluctance on Brownson's part to accept 
the doctrine of the infallibility of the Catholic Church 
in matters of faith, as will be indicated in a more de-
tailed manner in a later context. Rather, this should be 
understood as indicating the fact that while Brownson 
might rather easily have fallen into one of the more or 
less generally accepted modes of Aristotelian or Thomistic 
thought, he would have no master in philosophy, save reason 
itself. The clergy have no more authority in this field 
than do the laity, because: 
No class, caste, or order of men have 
a ·. monopoly of reason,. for reason is 
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the common inheritance of all men, 
though some cultivate it ~ore and 
more successfully than others. If, 
in a question of philosophy, we show 
as much reason, we are entitled, in 
that question, to as much consideration 
as though we wore a mitre, and neither 
our bishops nor our clergy of the 
second order, ever think of maintaining 
to the contrary.l 
Since philosophy is a rational science, then "no man 
has the right to cite authority against us, otherwise than 
as an argument addressed to our reason.n2 Moreover, ~e 
have yet to learn that we are bound as a Catholic to 
accept, with the reverence and submission due to a dogma 
of faith, every philosophic proposition to be found in 
Suarez, or even St. Thomas."3 Again, "in philosophy we 
swear by the words of no human master."4 
This is not however to deny that Brownson did not 
have a profound respect, either for St. Thomas himself or 
the medieval scholastics in general. For we find such 







The single name of St. Thomas, if 
against us, would, no doubt, be a 
presumption that we were in error; 
I, pp. 498-499. 
II, p. 488. 
II, p. '507. 
I, P• 320. 
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but on a point of simple natural 
reason we should not regard it as 
conclusive, for we believe it is 
lawful to dissent from even his 
philosophical opinions, when one 
has solid reasons for doing so.l 
I love and reverence as any man 
can the great scholastics of the 
middle ages. The Summa Theologica 
of the Angel of the Schools has for 
me as many miracles as articles, 
and when st_udi ed as it should be, 
it gives one th~ sum of all theology 
and philosophy. 
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Despite this admiration for St. Thomas, he nonetheless 
believes that, in philosophy, St. Thomas is wedded to 
Aristotle. In consequence, to differ from St. Thomas is 
simply to differ from Aristotle, for, 
1 
in his commentary on Aristotle he 
simply studies to explain his 
author, and in every question of 
pure philosophy, Aristotle is for 
him Philosophus, the Philosopher, 
whose words are verba mag~stri. -
The talk we hear of the Thomistic 
Philosophy is all nonsense. There· 
is no Thomistic philosophy. There 
may be a Thomistic _Theology., a 
Thomistic use and application of 
philosophy in theology; but there 
is no Thomistic philosophy, properly 
so called. In pure philosophy St. 
Thomas simply reproduces the philo-
sophy of Aristotle, and our judgment 
of him as a philosopher must be our 
Works, I, p. 321. 
2 Works, n, p. 222. 
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judgment of his pagan master. 1 
Hence, St. Thomas nwas never a free and independent phi-
losopher."2 Again, relative to this same consideration 
Brownson states that when St. Thomas 
uses natural reason as a theo-
logian in face of the dogma, 
seldom, if ever, errs, but when 
he leaves theology, and speaks 
ex professo, as an independent 
philosopher, he is a peripatetic 
and can by no means be always 
followed with perfect security.3 
Whatever truth there may be in Brownson's contention 
that as a peripatetic St. Thomas made no advance in phi-
losophy over Aristotle, nevertheless Brownson feels called 
upon to justify St.·Thomas' use of the peripatetic philo-
sophy. This use was, in Brownson's view utilitarian in 
nature, to the extent that St. Thomas 
was brought up, as to philosophy, 
in the school of Aristotle, and 
finding the peripatetic philosophy 
in vogue, he studied to master it, 
and to press it into the service 
of theology, and to forge from it 
an.effective weapon against the 
enemies of religion in his time, 
who generally professed to be 
peripatetics. He himself, from 
first to last, is the Catholic 
theologian, and in no instance 
1 Works, I, p. 493. 
2 Works, I, p. 492. 
3 Works, I, p. 420. 
does he show that his study was to 
found a philosophy. His aim was to 
use what he found accepted as philo-
sophy in the service of theology. 
Hence he never deviates from Aristotle, 
except when compelled by Christian 
dogma.l 
His view of scholastic philosophers is best summed up 
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in the statement that, "as philosophers, they added nothing 
to what had been transmitted to them from their Gentile 
ancestors.n2 This is to say that Brownson has never 
"been able to di-scover anything new or peculiar in their 
method, or to lay our finger on a single purely philo-
sophical problem of which they, as philosophers, have 
offered a new or original solution."3 
If philosophy is not authoritarian, it must then take 
its principles from natural reason and it "can arrive at 
no conclusion which is valid beyond the range of natural 
reason."4 Is this to imply that all truth is perceptible 
by natural reason? An affirmative answer to this question 






. is never capable by itself alone of 
being moulded into a complete system 
even of natural truth, and never 
Works, I, pp. 492-493. 
Works, I, p. 493. 
Works, I, p. 493. 
Works, XIV, p. 267. 
worthy of confidence When it aspires 
to disengage itself from revelation, 
and to stand alone as a separate and 
independent science.l 
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In consequence, Brownson asserts: "We should as soon think 
of disengaging our politics or our private and social 
duties from our theology, as of disengaging our philosophy.n2 
It is of interest to note at this point that we can 
discover what seems to be, one of the few radical changes 
occuring in Brownson's position throughout his philosophical 
writings. In 1840, in an essay on The Princeton Review he 
had explicitly declared that philosophy was superior to 
theology.3 This was an outlook which was to be of short 
duration. With the passage of years one finds an ever 
increasing dissatisfaction with philosophy. In 1867 in 
an article on Cousin's philosophy he quotes with approval: 
'Religion' said LaMennais in the 
first volume of his Essay on 
Indifference in Matters of Religion, 
'is found at the cradle of nations; 
philosophy at their tomb.' Woe to 
the nation that exchanges faith for 
philosophy! Its ruin is at hand, 
for it has lost the principle of 
life.4 
1 Works, I, p. 280. 
2 Works , I , p. 30 3 • 
3 Orestes A. Brownson, "Two Articles from The Princeton 
Review;" Boston Quarterly Review, iii (July, 1840), p. 288. 
4 Works, II, 328. · 
In 1874, two years prior to his death there appears in 
Brownson's writings a rather clear manifestation of a 
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tendency to abandon virtually all philosophical specula-
tion as worthless, and a 'consequent tendency to accept 
faith in all its simplicity. This is a position which is 
not surprising when considered in the light of his intu-
itionistic outlook. That this was his position, is true 
at least with regard to the revealed mysteries of religion, 
for in their regard he contends: 
As we grow older and less daring 
in our speculations, we are more 
and more disposed to reoeive the 
revealed mysteries with the 
simplicity of faith. Philosophy 
may remove some obstacles to their 
intellectual acceptance, but as a 
rule we believe it creates more 
difficulties than it removes. 
Philosophy, divorced from faith 
and theology, and operating by the 
sole light of nature, is compara-
tively worthless41 
Consequently, Brownson is convinced that: 
1 
2 
He who deduces his philosophy 
from the Holy Scriptures, the 
teachings of the church, and the 
traditions of the race, will have 
the highest and best of all 
philosophies, but his philosophy 
will bear a theological form, and 
be expressed in theological terms.2 
Works, VIII, P• 279. 
Works, VIII, p. 279. 
167 
This feeling of the impotency of philosophy, prescind-
ing from revelation, to furnish even an adequate solution 
of the natural mysteries of existence was, it would seem, 
due to a two-fold consideration: First, to a certain 
discouragement arising from the recognition of his own 
position, e.g. as already indicated, his belief that ob-
jective reality cannot be established in a logical way. 
Second, as will be indicated in another context in this 
chapter, his seemingly reluctant admission, that when all 
is said and done he finds himself unable to explain the 
relation of faith and reason. This discouragement is 
explicitly manifest by Brownson, when, in reference to his 
early philosophical development he states: 
We aimed to be a consistent rationalist, 
to spin all knowledge, spider-like, 
from our own bowels, till we found the 
thing was impossible. There was for 
us no alternative but rationalism and 
with it nihilism or the Catholic Church 
and tradition.l 
The second consideration which led Brownson to this 
conviction of the impotency of philosophy, and one might 
suspect that it was, for obvious reasons, the primary 
consideration, was due to an examination of the historical 
development of various philosophical positions, most of 
1works, III, p. 148. 
which Brownson maintained had clearly culminated in 
skepticism, egoism, nihilism, and the like. In the light 
of this consideration Brownson was gradually led to the 
conviction that although theoretically the mind was 
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capable of attaining truth and certitude in the natural 
order, nonetheless in practice this was extremely difficult. 
to attain. This was particularly borne out by the historical 
development of such systems as, for example, Cartesianism, 
wherein, 
we cannot fail to perceive the 
fatal error of those who seek to 
divorce philosophy from revelation, 
and like Descartes, to erect it into 
an independent science. Revelation 
is not the basis of philosophy, but 
no philosophy of any value can be 
constructed without it.l 
This is not however to imply that reason is radically 
deceptive, but simply that "it is limited, and we have not 




Reason is our natural light, and 
though of no value out of its sphere, 
in its sphere is inerrable. It does 
not suffice of itself for all the 
wants of the human soul, but its 
annihilation reduces us below the 
condition of men, and renders us 
Works, II, p. 100. 
Works, III, p. 308. 





incapable of receiving even a super-
natural revelation. · 
It would seem evident, therefore, that Brownson's distruct 
of reason, is not a distruct of it in se, but merely a 
recognition of its limitation. By virtue of this con-
viction he maintains that: 
Reason in its sphere is valid, because 
it is a participation of the divine 
nature, as the donum fidei is in the 
order of grace, and the lumen gloriae 
in the beatified state; but reason 
herself cannot affirm that she is 
this participation, for she is too 
feeble a participation for that, and 
therefor.e cannot legitimate herself; 
and herein is it specifically dis-
tinguished from the donum fidei 
and the lumen gloriae, each of which 
participates in a sufficient degree 
to affirm its own participation.2 
This is a limitation which, in Brownson's view, can be 
overcome only through revelation; 
not only because it furnishes data 
not furnished by natural reason;--
fromwhich conclusions may be drawn 
throwing much light on natural 
phenomena, but because it enable us 
to verify reason itself, the instru-
ment of philosophy, and without whose 
verification there can be no sound 
philosophy.j 
In declaring that by accepting revelation, "conclusions 
may be drawn throwing much light on natural phenomena," 
1 Works, VI, p. 150. 
2 Works, v, 509. p. 
3 Works, v, p. 510. 
Brownson would seem to have in mind the advantage which 
those who accept revelation have in attempting to solve 
even the so called, natural mysteries of existence. 
This is true to th~ extent that: 
The great controversies that have 
been called forth from time to time 
on the doctrine of the Trinity, the 
Incornation, the two natures and 
the two wills in the one person of 
our Lord, the Real xresence of our 
Lord's body, soul, and divinity in 
the Eucharist, liberty and necessity, 
and relations of nature and grace, 
and of reason and faith, throw a 
brilliant light on philosophy far 
surpassing all the light to be de-
rived from Gentile sources, or by 
the most careful analysis of thi 
facts of our own consciousness. 
In the light of the foregoing we are able to detect, 
from one standpoint at least, the reason for Brownson's 
antipathy toward the Cartesian Doubt, since, "it is not 
only a complete rupture with revealed theology, but also 
with tradition, and is an attempt to break the continuity 
of the life of the race, and to sever the future of 
humanity from its past~n2 This· comment is of particular 
interest to the extent that Descart~s specifically 
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declares that theological doctrines are to be exempt from 
his universal doubt. This is quite clear when in reference 
1 Works, II, pp. 325-326. 
2 Works, II, p. 375. 
to certain maxims Descartes declares: 
Arter assuring myself of these maxims, 
and having put them aside with the 
truths of the Faith, which have always 
been most certain to me, I judged that 
I could proceed freely to reject all 
my other beliefs.l 
Descartest explicitly declared reason for this exclusion 
of Theology from his universal doubt is clearly stated in 
the following: 
I revered our theology, and hoped as 
much as anyone else to get to heaven, 
but having learned on great authority 
that the road was just as open to the 
most ignorant as to the most learned, 
and that the truths of revelation 
which lead thereto are beyond our 
understanding, I would not have dared 
to submit them to the weakness of my 
reasonings. I thought that to succeed 
in their examination it would be 
necessary to have some extraordinary as-
sistance from heaven, and to be more 
than a man.2 
There has been considerable controversy as to 
whether or not Descartes was sincere in his protestations 
of the Catholic faith. This is not, it would seem, the 
specific point which Brownson has in mind in his attack 
on Descartes position; rather, this disagreement would 
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seem to indicate Brownson's conviction, so often repeated 
in his works, that in dne form or another philosophy should 
1 t 
Rene Descartes, Discourse on Method, trans. Laurence J. 
Lafleur (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1950) p. 18. 
2 Ibid. 
not divorce itself from any light regardless of the source 
from which the light originates. Brownson's position is 
most clearly manifest when he declares in relation to the 
tradition of mankind: 
We are among those who regard the 
catholic beliefs and traditions of 
mankind as integral elements in 
the life of the race itself, and 
indispensable to its continuous 
progress. The fut.ure always has 
its germ in the past, and a beginning 
de novo for the individual as for 
society is alike impossible and un-
desirable.! 
It is here of interest to note, if not an identical, 
yet, a somewhat similar recognition of and respect for 
tradition as it appears in one of the works of a contempo-
rary philosopher, E.s. Brightman. He declares: 
The legitimate function of tradition 
in civilization is impressive; in 
art, in religion, in education, in 
morals, in law, and in other de-
partments of culttire, tradition is 
the source of much that is highest 
and best. Without its traditions 
humanity would soon be reduced to 
barbarism. Unappreciative ho.stility;, 
toward the past is not merely in- 2 gratitude; it is cultural suicide. 
In any event, to require the individual to divest his mind 
of every vestige of the past, is in Brownson's view, as 
1 Works, II, p. 375. 
2 Edgar s. Brightman, An Introduction to Philosophy 
(New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1951), pp. 4B-49. 
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unreasonable as it would be ttfor the new-born infant to 
refuse the milk from its mother's breast, till it had 
by the exercise of its faculties settled the question of 
its wholesomenessonl 
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It would however be a grievous mistake to interpret 
Brownson as attempting to build science on faith. To such 
a procedure he is clearly opposed, for as he says: "We 
are as far as anyone can be from building science .on faith. n2 
However, left to themselves the natural sciences are unable 
to transcend the empirical, since, "the sciences all deal 
with particulars and cannot of themselves rise above par-
ticulars, and from them universal science is nox obtainable."3 








excludes from the knowable, principles 
and causes, all except sensible phe-
nomena; and although wrong in view of 
a higher philosophy than can be ob-
tained by induction from sensible or 
particular facts, yet he is not wrong 
in contending that the sciences cannot 
of themselves rise above the particular 
and ~he phenomenal.4 
II, p. 375o 
II, p. 375. 
Works, ·IX, p. 288. 
Works, IX, P• 289. 
What Brownson has in mind herein is that "there is 
no logical ascent from the particular to the universal."l 
So understood, it is his contention that starting with 
particulars it is impossible to integrate them in a uni-
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versal scrlence, that is; "a science that accepted, general-
ized, and explained them all."2 However: 
He who starts from revelation, which 
includes the ~inciples of universal 
science, can, no doubt, find all 
nature harmonizing with faith, and 
all the sciences bearing witness to 
its truth, for he has the key to 
their real and higher sense; but he 
who starts with the particular only 
can never rise above the particular, 
and hence he finds in the particulars, 
or the nature to which he is re-
stricted, no immaterial and immortal 
soul, and no God, creator and up-
holder of the universe. His gener-
alizations are only classifications 
of facts, with no intUition of' their --. ·· :,i_ 
relation to.;=any.'_order above themselves; 
his universal is the particular,and he 
sees in the plane of his vision no steps 
by which to ascend to science, far less 
to fai th.3 
Hence, any claim made by those who attempt to ascend 
from science, "that transcends the particular order of facts 
with which the sciences deal is only theory, hypothesis, 
conjecture, imagination, or fancy, and has not the slightest 
1 
289. Works, IX, P• 
2 
288. Works, IX, p. 
3 Works, IX, 288. p. 
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soientifio value.n1 
Brownson is equally opposed, on the,one hand, to 
the apologists who maintain that the soiences oorroborate 
revelation, and on the other, to those who use· the soienoes 
to attempt to overthrow Christian dogmas. The soienoes, 
"no more tend of themselves to oorroborate revelation than 
they do to impair it.n2 Again: 
None of the revealed dogmas are 
either provable or disprovable by 
any empirical soienoe, for they 
all lie in the supernatural order, 
above the reaoh of natural soienoe, 
and while they oontrol all the 
empirioal soienoes they oan be 
oontrolled by none.3 
\Vhat then does faith demand of the sciences as such? She 
demands only "their silenoe."4 She does not demand their 
support, she only demands that they keep in their own 
order, that the oobbler should stiok to his last, ne sutor 
ultra crepidam.n5 
While the preceding quotation might seem to indicate, 
on Brownson's part, a conviction that the various soiences 
1 Works, IX, P• 288. 
2 Works, IX, p. 289. 
3 Works, IX,- P• 290. 
4 Works, IX, 289. p. 
5 Works, IX, p. 289. 
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should be compartmentalized, it should rather be interpreted 
in the context of his conviction, of the impotency of the 
sciences themselves to rise above the particular. For, 
in fact, what Brownson opposes is precisely the attempt 
to compartmentalize the sciences and in consequence to 
fail to grasp the sciences in their unity and integrityo 
He asserts in this regard, that "each of these sciences, to 
be successfully studied, must be studied in its real re-
lations, and not one of them can deserve the name of 
science, if constructed by the ~ffort to rise from the 
particular to the universal."l What then is ·to be the 
integrating principle of the sciences? In replying to 
this question we find Brownson returning to his intu-
i tionistic outlook, that is ·to say: "We must begin with 
the real beginning, the creative act of God, and descend 
2 from the Whole to the parts." This position Brownson 
is again to ground on his basic epistemological consider-
ation, namely, that 
1 
2 
reason cannot operate without 
principles, and these must be 
given it a priori; for it cannot 
operate without principles, it 
cannot without principles engage 
Works, IX, p. 264. 
Works, IX, P• 264. 
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in the search after principles. 1 
Brownson is convinced that the sciences can only find 
their integration, through an acceptance by science of all 
the light which is available to it, from whatever source. 
Reason should not 
extinguish her own light and envelop 
herself in darkness, in order to see 
by the light of revelation. If to 
attain to true science reason needs 
immediate intuition of principles 
and the supernatural revelation of 
the superintelligible, it is reason 
that receives and uses them. In 
the field of science as distinguished 
from that of faith, revelation is 
adjutative rather than imperative. 
Its light and that of reason coalesce 





Not that in matters of science the 
mind must blindly submit to either 
revelation or philosophy as an 
extrinsic or foreign authority, 
restraining its freedom, or pro-
hibiting it from using its own eyes, 
and following its own inherent con-
stitution and laws; but that to 
operate freely and scientifically, 
according to the intrinsic laws of 
intelligence, it must avail itself 
of all the light with which it is 
furnished, - all the means of 
grasping the universe as a whole3 and in its parts at its command. 
Works, IX, p. 265. 
Works, IX, pp. 266-267. 
Works, IX, p. 264. 
The relation of faith and reason, in Brownson's 
view, should be obvious and anticipated, both from the 
standpoint of his intuitionistic position and because of 
his foregoing conclusions concerning the relations of 
revelation, philosophy and science. In brief, he con-
cludes that 
without faith our philosophy is in-
complete, and without the intuitive 
vision of God, in patria, our faith 
cannot be perfected. To this 
conclusion we are conducted by 
all sound philosophy.! 
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The foregoing conclusion is an attempt to render an 
intelligible account of what Brownson regards~ as the basic 
unity underlying intellectual knowledge. This conelusion 
is the product of a rather lengthy consideration of what 
Brownson refers to as the "three degrees of Divine 
intelligibil1ty.n2 In an attempt to forge a link between 
the natural and the supernatural in human knowledge, he 
declares relative to man: 
He certainly has desires both to 
know and to love which transcend 
the whole natural order. He has 
these desires prior to faith. 
Vfuether these desires belong to 
him as a pure nature or not, certain 
it is that he has them, and with 
1 Works, I, p. 360. 
2 Works, I, p. 358. 
them enters into all his acts or 
rational operations. It is im-
possible to find a nature which 
has not aspirations beyond nature, 
and which nothing in nature can 
satisfy. Every man proves it in 
his own experienceo The natural 
vision of God is insufficient to 
satisfy our craving to know, for 
it is remarkable that Reason, when 
she has attained the ultimate 
limits of rational knowledge, seems 
to herself to know perfectly well 
that there is an, infinite unkno"wn 
reality beyond. She never can 
persuade herself that the limits 
of what she knows are the limits of 
what is. Now how explain this? How 
explain this knowledge, if we may so 
say, of the unknown and the naturally 
unknowable ••• We do not know how to 
explain it, but we are disposed to 
regard it as the natural aptitude of 
the soul for the supernatural, by 
virtue of which the supernatural is 
as it were linked with the natural, 
joined on to it, and so that it can 
elevate the natural without super-
seding it. From this it would follow 
-that in the highest sense man is 
completed, perfected, only in the 
supernatural, ••• and which should 
be the case, if man was originally 
intended for a supernatural, no~ a 
natural, destiny.l . 
Again, one discovers a similar and somewhat striking 
statement relevant to this same basic consideration. 
This passage occurs in another of Brownson's works, 
wherein he is discussing the ability of the mind to know 
that the limits of her knowledge are not the limits of 
1 Works, I, pp. 356-357. 
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what is. This capacity to know, paradoxically speaking, 
the naturally unknowable, Brownson refers to as 
the faculty of superintelligence, 
and it is, as it were, an instinct 
of the soul directing it to the 
superintelligible, and presenting 
in the soul herself an aptitude to 
receive and credit a supernatural 
revelation of the superintelligible 
when made. It gives us as it were 
the instinct of faith, a certain 
prolepsis of revelation, a sub-jective capacity for it; for 
although it does not anticipate 
the revelation, it yet advertises 
that there is a reality beyond what is 
intelligible to be revealed, if God 
chooses to reveal it. It is in us 
a certain presage of revelation, as 
the desire of beatutude is a certain 
presage or pledge of the beatific 
vision. It makes it that revelation 
comes to us rather as an unexpected 
guest than as a perfect stranger, -
is a sort of presentiment of its 
coming. By virtue of it no violence 
is done to our nature in receiving 
revelation; no fitting up of a 
new apartment for its lodgment is 
required. Revelation thus finds 
an apartment already prepared for it 
and it simply supplies a want pain-
fully felt. The moment·-we .. ·reoognize:::; 
this faculty, revelation ceases to 
be antecedently improbable; there are 
no longer any a priori objections to 
it, and there becomes almost, in some 
sort, a natural presumption in its 
favor. It then requires only a 
degree of evidence demanded in the 
ordinary conduct of life for prudent 
action, to accredit it to the under-
standing. Here, then, is, at least 
on the subjective side, a real basis 
for the concord of faith and reason, 
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revelation and science.l 
In the light of the preceding statement we are in 
a position to inquire more s.pecifically into Brownson's 
view of the relation of reason and faith, and the conse-
quent relation of faith to the beatific vision, that is, 
«to the knowledge of God in his essence, as he is in 
himself. n2 Is there not some natural relation of reason 
to faith, and likewise of faith to the beatific vision? 
Brownson's answer to this question is decidedly in the 
affirmative when he declares, in apparent agreement with 
a work by M. Gratry entitled, De la Connaissance de Dieu: 
As every man does perceive, in 
perceiving God per speculum, that 
the infinite is, though he perceives 
not what it is, why may we not say 
that man naturally aspires to the 
infinite, and that in this aspiration 
there is in some sense a natural basis 
of supernatural faith? Faith, and 
even the beatific vision, though above 
reason, cannot be wholly foreign to 
it; for if they were, how could we 
speak intelligibly of them, and how 
could what we say of them have any 
meaning for the natural understanding? 
It seems to us, therefore, that the 
three degrees of the Divine intelli~ 
gibility are to be considered, not as 
three separate itineraries, but as 
three stages· in one and the same 
itinerary of the soul to God. Phi-
losophy, if worthy of the name, has 
1 Works, III, p. 580o 






then a natural aptitude for super-
natural faith, and conducts to faith, 
as faith conducts to the perfect 
knowledge of God in the beatific 
vision.l · 
\Vhy must faith find its consummation in the beatific 
vision? Because, "it is only in this that the soul can 
find its supreme good, or the object adequate to satisfy 
its natural craving to love.n2 Or, put in other terms, 
man is in fact not satisfied with the per speculum 
knowledge of God, and hence, it would seem, "that the 
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soul can find its supreme g·ood only in the complete 
knowledge and perfect love of God, and that this knowledge 
and love are not naturally attainable. 8 3 
Viewed from this perspective it is not difficult to 





All true philosophy, though falling 
always below faith, though never 
faith itself, yet conducts to faith, 
and finds its complement in it; and 
therefore all those intellectual 
systems, called Philosophy, which 
conduct to doubt or scepticism, are 
false, and unworthy of the least 
attention.4 
I, p. 358. 
I, p. 360. 
I, p. 360. 
I, p. 358. 
While Brownson seems convinced of the necessity of 
faith, for the development of any sound philosophy still, 
toward the end of his, in 1873, he has the honesty to 
admit: 
The real relation between our 
rational knowledge or apprehension, 
and the revelation of the super-
natural order, or reason and faith, -
is one of the mysteries of life that 
we do not find ourselves able to 
explain.l 
Following the preceding description of Brownson's 
account of the relation of faith and reason, and likewise 
of his conviction that faith finds its consummation in the 
beatific vision, the statement that the real relation of 
reason and faith is "one of the mysteries of life that we 
do not find ourself able to.explain," comes as a rather 
surprising conclusion. However, the element of surprise 
vanishes is we take into consideration the fact that 
Brownson's previously stated conviction of this relation 
is, for him only a possible solution. That Brownson is 
somewhat uneasy about his own solution is evident to some 
extent, even in his original statement of .this relation, 
for, even at this point, we find him declaring relative to 
the explanation he has offered: 
1 
It confines philosophy within the 
sphere of the natural, it removes 
Works, III, p. 543. 
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all discrepancy between it and faith, 
and enables the natural understanding 
to perceive the unity of man's whole 
intellectual life, or at least the 
possibility of such unity.l 
The phrase "the possibility of such unity", would seem to 
indicate, at least, a much less firm conviction of the 
truth of Brownson's posi ti:'on, at this point; than is 
evident relative to other philosophic.convictions which 
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he possessed. However, this uneasiness.as to the relation 
of faith and reason is not, in Brownson's case in any 
event, due to a conviction that there are or can be any 
real contradictions between faith and reason. T~s is not 
to imply that Brownson is unaware that there may be seeming 
discrepancies between faith and reason. However relative 
to these he declares: 
1 
2 
Whatever apparent discrepancy we 
may discover between religion and 
science, must necessarily be sub-jective, in our views or theories 
of the one or the other, or of 
both, and grows out of the in-
completeness of our views or of 
our rendering of them. What needs 
to be reconciled is never nature 
and revelation, but our interpre• 
tation of them, which often con-
flict with one another~ and with 
the objective reality.~ 
Works, I, p. 358. 
Works, III, p. 531. 
Objectively considered there can be no real discrepancy 
between them. Since, 
as God is supreme Logic, Logic 
itself - the Logos - he must be 
always consistent or in accord 
with himself, and therefore all 
his works taken as a whole, must 
be supremely dialectic, without 
any jar or discord.l 
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In another article, one discovers what might be considered 
the logical conclusion of the foregoing, when Brownson 
states: 
The dialectic harmony of the 
universe may not be apparent to 
our feeble vision, which can take 
in only a part; but the logical 
character of the whole must be 
asserted ••• What appears to us 
isolated, detached, unrelated, 
sophistical, so appears because 
we cannot see the whole, and take 
in at one view all its parts in 
their relations to the whole and 
to one another.2 
Whatever tension Brownson feels relative to the 
relation of faith and reason is due, in his view, not to 
any discovered contradiction between them but rather to 
the insufficiency of the human reason, as finite, to 
detect their completely harmonious relationship. In the 
light of such an interpretation, the question naturally 
1 Works, III', p. 531. 
2 Works, III, P• 576. 
arises as to whether Brownson's conviction of the harmony 
of faith and reason was itself not a reasoned conclusion• 
but, rather an act of faith. While, for Brownson, this 
belief in the harmony of faith and reason would seem to 
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be an act of faith, it is nonetheless an act of faith with 
a rational foundation. This is true, it would seem, to the 
extent that once having convinced himself of the reasonable-
ness of the claims of the Catholic Church to be an infallible 
guide in matters of faith, it would ?ppear evident that, for 
Brownson, as equally for anyone with similar convictions, 
all discrepancies between faith and reason must be but 
apparent or seeming discrepancies. One suspects rather 
strongly, that it is precisely the foregoing point which 
Brownson has in mind when he declares: 
So faith in a supernatural revelation, 
in whatever is proved to be the word 
of God, is so far from being repugnant 
to reason or requiring an abdication 
of reason, that it is the highest and 
freest act of reason possible.l 
Regardless of what assessment one may place on it, 
nonetheless, Brownson feels convinced that he has found 
faith and reason reconciled within the bosom of the 
Oatholio tiommunion which he entered, and in which he 
remained until the end of his life, following so many 
l Works, III, p. 313. 
I=--:--
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years of changing theological allegiances. That he is so 
convinced, is evident, when in reference to "the internal 
tragedies caused by the struggle between faith and reason, 
belief and doubt, hope and despair,"l he declares: 
We have had some experience of 
those interior struggles, and 
many a tragedy has been enacted 
in our own soul, but it is with 
difficulty that we can recall 
them; in the peace and security of 
Catholic faith and hope they have 
almost faded from the memory, and 
yet the period of our life since 
we became a Catholic has been with 
us the period of our freest and 
most active and energetic thought. 
If we have worn chains we have not 
been conscious of them, and they 
certainly cannot have been very 
' heavy, or have eaten very deeply 
into the flesh. The reason of it 
is that we find in Catholic faith 
and theology the two elements which 
in the non-Catholic world are in 
perpetual war with each other, 
perfectly reconciled and mutually 
harmonized.2 
Brownson is keenly aware of the criticisms he must face 
due to his claim that faith and reason are reconciled 
in the Catholic Church. This awareness is brought out 
rather strikingly, when, in reference to Oliver Wendell 
1 Works, III, P• 310. 
2 Works, III, pp. 310-311. 
Holmes, he asserts: 
The Professor, no deubt, will 
smile at our assertion, and set it 
down to our simplicity or enthusi-
asm, but we have this advantage of 
him, that we know both sides, and 
taught or might have taught him 
more than thirty years ago the phi-
losophy he brings out so racily at 
the breakfast table.l 
Brownson's acceptance of the Catholic Church might 
be ascribed to some psychological need for authority, or 
perhaps more accurately speaking, to some need for the 
security which is to some extent the concomitant of the 
acceptance of authority. Although this might be true to 
some extent, the overall evidence, which can be gleamed 
both from a study of Brownson's works themselves and from 
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a study of the various biographies concerning Brownson 
would hardly seem to support this view. He would seem to 
be willing to submit to authority, only, in those isolated 
instances, where he was firmly convinced of the reasonable-
ness of that same authority, Brownson's disdain for 
authority, for its own sake, is at least suggested by 
Perry Miller when he declares, relative to Brownson's 
Review: 
Only the fact that in 1844 Brownson 
became a Catholic, and so induced 
his former friends to erase his 
1 Works, III, p. 312. 
name from their memories, explains 
the otherwise inexplicable negligence 
with which historians have treated 
this jo~nal, the most vigorous of 
its day. Between 1838 and 1842 it 
was the one effective assailant in 
America of prescription and authority, 
and it inflicted upon them an infi-
nitely heavier damage than ~e Dial 
ever dared attemptol 
In summation, Brownson having convinced himself of 
the reasonableness of the claim of the Catholic church 
to an infallibility in matters of faith, concluded on 
this basis, that there could be no real discrepancy 
between faith and reason, other than that imposed by the 
limitations of reason itself. This should not be under-
stood to mean that from this point onward Brownson made 
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no concrete attempts to indicate, and this in considerable 
detail, to the extent that reason permitted, the harmony 
of the fundamental dogmas of the Catholic church with 
reason. Although a development of this point is beyond 
the scope of this dissertation, still, we are convinced 
that Brownson was as equally adept a theologian as he was 
as a philosophero In this regard, we find Perry Miller 
declaring relative to the theological struggles between 
the Transcendentalists and the Unitarians: ffParker and 
1 Ferry Miller (edo), The Transcendentalists (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1950), pp. 180-18lo 
Brownson were the only Transcendentalists who commanded 
that kind of scholarship in systematic theology that 
could meet the Princeton pundits on their own ground."l 
It should be noted however, ~hat Brownson 1 s con-
viction of the necessity of revelation, as an anchor for 
any sound philosophy, was not in any complete sense the 
fruit of his life-long attempts to find a sound basis 
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for philosophy. Rather, it manifested itself, germinal-
ly at least, as far back as 1842 in an essay in the 
Democratic Review, wherein he states: "A people believing 
in the Christian r~ligion can have, can at ~east tolerate, 
no philosophy resting on a basis independent of Christi-
anity, and contemplating any Ideal but the Christian. n 2 




Is the reassertion of the legitimate 
authority of Christianity, in all that 
pertains to human development. By-
this reassertion we shall attain to 
a complete and living synthesis of 
every branch of human science; and 
the whole of lif~will be harmonious 
and consistent, and society in all 
its departments will be subordinated 
to the one catholic principle of the 
Gospel, for the realization on earth 
of the true Christian Ideal, that is, 
the establishment of the reign of 
God in all human affairs.3 
Miller, p. 240. 
Works, I, p. 23. 
Works, I, p. 23. 
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Despite this conviction, still we find in Brownson 
a marked disdain for anything calling itself, Christian 
philosophy, e.g., "all this has a pious and orthodox 
sound, as would have Christian coats and pantaloons, 
Christian hats and shoes.n1 Nonetheless: 
There is a Christian ~ of philosophy 
but, correctly speaking, there is and 
can be no Christian philosophy. The 
Christian order, we take it, is the 
supernatural order, and in all that 
is peculiar to it included in the new 
creation, whose principle is grace; 
but philosophy belongs to the natural 
order, and is restricted to natural 
reason, essential to and inseparable 
from human nature itself, whether in 
Christians or non-Christians, and 
incapable without the aid of divine 
revelation, of attaining even to a 
conception of the supernatural. 
Christian philosophy, if it could 
mean anything, would mean Christian 
theology, or the sacred science, of 
which St. Thomas speaks, a science 
constructed not by reason from its 
own data, but by the use of reason 
from data furnished by faith or 
revelation.2 
If one bears in mind Brownson 1 s previously stated 
views of the inability of unaided reason to culminate 
in any sound philosophical position, one has a focal point 
from which tm inquire into Brownson's final views as to 
1 Works, I, p. 494. 
2 
Works, I, p. 494. 
I 
the relation of faith and reason. Initially, it is clear 
that while in Brownson 1 s view faith does not supersede 
reason, it nonetheless enlarges its scope. 
Revelation was not given to silence 
reason, to overwhelm it, to puzzle 
it, or to supersede it, but to aid 
it, strengthen it, enlarge its 
scope, and to supply its defects. 
It brings to man's understanding 
the superintelligible, and is a 
sort of telescope added to the 
natural eye of reason. But the 
telescope does not supersede the 
natural eye, for it is the natural 
eye that sees in or t~rough it, 
and it would be of no use to a 
blind man. So of revelation. It 
does not supersede or even lessen 
our natural intelligence, after 
all, that understands and believes 
in it or by it.l 
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Although interesting, the previous quotation presents 
certain difficulties. Is revelation accepted as a con-
sequence of a reasoned conviction of its truth or a~cepted 
on faith? If the former, how does revelation, if reasonable, 
enlarge the scope of reason? If the latter, in what sense 
can faith be called reason~ble? Brownsonts answer to these 
questions will, it is to be hoped, be clar.ified.·.in:~what 
is to follow. 
A further question quite naturally arises at this 
point; namely, how to verify reason itself? In short, 
1 Works, VIII, p. 32. 
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how is one to know that reason, the instrument of 
philosophical speculation, has the capacity to arrive at 
any valid conclusions? If the essential capacity of reason 
to arrive at any valid conclusions is in doubt at the 
outset, then how is it possible through the use of this 
same instrument to arrive at any valid conclusions? 
BrownsonTs answers to these questions has, for him in any 
event, for reaching consequences if one is to escape 
Skepticism. Since, rather obviously, if the essential 
trustworthiness of reason is in question at the outset, 
what have we but reason to verify reason? 
Turn which way we will, by 
natural reason alone there is · 
no escape, as she herself ~sserts; 
because it is demonstrably evident 
that we have nothing but reason 
with which to verify reason, and in 
every effort to verifl it we must 
begin by assuming it. 
If reason cannot verify reason, what can possibly 
verify reason? Faith! This is to say, Brownson accepts 
·the essential capacity of reason to attain truth on the 
basis of the teachings of the church. In a last analysis, 
Brownson's fundamental conviction may be best summarized 
in his declaration: 
In the donum fidei, which is a 
supernaturally infused power or 
virtue, we have, as it were, a 
1 Works, V, pp. 508-509. 
-supernatural reason, the antecedent 
from which it may be concluded, and 
its primitive act of faith legitimated. 
We receive the church on the authority 
of the donum, the supernatural gift, 
and therefore on an authority above 
and more ultimate than reason. The 
authority of the church, by virtue 
of this supernatural principle of 
assent,. is really above and more Ulti-
mate than reason, and not, as those 
who are outside of the church commonly 
imagine, merely the authority of reason 
in a disguised form. This authority is, 
then, really authority for reason, and 
whatever it proposes is an antecedent 
from which reason may logically con-
clude, without any danger of concluding 
idem per idem. Novy, the church teaches 
us that man was made after the image 
and similitude of his Maker, and that 
this image and similitude are in his 
rational nature, In his rational 
nature, man participates of the divine 
nature, and in that sense in which the · 
essence of the divinity is to know, 
and to know without other medium than 
itself. Hence, it would be a contra-
diction in terms to suppose reason 
could not make the affirmation in 
question.l . 
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Although Brownson may not have always explicitly adverted 
to the fact, one ·suspects that it was the foregoing con-
viction, accepted on faith, that man is made to the 
image and likeness of God and that God knows without any 
intervening medium that furnished to Brownsonts hand the 
fundamental reasons for his conviction of the extramental 
reality of the objects given in thought~ This would seem 
1 Works, V, p. 509. 
to be true to the extent that, if the mind is in direct 
and immediate contact with objects, then, there is no 
necessity to inquire whether things exist, or, exist 
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as we perceive them; since, on such a view the mind is 
not limited to an awareness of subjective representations, 
which may or may not be true and accurate representations. 
If the mind is in direct and immediate contact not 
with the mental representation, likeness, image, or 
whatever it may be labeled, but as in Brownson 1 s view, with 
the real object itself, the problem of accounting for 
error naturally arises. It is evident that Brownson 
recognizes this problem, since he states: 
1 
In concluding the reality of the 
object from the fact that we think 
it, we are far from pretending that 
thought cannot err; but the error 
is not in regard to what we really 
think, but in regard to that which 
we do not think, but infer from our 
thoughto We think only what is 
intelligible, and What is intelli-
gible is real, and therefore true, 
for falsehood, being unreal, is 
unintelligible, and therefore 
cannot be.thought. But in converting 
our thought into a proposition, we 
may include in the proposition not 
only what we thought, but what we 
did not think. Hence the fact of 
error, which is always the fact not 
of knowledge, but of ignoranceol 
Works, II, p. 301. 
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To state that we include in the proposition, "not only 
what we thought, but what we did not think," seems at 
first glance contradictory. However, considered in the 
light of Brownson's statement; in the ~ame context, 
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that error is not in what we think but rather in what we 
"infer from our thought", and this is not to be understood 
as meaning that inference is not thinking, for while one 
can think without inferring one can hardly infer without 
thinking; his position takes on more intelligibility. It 
would seem, that what Brownson is attempting to indicate 
herein is something analogous to a misinterpretation of 
the immediate data of conscious awareness. ·If one grants 
that consciousness, as such, does not judge but merely 
presents data to the conscious subject and that it is the 
mind which forms an interpretative judgment on the data so 
presented, then Brownsonts account of error even if un-
acceptable is nonetheless meaningful. Taken in this 
context, what Brownson would seem to be attempting to 
indicate is something analogous to a misinterpretation of 
the true significance of the conscious data itself. For 
example, consider the case of an individual who is conscious 
of chest pains, pains in the left arm, fainting spells, 
and the like, and who' in consequence betakes himself to 
a heart specialist on the assumption that he has a heart 
condition. Let us now assume that after due examination 
the physician finds no indication of an abnormal heart 
condition. Now in this case the error is not in what 
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the subject is directly conscious of, namely, the symptoms 
described, but rather in the intellectual judgment whereby 
he attempts to assign the cause of the conscious data so 
presented. The foregoing should not·be interpreted as 
meaning that the conscious subject is not conscious of 
his judgment that: "I have heart trouble," but rather that 
this same judgment of which he is undoubtedly conscious, 
is not in itself a bare intellectual conceptualization of 
what is given in direct conscious. It is rather an 
intellectual interpretation and hence is liable to error. 
It would seem evident that individuals frequently 
misinterpret the data of conscious awareness, in particular, 
when they attempt to assign such factors as the cause or 
the precise nature of the conscious fact. Again, consider 
the findings of such sciences as Psychology and Sociology, 
which have established the influences of such factors as 
prejudice, emotion, passion, not only on the overt 
behavior of individuals but even on their fundamental 
outlook on, and interpretation of, reality. That this view 
of error, as misinterpretation, is Brownson's meaning would 
seem to find confirmation, at least by inference, from 
his statement: 
Place the mind and truth face to 
face, with nothing interposed 
between them, and the truth evi-
dences itself to the mind, and 
the mind accepts it, with out 
seeking or needing any further 
reasono The assent termed knowledge 
follows immediately from the joint 
forces of the intelligible object 
and the intelligent subjectol 
Hence, in Brownson's view, ntruth needs no voucher, and 
when immediately presented to the mind, evidences or 
affirms itself.n2 To ask how one knows that the mind and 
its object are face to face, or to ask how one knows that 




To know something, and to know 
it to be true, is one and the same 
thing; and this is what is meant 
when we say truth is the object 
of the intellecto Hence, no 
logical process is even needed to 
prove to the mind that the object 
it immediately apprehends is 
truth, or is true. Tliat it is 
true or truth is included in the 
fact that the mind apprehends it 
as its object, or knows it. To 
suppose the contrary, to suppose 
that a logical process is needed 
to demonstrate that the object 
in immediate relation to the mind 
is true, would be absurd; for it 
would demand an infinite series 
of logical processes to every 
single act of knowledge or mental 
assent.3 
v, P• 135. 
v, p. 135e 
v, p. 136o 
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Such being the case, we are now in a position to 
inquire as to what, in Brow.nsonts view, could possibly 
be the source of erroneous judgments. The source must 
be the will. 
The will may be perverse, and 
withdraw the intellect from the 
contemplation of truth; prejudice 
or passion may darken the under-
standing, so that it does not for 
the moment see or recognize the 
object; but, whenever the truth is 
immediately present, and reason 
looks it full ih the face, it knows 
that it is truth. To deny this 
would be to deny to the soul the 
faculty of intelligence, the 
faculty of knowing at all. To 
know a thing is to know that it 
is true, for nothing but truth is 
or can be an object of knowledge. 
To say that you know a thing, and 
yet do not know whether it is true 
or not, is only saying that you do 
not know the thing at all. No man 
does or can know falsehood, for 
falsehood is nothing, is a nullity, 
a mere negation, and therefore no 
intelligible object. Falsehood is 
intelligible only in the truth it 
denies, and is known only in knowing 
the truth. In so far as any proposi-
tion is false, it is unintelligible, 
and never known. In all errors we 
know only the element of truth which 
they contain; and the part of error 
is simply the part of ignorance1 the part in which nothing is known. 
1 Works, V, pp. 135-136. 
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It is of interest to note the Platonic outlook 
manifest by Brownson herein in stating that "error is 
simply the part of ignoranceo" What Brownson would seem 
to be pointing to is the fact that, strictly speaking, 
to know a thing is to apprehend a thing as it is. To 
apprehend a thing other than as it is, is to misapprehend 
it, i.e., not to know it to be ignorant of it. However, 
what is perhaps of more significance, in the light of 
Brownson's overall criticism of Descartest position, is 
the general similarity of Brownson's position to that of 
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Descartes relative to the source of error. For, Brownson 
has stated above that, "The will may be perverse, and with-
draw the intellect from the contemplation of truth." 
Now in Descartes the source of error is the freedom of 
will, to the extent that it is in virtue of this freedom 
that it has the power to assert that which we do not under-
stand. As Descartes states relative to erroneous judgments: 
They arise from this cause alone, 
that I do not restrain the will, 
which is of much wider range than 
the understanding, within the same 
limits, but extend it even to things 
I do not understand, and as the will 
is of itself indifferent to such, 
it readily falls into error and sin 
by choosing the false in room of 1 
the true, and evil instead of good. 
1 Ren~ Descartes, e Meditation and Selections From the 
XTinciples of Rene Descartes, trans. John Veitch La Salle, 
Ill.: Open Court Publishing Company, 1948), p. 69. 
Despite this general similarity of the respective 
views of Brownson and Descartes relative to the will, as 
the source of error, there would seem to be, likewise, 
in the light of the preceding quotations, a marked 
dissimilarity in their respective positions at this 
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level. This dissimilarity lies in the fact that Descartes 
makes the erroneous judgment an assent of the free will, 
whereas, although Brownson explains error in terms of 
perversity of will by way of the influence it exerts on 
the intellect, nonetheless, he does not hold that the 
erroneous judgment is an assent of the will but rather of 
the intellect. Briefly, while Brownson's account of the 
origin of error is voluntaristic, he does not, as does 
Descartes, maintain that the erroneous judgment is itself 
an act of the will. 
In any event, if, Brownson's conviction both of the 
validity of reason and of the reality o~ the objects of 
perception are ultimately grounded on faith, how can 
they possibly be said to be philosophical conclusions? 
Brownson's answer can, it would seem, be found in a 
context wherein Brownson is attempting to indicate that 
when all is said and done, not only faith but natural 
knowledge as well is ultimately grounded on authority, to 
the extent, that the denial of all authority is the denial 
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of all knowledge whatsoever. Moreover, in this same 
context one discovers an excellent summation of Brownsonts 
views, previously indicated, that principles must be given 
and not acquired, and likewise of his basic intuitionistid 
·position together with at least a veiled suggestion of his 
faith in the common convictions of mankind. Brownson 
declares: 
That all knowledge, whether discursive 
or intuitive, is assent on authority, 
is as certain as any thing can be 
to natural reason. Demonstration, 
as the word itself indicates, merely 
shows the mind the conclusion in its 
relation to some principle or principles 
which the mind holds to be indubitable. 
It is the preamble to the assent yield-
ed, but in no conceivable case its 
motive; and hence it is, that we not 
unfrequently find persons, not desti-
tute of intellectual ability, who 
resist the force of the clearest 
demonstration. Two things respectively 
equal to a third are equal to one 
another. The demonstration of this 
consists in the discursive process 
which enables the mind to perceive 
that the equality predicated in the 
one case is the equality predicated 
in the other. The motive of the 
assent yielded to the conclusion is 
the principle that the same is the 
same, things identical are identical, 
what metaphysicians call the principle 
of contradiction or of non-contradiction. 
In every demonstration, the process is 
the same. The demonstration does not 
demonstrate its principle, but reduces 
the demonstrable matter to the principle 
or principles applicable in the case, 
and the mind assents solely on the 
h •t f th . . 1 1 aut or1 y o e pr1nc1p es. 
Moreover: 
1 
In intuition, whether internal 
or external, whether of principles 
or of material objects, it is the 
same. The same is the same; the 
same thing cannot both be and not 
be at the same time; whatever 
begins to exist must have a cause; 
no contingent being can exist 
without a sufficient reason, etc.; 
are principles, however variously 
they may be expressed, which every 
reasonable being admits and must 
admit; but which cannot be proved, 
since every process of proof demands 
them as its postulates. We may be 
told that they are intuitively be-
held but this only means that they 
are beheld as constituent principles 
of reason, or simply as that which 
reason declares immediately to be 
necessary truth. The intuition 
does not seize them in se, but 
simply in reason, and the assent 
to them has and can have no motive 
but reason herself. Suppose the 
authority of reason, their validity 
is supposed; deny the authority of 
reason, and their validity is denied. 
The assent, then, to what are called 
first principles is solely ~ssent 
on authority. In external intuition, 
the assent is also on authority. We 
behold a tree, a house, the sun; at 
least, so we say, but question the 
authority of our sense; how, then, 
could we say so? The assent we give 
to the proposition, we see a house, 
a tree, a man, the sun, or that in 
either of them we see a real object, 
rests for its motive on the authority 
Works, V, pp. 493-494· 
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of our perceptive power, and therefore 
is assent on authority. The whole of 
human knowledge, turn the matter as 
we will, resolves itself, in the last 
analysis, into assent on the authority 
of our faculties, that is to say,· 
belief in our faculties; in science, 
belief in reason, in perception, in 
the perceptive power. No metaphysical 
analysis of either the objects appre-
hended, or of the faculties appre-
hending, can get behind this, as is 
easily proved; because, in attempting 
to verify the authority of our facul-
ties, we must assume them, and the 
proof of them is necessarily the proof 
of the same by the same.l 
There would appear to be something of a shift in the 
meaning of the term authority in the previous statement. 
On the one hand, Brownson is using the term authority to 
indicate the assent to certain principles on the basis 
of their being self-evident intuitions; on the other hand, 
he is using the term authority to indicate the assent which 
the mind makes, on the basis of the testimony of the sensest 
to the existence of material objects where existence is not 
self-evident. It is to be regretted that Brownson did not 
use different terminology to indicate the mental assent 
given on the basis of these two different kinds of evidence. 
However, despite this lack of terminological exactness 
Brownson's fundamental conviction that to verify the 
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testimony of our faculties we must assume their trustworthiness 
1 Works, V, p. 494. 
in t~e very attempt to verify their testimony, would in 
the main, seem sound enough as far as it goes. 
In concl~sion it might be well to indicate that we 
have restricted the matter of this chapter, and this with 
considerable difficulty, to those fundamental consider-
ations which would seem to be specifically relevant to 
our explication of Brownson's realism. However, from a 
consideration of Brownson's writings on the relation of 
faith and reason, there are any number of issues either 
explicitly raised or at least implicitly suggested in 
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this chapter, which could well, form an adequate basis as 
subject matter for further dissertations. We have in mind 
such problems as, a comparison of Brownson's views of faith 
and reason with that of various other philosophers, as for 
example, with St. Thomas; the philosophical views of 
Brownson which influenced his acceptance of Catholicism; 
an anlaysis of the changes, whether major or minor, which 
might be detected in his philosophical outlook in the years 
following his acceptance of Catholicism; and possibly 
others. 
SUMMARY 
While expressing admiration for St. Thomas and the 
scholastics of the middle ages, still, Brownson would 
have no master in philosophy save reason itself. He 
maintains that, in philosophy, St. Thomas is wedded to 
Aristotle, and consequently our judgment of him as a 
philosopher must be our judgment of his pagan master. 
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With the passage of years, one can detect, on 
Brownson's part, an ever increasing dissatisfaction with 
the ability of philosophy to solve even, the so called, 
natural mysteries of existence. This dissatisfaction was 
due, in no small measure, to his own inability to arrive 
at any adequate solution of many of the internal problems 
within his own system. Again, this dissatisfaction was 
due to Brownsonts conviction that the great bulk of 
modern philosophy logically, if not psychologically, 
,Pulminates in Skepticism. 
Although distinguishing between philosophy and 
theology, Brownson is nonetheless convinced that the 
philosopher should avail himself of any light, which is 
available to him, from whatever. source it arises. 
Brownson castigates Descartes' theory, to the extent, that 
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Descartes prescinds from revelation and attempts to 
develop his philosophy from a purely rationalistic basis. 
Such a procedure is, for Brownson, virtually worthless 
as incapable of furnishing any adequate solution to the 
perennial problems of philosophy. This is not to imply 
that Brownson regards reason as essentially invalid, but 
rather, simply, that reason is limited. Moreover, reason 
is unable to verify itself without at least a tacit 
assumption of its validity in the very process of its 
verification. Hence, reason must look elsewhere for its 
verification, namely, to revelation, wherein we learn that 
man is made in the image of the Divine nature, in the 
sense in which it is of the Divine nature to know and to 
know without any intervening medium. 
It is the foregoing conviction, accepted on faith, 
that man is made in the image and likeness of God, and 
that God knows without any intervening medium, that 
furnish to Brownson's hand the basic tenet of his theory 
that the human mind directiy perceives without any 
intervening medium~ If such is the case, how account for 
error? Brownson attempts to account for error in terms 
not of what we think, but rather of what we infer from 
our thoughts. This misinterpretation is due, in Brownson's 
thought, to some perversity of will withdrawing the 
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intellect from the contemplation of truth. 
Finally, Brownson attempts to indicate what he regards 
as the real relation of faith and reason. Faith is the 
fulfillment of reason to the extent that the soul has a 
natural aptitude for the supernatural. Moreover, faith 
finds its fulfillment in the beatific vision. It is via 
this method of approach that Brownson attempts to indicate 
the unity and correlation of human knowledge. Any dis-
crepancies between reason and revelation, are, in Brownson's 
view, but seeming discrepancies due to the limitations of 
human reason. It is due to these same limitations that 
the reason is unable to attain a comprehensive view of 
reality. If, it could obtain such a view all seeming 
contradictions and discrepancies would vanish in the light 
of this higher view. 
. ~ ;.. ·' 
CHAPTER VIII 
GRITIGAL ANALYSIS 
Although Brownsonts writings have been recognized 
to some extent, this recognition has come, for the most 
part, in such fields as controversy, apologetics, and 
literature. While comparatively little has been done 
relative to his philosophical theories, nonetheless, it 
seems difficult, if not impossible, to have a just 
appreciation of his writings in these other fields without 
at least a basic understanding of his philosophic positiono 
Even though recognizing that this is true, to come extent, 
of every author who has contributed in more than one field 
of endeavor, it is particularily evid~nt1in Brownson 1 s 
\ 
works, to the extent that Brownson seems unwilling, or 
perhaps more accurately speaking, unable, to isolate and 
compartmentalize these various subjectso In Brownson's 
view, such a piecemeal treatment of knowledge would tend 
to destroy the integrity of knowledge, unless, in some 
way unified by way of a fundamental. philosophic outlook. 
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Although in his collected works only a comparatively 
small portion is classified as strictly philosophical in 
nature, still, one would find it extremely difficult, even 
in a hasty perusal of his writings on other subjects, to 
skim even a page or two without finding Brownson recurring 
in one form or another to his fundamental philosophic 
position. This would lead one to suspect, rather strong-
ly, that Brownson 1 s primary interest was, in the last analysis, 
in philosophy and that perhaps to some degree, even if not 
always consciously, these other fields of endeavour were mere 
vehicles by which he was attempting to elaborate more con~ 
cretely his fundamental philosophical outlook. 
Brownson did have an advantage which most of his 
contemporaries lacked, namely, that he alternately spent 
roughly half of his life among two groups whose phi-
losophical outllok was considerably diverse. He came 
from a background where, generally speaking, modern phi-
losophy together with its supporters having broken from 
the authoritarianism of the past, was considered to have 
loosened the fetters of the mind and in consequence to 
have given reason a free and independent rein to follow 
wherever its dictates led, uncramped by the narrow con-
fines to.which it had been so long restricted. At the age 
of forty-one Brownson entered the Catholic Church, and 
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while familiar with the general trend of modern philosophy 
it is rather noteworthy, if accurate, and the evidence 
would seem to confirm this, that the "most remarkable 
feature of Brownson's conversion was that he came to the 
Church by means of philosophy and yet never read a single 
Catholic philosophical treatise.nl 
The term "Catholic philosophical treatise" seems 
somewhat peculiar, as equally might the terms Catholic 
mathematics or Catholic geography, and the like. What the 
author would seem to have in mind is that Brownson was 
unacquainted, prior to his conversion to Catholicism, 
with what might be described as the more or less standard 
manuals in Scholastic philosophy. Moreover, he seems not 
to have read St. Thomas' works themselves. Even as late 
as 1843, one year prior to his entering the Catholic Church, 
as one of his biographers declares, "Brownson's small 
acquaintance with Catholics and Catholic controversial 
literature had not encouraged him to inquire further into 
Catholic doctrine."2 
This fact is intelligible, only, if we bear in mind 
Brownson's convict-ion that the tendency of the bulk of 
modern philosophy, logically, if not psychologically, tends 
1 George N. Whittaker, "A Logical Yankee," Information, 
LXIII (January, 1949}, p. 35. 
2 Schlesinger, p. 172. 
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to culminate in Skepticism, For a mind which was never 
of a skeptical nature, this acceptance of a harbor of 
faith is not difficult to comprehend. Nonetheless, there 
were in this connection, two points which redound to 
Brownson's credit as a philosopher. First, even after a 
prolonged study of the medieval scholastics, and despite 
his evident and often stated respect and admiration for 
them, as philosopher·s, he never gave them an unreserved 
support and to the end of his life, he retained a c~itical 
attitude toward any philosophical doctrine of theirs which 
he did not honestly regard as philosophically justifiable. 
On the other hand, he a,ccepted and acknowledged whatever 
he regarded as tnne in the position of the moderns, even 
though, he deplored the whole trend which modern phi-
losophy had taken since the time of Descartes. Had 
Brownson been less scrupulous, as a philosopher, he might 
rather easily have fallen into one of the more or less 
generally accepted modes of Scholastic thought and like-
wise have cast aside, in their entirety, the respective 
doctrines of modern philosophy; but Brownson's love of 
truth was too intense for such a procedure. He was to 
take the truth, as he saw it, from whatever source it was 
furnished, and would submit his reason, at the level of 
philosophical truth, to no human authority. This refusal 
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to submit his reason to any human authority, was clearly 
the outgrowth of a conviction, previously mentioned, that 
reason is the same in kind in all men and no man or body 
of men has a monopoly on reason. 
While Brownson's theological position was in constant 
flux throughout the years prior to his acceptance of the 
Catholic Church, 1 the same cannot fairly be said of his 
philosophical position. This particular point is made 
quite emphatically by Wellek when he states that Brownson's 
fundamental position, 
which extends over a period of some 
thirty-five years of indefatigable 
writing seems to point to a greater 
coherence and consistency than is 
usually allowed by those who see 
only the shiftings and changes of 
his religious associations.2 · 
Anyone who has made a study of Brownson's philosophical 
essays, in terms of their chronological order, would find 
it extremely difficult to dispute Wellekts fundamental 
thesis. Whatever changes occured in Brownson's phi-
losophical position throughout the years, would seem, for 
the most part, to be changes only in a developmental sense, 
to the extent that he found himself more capable of 
1 Relative to the frequent changes in Brownson's theological 
associations consult any of the biographies of Brownson 
indicated in the bibliography. Likewise, consult The 
Convert to be found in the fifth volume of his WorKS7 
2 Wellek, p. 670. 
expounding and clarifying the theories which were 
contained, generally at least, in his earlier works; 
e.g., as far back as 1838-1842 we find him defending 
214 
such theories as the objectivity of the object of thought, 
the necessity of certain indemonstrable a priori elements 
in thought, the objectivity of these same pre-empirical 
elements of thought, the notion that principles must 
precede method, t~e relation of faith and reason for the 
believing christian, and others. 
The fact of consistency and the absence of change 
in one's philosophical outlook, is not necessarily an 
intellectual virtue. It can, at times, be even an 
intellectual vice, if it is grounded on such factors as 
stubbornness, pride, the inability or unwillingness either 
to consider or comprehend opposing viewpoints, and the like. 
The general consistency and lack of change in Brownson's 
philosophical.writings, cannot, it would seem, be justly 
ascribed to any such factor. The general character of the 
man together with his.relentless search for truth, would 
seem to militate against such an interpretation. Again, 
that Brownson was not averse to change, is clearly evident, 
in terms of the almost constant flux of his theological 
position. Moreover, his willingness to face issues on the 
basis of reason, at least as he saw it, and in consequence, 
I . 
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his tendency to decry any appeal to authority as a criterion 
of truth, except in those isolated cases wherein he was 
convinced that there existed a rational basis justifying 
.the ac.ceptance of this same authority, ·would seem, to be 
strong presumptive evidence in support of the thesis, 
that the consistency of Brownson's philosophical position 
was not motivated by any of -the factors mentioned. 
Brownson's strength as a philosopher was due mainly 
to his ability to perceive the basic issues which modern 
philosophy raises and to his attempt to solve them. 
Moreover, he manifests an unusual ability to penetrate 
to the heart of a given philosophical problem and does 
not allow himself to be diverted by secondary consider-
ations or problems which are not germaine to the issue, 
and might tend to cloud the central problem; for example, 
his ability to detect the fundamental weakness of what he 
labels the method of "exclusive psychology," to the extent 
that such a method does not permit any logical escape 
from the me to the not-me, that is, from the subjective 
to the objective. Again, he manifests an unusual ability 
to draw forth, with clarity and precision, the consequences 
which logically follow from a given philosophical position; 
for example, his repeated demonstrations of the fact that 
the philosophical views of such men as Descartes, Locke, 
Kant, and others, logically, if not psychologically, 
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· culminate in Skepticism, Egoism, Nihilism, and the like. 
For the most part, whenever Brownson's criticisms 
might be judged as unfair they would not seem to be 
consciously such, nor to flow from any lack of ability to 
draw from a system its fundamental logical consequences. 
Rather, such misinterpretations would seem to be of a 
relatively minor nature such as not to invalidate Brownson's 
basic criticisms. One has in mind Brownson's misinterpreta-
tion of Locke 1 s position, to the extent that Brownson 
maintained that, for Locke, the existence of God was an 
in:ference from the phenomena of nature. Now, this 
misinterpretation would hardly seem to invalidate Brownson's 
criticism of Locke 1 s contention that knowledge is representa-
tive to the extent that the mind in knowing is conversant 
only with its own ideas. 1 Again, from another standpoint, 
Brownson perhaps fails to appreciate fully the realistic 
tendency of .Aristotle's Epistemology. However, despi.t.e 
these deficiencies Brownsonts criticisms would seem, on 
the whole, to be fair criticisms when considered in the 
light of that specific area of a philosophical position 
against which his attack was directed. 
1 Consult in this regard the fourth book of Locke's 
Essay Concerning Human Understandingo 
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The reasons for such minor misinterpretations are not 
difficult to ascertain, if, one takes into consideration 
the fact that Brownson was not a professional philosopher, 
in the sense of having any formal training in the detailed 
analysis of the technical distinctions occurring within 
the various philosophical schools. Again, as the editor, 
and in many oases the sole contributor to his Review, he 
was forced to consider a variety of diverse subj eots and 
in consequence, to diver.t a good deal of the energy 
which might have been employed in a more detailed analysis 
of philosophical problems to other and at times more 
pressing problems of a practical nature. In the light 
of these considerations, one can only conjecture as to 
what success Brownson might have achieved, in the field 
of philosophy, had these conditions been other than they 
actually were. 
Brownson, does not seem to have posed any entirely 
original philosophical problem, nor to have proffered 
any completely original solutions to existing philosophical 
problems except such as were contained germinally at least, 
in other systems. Although eclectic, and admittedly so, 
he did manifest considerable ability to bind together in 
a synthetic unity doctrines previously held in isolation 
and to detect the relations between what he regarded as 
true in other systems. Here, we have in mind such factors 
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as Brownsonts acceptance of the Kantian thesis that there 
are certain a priori elements in the knowledge situation; 
although, in incorporating them into his own system he, 
unlike Kant, gives to them an objective status. Brownson 
further· identifies these same universal and necessary 
elements with God, to the extent that God alone is 
Necessary Being. From another point of view, Brownson 
accepts what he regards as true in the doctrine of 
Ontologism, namely, that the human mind has a direct 
apprehension of God. However, Brownson, unlike the 
Ontologists, does not go to the extreme of maintaining 
that the mind has a direct apprehension of God, as God. 
In Brownson's view, we see all things by God in so far as 
the lumen Dei 1 which he identifies with God, renders the 
intellect intelligent and objects intelligible. Hence, 
we do not see things in God but more accurately speaking 
Ex_ God. 
Two points in particular, would seem, to be of 
capital importance in Brownson's philosophical outlook. 
First, his insistence that principles are given and not 
acquired, and that in consequence, principles must logical-
' 
ly precede method. As already indicated, it is this 
failure to recognize principles as given, that has, in 
Brownson's view, vitiated many systems of modern philosophy. 
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Brownson's theory as to the manner in which these 
principles are given, or as to what concretely these 
principles are, is certainly open to debate, as is 
equally true of any other system which espouses a ~ogical 
intuitionism as will be indicated in a later criticism of 
logical intuitionism as such and of Brownson's specific 
type of logical intuitionism. 
However, on the assumption that Brownson was correct 
in his claim, following Hume, that no valid universals can 
be concluded from particulars, it is at best, difficult to 
. discern how any certain knowledge is possible under any 
other view. This would seem to be true, at least to the 
extent that if universal principles, which in Brownson's 
view are intuitively grounded, and upon which the process 
of demonstration ultimately rests, are themselves not 
certain and evident principles, then the philosophical 
conclusions arrived at by way of such a process can never 
attain the stature of philosophical certitudes. If the 
possibility of attaining certitude in the field of 
philosophy is denied, and if one were to maintain that 
the most attainable is a high degree of probability, then 
one is faced with another problem. Before considering this 
problem it might be well to indicate the sense in Which 
the term probable is being used. The term probable is 
here used to designate a mental assent to the truth of 
a proposition because the mass of evidence would seem to 
justify this assent. · However, this assent would differ 
from certitude as a mental state to the extent that the 
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assent is here a hesitating assent, due to the subject's 
awareness of the possibility that the contradictory might 
be true. Now, the problem becomes one of ascertaining the 
grounds on which one is justified in maintaining that what 
is highly probable is not, at the same time, and in the 
same respect, highly improbable. In short, under such a 
view does the term probable have any meaning at all, except, 
under at least the tacit assumption of the universal 
validity of the principle of contradiction? This is a 
principle which is itself incapable of any strict demon-
stration herein, namely, as being shown to be true by 
being resolved or reduced to any more evident truths or 
principles from which it may be inferred. That the fdre-
going is what Brownson has in mind in contending that 
principles must be given and not acquired, would seem to 
find further confirmation in another context, wherein, he 
inquires as to how, if there is no objective certainty, 
"can you .affirm fitness or congruity or probabili ty'?"l 
1 Works, XIV, p. 156. 
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A second consideration that would seem to be of 
.I 
significance in Brownson's thought is his oft-repeated 
position that there can be no more in the conclusion of 
a reasoning process than is contained in the premises. 
The significance of this is, rather obviously, not in 
what Brownson is saying, since, to our knowledge, there 
has been no logician who would seek to dispute this point. 
BrownsonTs contribution at this point, lies in his constant 
reiteration of this logical principle, a principle which 
while granted theoretical acceptance, is much too frequent-
ly overlooked in practice. Moreover, this same logical 
' principle furnishes to Brownson's hand one of the chief 
instruments, which he utilizes in his attack, on what he 
regards, as the philosophical errors of those whose philo-
sophical conclusions assert more than their premises allow. 
Brownson's criticisms of the position of those phi-
losophers whom he regards as asserting more in their 
conclusion than their premises logically allow is clear in 
any number of instances. Brownson attacks Descartes method, 
as already indicated, to the extent that he attempts to 
point out on innurrferable occasions that starting with the 
method of "exclusive psychology" D~scartes has no logical 
warrant for concluding the extra-mental existence of such 
entities as God or the material universe. The same basic 
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criticism is levelled against.Locke, since, Brownson 
contends that one is no better able logically to conclude 
the actual existence of extra-mental entities, from I feel 
than from I think. Further, as previously indicated, 
although in evident agreement with Kant relative to the 
existence of certain a priori element~ in the knowledge 
situation, Brownson contends that from the fact that these 
elements are independent of experience, one is not logical-
ly justified in holding that they are pure forms of the 
understanding with no ontological status. 
From an epistemological point of view, Brownsonts 
chief weakness would seem to be his failure to establish 
the objectivity of the objects of human thought. While 
he frequently refers to the objects of human thought in 
terms of the "not-me", "le non-moi", and while he states 
that subject, object and their relation are essential to 
thought, and that in consequence in the absence of any of 
these elements there is and can be no thought, he rather 
gratuitously assumes that the object of thought must, 
therefore, exist a parte rei. This is obviously not an 
attempt to establish the objectivity of thought, but 
rather an assumption that the object of thought and 
objective reality are identical. Granted that an object 
of thought is necessary if one is to think, it no more 
follows that the object of thought has an existence 
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a parte rei than to think a pixie establishes the 
objective existence of this same pixie. In fairness to 
Brownson, however, it may be questioned as to whether his 
belief in the objectivity of thought does not, as previous-
ly mentioned, rest upon his conviction that God alone can 
be His own object. Even if this is a correct inter-
pretation of Brownson's view, it is difficult to locate 
any specific philosophical proof of this matter. It may 
well be a conclusion drawn from Brownson 1 s theological 
position. If such is the case, he should have clearly 
labelled it theological and introduced it in his phi-
losophical writings under this precise formality. So 
introduced, his position would be more intelligible both 
in terms of his disdain for compartmentalized knowledge 
and his conviction that the solution of philosophical 
problems is not wholly adequate when treated out of the 
context of Christian revelation. 
Moreover, even granting that the object of thought 
has an existence a parte rei, Brownson seems to assume 
that the object exists in the mind as it exists in 
reality. This does not mean that in Brownson 1 s view the 
object exists in the mind as thing, but rather as thing 
known to the extent that what is directly known is the 
thing and not its representation. What Brownson refuses 
to consider at this point is the fact that, whatever is 
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perceived must be perceived according to the nature of 
the percipient subject, and accordingly things are not 
necessarily in the mind as they are in the extra-mental 
order. For, such a concession would, in Brownson's view, 
logically lead to Skepticism. Since on such a· view how 
know that things are as they are represented by the 
perceiving subject? This is to say that once an admission 
is made of even the bare possibility that things may not 
be accurately represented in the mind, then how ever know 
that things are really and objectively as the mind 
represents them to be. 
Brownson's conviction both of the objectivity of the 
object given in thought, and likewise, that things are in 
the mind as they are in reality, would seem, in a last 
analysis, to be at the basis of his criticism of what he 
refers to as the "mundus logicus" of Aristotle and the 
"exclusive psychologism" of the great bulk of modern 
philosophy. If Brownson"s criticism means anything, it 
would seem to indicate quite clearly, his conviction that 
the mind is in direct and immediate contact With objects, 
with only the lumen Dei intervenfng. Hence, the objec~ 
exists a parte rei and since directly perceived, is 
perceived as . it is. 
Here, Brownson would seem to be faced with the same 
fundamental problem which faces any realistic position, 
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namely, the problem of establishing that the mind is 
in direct and immediate contact with things, rather than 
with their representations, images, vicarious likeness, 
or whatever they may be d~signated. Unfortunately this 
is a problem which has never found an adequate solution, 
and which must, if accepted at all, be accepted on the 
basis of a fundamentally intuitionistic outlooko For even 
were one to grant that the mind had a direct contact with 
things, still this fact, if fact it is, seems incapable 
of demonstration without at least a tacit assumption of 
the very fact to be demonstrated. 
Moreover, the theory that the mind is in direct and 
immediate contact with things and not with their re-
presentations, raises a further problem, namely, the 
problem of accounting for error. As has been indicated 
in the preceding chapter, Brownson attempts to account for 
error in terms of a misinterpretation of thought, in the 
sense that error lies not in what we think but in what we 
infer from our thoughto Brownson has accounted for· their 
misinterpretation in terms of perversity of will, withdraw-
ing the intellect from the contemplation of truth by 
virtue of such factors as passion and prejudices. vVhile 
Brownson 1 s conviction that error is somehow rooted in the 
will is clear enough as far as it goes, it does not go 
far enough. It fails to point in a more specific and 
. ~ 
detailed manner to the precise causes of this perversity 
of will. Might not these same prejudices and passions, 
to which Brownson refers, be the effect of a deficiency 
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of perception rather than its cause? Is it not true that, 
generally speaking, such factors as prejudice tend to 
diminish with the increase in knowledge? In this context, 
might not prejudice be the effect of a lack of knowledge 
rather than its cause? If Brownson had attempted, in a 
more concrete manner, to answer the foregoing and similar 
questions, his solution offered to the problem of error 
might have been more adequate. As it stands, his solution 
to this problem, while generically clear, leaves much to 
be desired relative to further and more detailed ~pacifi­
cation. 
In the light of Brownson's intuitionistic outlook, it 
is not difficult to ascertain his reason for disavowing the 
general trend of modern philosophy from Descartes onward. 
Generally speaking, as Brownson sees it, the vast portion 
of modern philosophy tends logically toward Skepticism. 
While Brownson might be commended for his attempt to 
escape the subjectivistic conclusions to which he regards· 
modern philosophy to lead, it is, to say the least, highly 
questionable whether Brownson ever logically accomplished 
this escape. However, in justice to Brownson, it must 
be admitted that he did recognize that such an escape was 
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logically impossible, for, he explicitly declares that, 
"objective reality cannot be established in a logical 
way.n1 Again, in reference to the human race he declares: 
From the first day of its conscious 
existence, it has not ceased to be-
lieve itself in strict relation 
with a world out and independent 
of itself. God and nature have 
been and are realities to it, as 
much so as its own existence. 
Strange! The human race, the 
savage in his forest, the shepherd 
on his hillside, the rustic following 
his plough, - all believing what the 
metaphysicians have hitherto been 
unable to demonstrate, and what 
the more sober-minded among them 
contend cannot be demonstrated. 
This fact should have induced them 
to inquire, if, after all, they 
have not erred in assuming any 
demonstration to be necessary. 2 
The failure of much of modern philosophy to establish 
the objectivity of the object given in thought is due, 
according to Brownson, to its taking as its point of 
departure the ego and failing to recognize as previously 
indicated, that all 
three elements of thought being 
given simultaneously and syn-
thetically in one and the same 
fact, they all three rest on the 
same authority and are equally 
certain both subjectively and 
1 Works, II, p. 341. 
2 Works, I, pp. 63-64. 
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objectively., 1 
If the object of thought is not, in some manner, 
directly and intuitively given, then any valid demonstration 
of its actual existence a parte rei seems highly unlikely, 
if not impossible. This inability to demonstrate the 
actual existence a parte rei of the object of thought 
would seem to find confirmation in the failure of that 
area of modern philosophy which Brownson was combatting to 
accomplish this feato To this extent, the writer cannot 
but concur with Brownson 1 s view of the matter. This con-
currence should not be understood as a failure to re-
cognize other possible solutions that have been offered, 
or as blanket condemnation of the same, but simply a 
concurrence with Brownson 1 s claim as to the failure of 
that specific type of epistemological idealis~ against 
which Brownson is directing his criticism. If Brownson's 
view is correct there must be a point of departure 
radically different from the point of departure of the 
"exclusive psychologists", if one is logically to escape 
Skepticism. While one may legitimately dissent from many 
specific points in the detailed working out of Brownson's 
intuitionistic views~ nonetheless, it seems extremely 
1 . Works, II, p. 43. 
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difficult to reject his basic intuitionistic outlook, if 
Skepticism is to be avoided. 'Vhile Skepticism is here 
understood as the contention that the mind is unable to 
·attain formal certitude of the truth of any proposition 
whatsoever, and while some other definition of Skepticism 
might be less rigid, still in the light of the foregoing 
definition of the term, BrownsonTs position would seem to 
follow logically enough. 
Moreover, while recognizing that the term demonstration 
may permit of somewhat varying meanings, nonetheless, taking 
the term demonstration in the sense in which Brownson ap-
parently understands it, and in which it has been defined 
in an earlier context in this chapter, BrownsonTs con-
clusion seems inescapable. For, if everything requires 
demonstration, then nothing is demonstrable. Hence, it 
would seem, that any philosophical system which takes its 
point of departure in the ·conviction that nothing is to 
be accepted as philosophically valid which cannot be 
demonstrated, must end where it begins, if not psycho-
logically, yet logically. 
1Vhile admittedly Brownson does not, nor perhaps could 
not demonstrate the reality of the object given in thought, 
it may be questioned as to whether this was a defect in 
his system to any greater extent than it could be said to 
be a defect, if defect it is, in the realistic outlook as 
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such; or, equally a defect in the outlook of that type of 
epistemological idealism, which denies the ability of the 
mind to transcend itself, and in consequence, limits the 
mind to a direct and immediate awareness only of its own 
ideas, conscious impressions, subjective states, or whatever 
they may be designated. Is not this latter position 
equally indemonstrable? One has in mind a position such 
as that taken by John Locke, namely, that the mind is 
conversant only with its own ideas. While to know a thing 
is to be aware of it, and in this sense the object known 
must, as known, exist in the knower, the true state of 
the question, would seem to be, whether the mind is direct-
ly and immediately conscious of the subjective affection as 
such, or, whether the mind directly grasps things or objects 
via the men tal state without explicitly adverting, .to the 
mental state as such. In short, is the mental state the 
object of knowledge or merely the vehicle of knowledge; 
the medium quod or the medium quo'? 
In any event, it would seem that Brownsonts tendency 
to espouse a realistic position was due, from one aspect 
at least, to his conviction that by whole and large the 
so called spontaneous convictions of mankind were true. 
If our interpretation is correct, his tendency was then to 
assume that these spontaneous convictions were valid, 
unless, they could be positively disproved. In brief, as 
spontaneous convictions they had a certain amount of 
presumptive evidence in their favor. Hence, the burden 
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of proof is not o'n those who assent to these convictions, 
but rather on those who attempt to deny them. The disproof 
of these spontaneous convictions has not, in Browns on's 
view, been accomplished by modern· philosophy, and what 
might seem to be a disproof is valid, only, if we take the 
point of departure of the vast bUlk of modern philosophy, 
which point of departure Brownson is unwilling to admit as 
a legitimate starting point. 
Prescinding from the above consideration, one finds 
considerable difficulty in attempting to give a clear 
interpretation of Brownsonts position at certain points. 
This difficulty is due in no small measure to Brownson's 
careless use of terms. This terminological inexactness is 
particularly evident in Brownson's attempt to elaborate 
his conviction that the ideal object is explicitly known 
as God only as a result of reasoning and reflection, 
whereby the ideal is disengaged from the empirical. 1 Are 
reflection and reasoning identical? This would seem to be 
the case, yet at another point .he states in reference to 
the intelligible, that the nactive intellect abstracts, 
1 Works, II, p. 438. 
divides, disengages or separates- not infers- them.nl 
While this may be considered a minor defect, it is 
nonetheless a defect which has grave consequences for 
Brownson's theory of ideal intuition, as would seem 
apparent from the fact that he never attempts in any 
concrete manner, to specify the precise way in·which the 
ideal is disengaged from the empirical. This same lack 
of precision in his terminology likewise vitiates any 
attempt to indicate, at least in any precise manner, how 
the intellect becomes aware of the identity of the ideal 
and God. This same lack of terminological exactness, as 
has been indicated in the body of this text, likewise 
renders Brownsonts general metaphysical position quite 
vague at times. For at times, Brovmson 1 s terminology 
rather easily lends itself to a pantheistic interpreta-
tion, or possibly to an interpretation in terms of some 
form of Absolute Idealism, or again to an interpretation 
in terms of the ontologistic view of Malebranche, and 
possibly others. However, this would seem to be a more 
or less common difficulty for philosophers, in attempt-
ing to indicate their own positions in contradistinction 
to o~her positions which are considerably similar. 
1 Works, II, p. 54. 
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Finally, turning attention to Brownson 1 s convictions 
as to the relation of faith and reason many problems 
suggest themselves. However, if one were to grant 
Brownson his initial premise as to the infallibility of 
the Catholic Church in matters of faith, a premise to 
which he gave unreserved assent on entering the Catholic 
communion, then the conclusions which he drew on the 
basis of this assent, would seem in substance at any 
event to be logical enough. This would seem to be true 
to the extent that, if one aQcepts revelation as interpret-
ed by the Catholic Church to be the word of God, who can 
neither deceive nor be deceived, then any conflict between 
faith and reason must be but a seeming or apparent con-
flict. This is a conflict which arises, in one form or 
another, from the inability of human reason to attain a 
comprehensive view of reality. If only the human reason 
was capable of attaining this comprehensive view, all 
these seeming discrepancies or contradictions between 
faith and reason would find their perfect reconciliation 
in the light of this same comprehensive viewq 
Brownsonts tendency to give preference to faith over 
reason should not be interpreted as indicating that 
Brownsonts feeling of the impotency of reason, independent 
of revelation, to attain to anything like a comprehensive 
~~~-------···- ---- ···----------···--··---- ---··-·--------·--·········· .. -··-·····- ----· ------
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and integrated view of reality, arose solely from his 
acceptance of the Catholic faith. Rather, as previously 
·indicated, this conviction of the impotency of reason 
arose, in great part, from Brownson's awareness of his 
own inability, on the basis of a purely rationalistic 
approach, to solve many of the internal problems within 
his own system. Further, it arose from Brownson's con-
viction, based on a study of the history of philosophy, 
that on the basis of a purely rationalistic approach, 
philosophers had been unable to agree on the solution of 
practically any philosophical problem. Again, it arose 
from Brownson's conviction that the great bulk of modern 
philosophy, logically, if not psychologically, culminates 
in Skepticism. 
Perhaps Brownson should, in the face of this mass 
of evidence, have recognized the impotency of human reason, 
and stopped short at this point. However, Brownson's 
mind was not of a skeptical nature, In consequence, he 
felt the necessity of attempting to verify reason, the 
instrument of philosophical reflection. Now, in 
Brownson's view, reason is unable to validate itself, 
since its validity must be tacitly assumed in the process 
of its own validation. Hence, if reason is to be vali-
dated, this validation must come from some extrinsic 
source. As indicated in the preceding chapter, Brownson 
finds reason validated in the teachings of the Catholic 
Ohurch. 
It might be suggested that Brownson was, here, 
involved in a vicious circle, to the extent that he 
utilized reason and in one form or another assumed its 
validity in assuring himself of the reasonableness of 
tue claims of the Catholic Church. This would be a fair 
criticism if Brownson had contended that his reason for 
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submitting to the authority of the Catholic Church was, 
in a last analysis, grounded on the reasonableness of her 
claims. However, Brownson's contention has been that the 
most logic or reason can accomplish in this regard is to 
remove some of the obstacles to the acceptance of the 
Catholic Church, but logic or reason is not the cause of 
this acceptance. Rather, quite clearly, for Brownson, 
faith is a donum, a gift. Why must it be a gift? It must 
be such in Brownson's view be~ause what is known is the 
superintelligible, which is ffbeyond the reach of our 
scientific faculties.n1 In consequence, there is required 
nthe supernatural elevation of the subject as well as the 
supernatural revelation of the object.n2 
1 Works, III, p. 578. 
2 Works, V, p. 449. 
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If Brownson's original premise as to the infallibility 
of the Catholic Church be not granted, then many problems 
arise. For example, how know with certainty which of the 
competing and often conflicting faiths is the true faith? 
How even know with certainty that there is but one true 
faith? These are at least some of the fundamental questions 
which suggest themselves to this writer. As interesting or 
as desirable as an answer to these questions might be, 
these questions must be left to others, since a lengthy 
elaboration of these questions and their answers is, hardly, 
,within the limited scope of this dissertation. These 
questions and the answers which might be forthcoming, could, 
in this writers view, fUrnish adequate material for a further 
dissertation, particularly, in some theological setting. 
In conclusion, it is of interest to note how keenly 
aware is Brownson himself of the many pitfalls to be 
avoided in attempting to make a critical evaluation. In 
this regard, he declares: 
It must be borne in mind that 
no man ever in writing, or even 
in speaking, expresses or can 
express his whole thought. Few 
men have the power of leaving their 
own standpoint and placing them-
selves in that of another. No man 
sees what lies out of the plane of 
his vision, or that which is 
invisible from his point of view. 
Not many men have learned that 
we never understand a doctrine 
Again: 
1 
till we have seen it in a light, 
or under an aspect, in which it 
is true. You must see and under-
stand a man's truth, before you 
can see and comprehend his error. 
Overlooking all consideration of 
this sort, controversialists do 
not read, at least 4o not note, 
all that the man that they are 
controverting writes, and usually 
take what is intelligible to them 
from their point of view, either 
as confirming or as impugning 
thefur own convictions. What else 
is said or written counts for 
nothing. Having fixed in their 
minds what must be the meaning and 
purpose of an author; they treat 
all he says which is not conformable 
thereto, either as a self-contradiction 
or as so much mere verbiage. All men, 
except certain rare individuals to 
whom God gives the precious gift of 
real philosophical genius, are more 
or less guilty of the unfairness 
toward those who differ from them, 
and that, too, even without intending 
or suspecting it.l 
We are generally allowed to write 
tolerably clear, plain, and forcible 
English, and yet we have rarely found 
our full and exact meaning reproduced 
by either a friendly or an unfriendly 
critic. we have been applauded for 
meanings we never dreamed of and 
cried down for views we have never 
entertained, and which we hold in 
horror; and that, too, by men .whose 
native and acquired ability we respectJ 
and whose right feeling and honesty 
Works, III, p. 566. 
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of purpose we cannot doubt. The 
fact is, people cannot know 
strangers by a merely nominal 
introduction, and do not always 
recognize even their friends in 
an unusual or an unfamiliar dress. 
From all this we should learn1a lesson of mutual forbearance. 
l Works, III, p. 568. 
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Abstract 
The primary purpose of this dissertation is to 
explicate and assess the realistic elements in the 
philosophical position of Orestes A. Brownson. From 
a critical viewpoint, Brownson disavows one of the main 
trends of modern philosophy from Descartes onward. His 
fundamental conviction is that there are three chief 
factors which have vitiated the great bulk of modern 
philosophy: first, the tendency to treat the question 
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of method before that of principles; second, relative to 
method itself, the tendency to employ what Brownson labels 
the method of "exclusive psychology;" third, the consequent 
tendency of such a method toward an epistemological 
idealism, according to which the idea or mental re-
presentation is the direct and immediate object of 
conscious awareness. 
vfuile Brownson disavows the general trend of modern 
philosophy, his attack, more specifically, is directed 
against Descartes, regarded as the major representative of 
the method of "exclusive psychologytt, and against Locke 
taken as representative of the sensistic approach in 
philosophy. Finally, he directs his attack upon the 
German philosophers in general, and Kant in particular, 
although he does accept in substance at least, the Kantian 
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thesis that there are certain pre-empirical elements in 
the knowledge situation. However, Brownson's claim is 
that though pre-empirical they none the less have an 
objective status. In the last analysis, Brownson's 
rejection of the positions of the aforementioned phi-
losophers is due to his conviction that their respective 
positions logically, if not psychologically, culminate in 
skepticism. 
Brownson further castigates the respective 
epistemological tenets of both Aristotle and St. Thomas 
in certain areas, since in his tenets, both are guilty, 
at times, of considering knowledge as representative. 
This is an epistemological position which is, in Brownson's 
view, ultimately incapable of establishing the existence 
of any sort of reality independent of the conscious ego. 
Brownsonts epistemic position is itself an 
intuitionism, which he ultimately grounds on three 
fundamental convictions. First, in the knowledge situation 
the mind has some sort of intuition of the universal and 
necessary and that this universal and necessary is identical 
with God. However, this identity is discovered only as a 
result of reasoning or reflection. Second, the primary 
human intuition is of the judgment that "Being creates 
existences". This judgment, according to Brownson, 
represents not only the actual ontological relation of 
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things but is likewise logically, though not psychologically, 
prior to all other human judgments. Third, in the knowledge 
situation the mind is in direct contact with its object 
and not with its representation or vicarious image, with 
only the "lumen Dei" serving the function of the light 
which renders the intellect actually intelligent and the 
object actually intelligible. 
Of importance in an integrated consideration of 
Brownson's realistic outlook is his conception of the 
relation of faith and reason. Although denying the 
legitimacy of authority in philosophical matters, he 
nonetheless refuses to isolate and c:ompartmentalize 
philosophy. While rejecting the title "Christian 
Philosophy", Brownson is nevertheless convinced that no 
sound philosophy can be constructed apart from the Christian 
revelation, and that in consequence philosophy is not worthy 
of confidence when studied alone as a separate and independent 
science. 
Brownson's intuitionistic views manifest certain 
fundamental weaknesses. For example, the attempt to account 
for error in terms of what we "infer from onr thought" 
leaves much to be desired both in clarity and in adequate 
specification. Further, although opposed to Pantheism and 
Ontologism, Brownson is at times so close to one or the 
other of these that it is highly questionable whether he 
ever logically escaped these positions. 
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